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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a theoretical and empirical study of the impact of
venture capital funding on the growth of small high technology
manufacturing firms located in the South East of England and
Scotland.
In order to set the research in context, information is provided
on the history of investment finance, public sector involvement in
high technology companies and venture funding, and the emergence
and structure of the United Kingdom venture capital industry vis-
a-vis the United States example. This literature review, along
with a consideration of the issues which prompted the research,
lead to the formulation of seven principal hypotheses.
These hypotheses are tested by means of data generated from two
surveys, a postal questionnaire and personal interviews, both
involving manufacturing firms in the high technology study
industry. This information is supplemented by qualitative
interviews with a small number of venture capital organisations.
The principal areas of investigation include: the use of external
finance, in general terms, by survey firms; the distribution and
impact of venture capital finance within the study industry; and
the unique role played by venture capital organisations in
relation to other financial services. Explanations are also
offered for the pattern of venture capital distribution according
to the business plan content, and the attitude of the main founder
towards ownership and control of the company.
Finally, the thesis offers some conclusions and recommendations
for theory, practice and policy based on the comparison of
theoretical and empirical issues. Principally, these require a
re-structuring of the United Kingdom venture capital industry.
- xv -
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Venture capital funding traditionally involves the provision of long-
term equity, rather than loan capital, to high risk ventures which are
too small to be considered for a public listing. The venture
capitalist will provide further input by participating in the
management of the venture, ensuring that the company has every
opportunity to grow and, thus, adding value to the investment. If
everything goes to plan, the investee company will grow to the point
where it becomes eligible for a public listing. The investor then
receives a substantial return on the capital invested when all, or
part, of his shareholding is sold on the financial market.
Or, put in more general terms:
"... 'venture capital' investment is used to describe
a way in which investors support entrepreneurial
talent with finance and business skills to exploit
market opportunities, and thus to obtain long-term
capital gains," (Shilson, 1984, p207).
Venture capital funding is entirely different from established
institutional sources of finance. However, the venture capital
industry is more remarkable for the role it has played in the
-1-
proliferation of new businesses, financing a disproportionate share of
rapidly growing companies, especially in high technology sectors.
These new and growing businesses then contribute to the economic
prosperity of a nation by providing, inter q ua, new jobs, tax
revenues and export sales. Evidence on the importance of the venture
capital industry to technology funding and economic growth first
emerged in the United States where Pratt (1982) observed that:
"The imagination, boldness, and energy of
entrepreneurs and small business owners, combined
with the persistence and involvement of experienced
venture capital investors, has often led to the
creation of new industries and new technologies,
which in turn have increased the productivity of the
nation's economic process and of its workers," (pXV).
The principal objective of this thesis is to investigate the United
Kingdom venture capital industry and its impact on the formation and
growth of small high technology manufacturing firms. This work
originated from three major observations. First, venture capital
funding in the United Kingdom did not appear to be of a type or extent
similar to the venture capital services available in the United
States. Second, there was an indication that venture capital
organisations in the United Kingdom were not assisting small high
technology manufacturing firms to any significant degree. Third,
venture capital providers and investments appeared to be concentrated
in the South East of England to the possible detriment of other
regions in the United Kingdom. This study, therefore, aims to
establish whether venture capital providers in the United Kingdom are
venture capitalists in a true sense, based on the definition given
above, and to uncover any geographical variations in the extent of the
provision made by such organisations.
-2-
This thesis comprises three sections. The first section considers
general theoretical issues in relation to the topic of research:
Chapters 2 and 3 detail and comment on the public and private sector
sources of investment finance available to small firms, both
historically and presently; and Chapter 4 considers the development of
the United Kingdom venture capital industry in relation to the venture
capital example of the United States. Chapter 5 explains and
justifies the survey design and methodology used to collect the
empirical data of this research. Chapters 6 through to 10 comprise
the empirical section which presents the results of the data analysis.
In particular, Chapter 6 investigates the sources of investment
finance, other than venture capital, utilised by survey companies.
Chapter 7 evaluates the general distribution and impact of venture
capital finance on the study industry. Chapters 8, 9 and 10 then
investigate specific issues affecting the take up of venture capital
funds; mainly an anlaysis of the use of business plans as screening
instruments by venture capital organisations, the ethos of the
founding entrepreneur with regard to ownership and control of survey
firms, and the effect of market forces on venture capital provision in
the United Kingdom. Conclusions and recommendations are included in
the final chapter, Chapter 11.
At a general level, this study contributes to the body of knowledge
concerning the operations of the venture capital industry in the
United Kingdom. On a more specific level, the analysis offers
explanation for both the extent of venture capital provision
available to firms in the same sector of high technology industry in
two very different regions of the country, and observed differences in
the propensity of entrepreneurs to apply for, and obtain, venture
-3-
capital funding. Moreover, the conclusion to this thesis offers
policy recommendations, based on a comparison of theoretical issues
with the empirical results, in order to suggest measures which will
encourage future venture capital investments in the small high
technology business sector.
-4-
Chapter 2
A HISTORY OF INVESTMENT FINANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
PRIOR TO 1971
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with
contextual information surrounding the history of the venture capital
industry in the United Kingdom prior to the Bolton Report in 1971.
The more recent "post-Bolton TM development of this important new sector
of investment finance is then considered separately in Chapter 4.
This evaluation of the historical sources of investment capital
available to entrepreneurs will contribute to an understanding of the
decision-making processes involved in obtaining external funds over -
the years.
The following discussion benefits from information obtained from three
major government studies and publications covering a wide time-span.
In chronological order these are: the Macmillan Report (1931) which
conducted a study on Finance and Industry; the Radcliffe Committee,
which was concerned with the Working of the Monetary System and
reported in 1960; and the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Small
-5-
Firms (1971) which was chaired by John Bolton. Between them these
reports provide a comprehensive review of the evolution of the
financial environment for the small firm at regular intervals over a
forty year period. In addition, small high technology firms are
singled out for special attention in the Radcliffe and Bolton Reports,
and policy recommendations are made in order to assist such
enterprises.
2.2 THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE MACMILLAN REPORT (1931)
The following is a brief overview of the financing of industry in the
United Kingdom in the years between the industrial revolution of the
18th Century and the publication of the Macmillan Report in 1931, the
first government review concerned with the operation of the financial
market. Initial sources of capital available to entrepreneurs seeking
to establish firms in the late 1700s depended upon the economic and
social backgrounds of these individuals (Cottrell, 1980). That is,
the evolution of manufacturing industry in the United Kingdom owed
much to the fact that founders of companies held personal wealth due,
in part, to belonging to the propertied classes. These entrepreneurs
were also able to avail themselves of further sources of investment
funds, namely the savings of relatives and friends (Cottrell, 1980).
By the beginning of the 19th Century, industrial concerns were an
important source of revenue to landowners (Cottrell, 1980) and the
necessity to manage this wealth led to the beginnings of a nationwide
private banking system (Lawrence, 1988).
-6-
A number of independent banks were formed by industrialists to meet
their need for wage payments to employees, usually in the form of
tokens or promisory notes, since actual currency was in short supply
in the early 1800s (Cottrell, 1980). The manufacturer was not only
able "... to satisfy his own financial requirements but by providing
banking services to the public, especially through deposits, could
augment the resources of his manufacturing enterprise,M (Cottrell,
1980, p14). However, these industrialists tended to borrow long term
finance from their own banks, which led to their eventual failure
(Cottrell, 1980). Presumably the payback period on the industrial
investment to the banker/entrepreneur proved too long to support the
short-term requirements of meeting wage and creditor payments,
although these banks did appear to perform well as sources of short-
term credit.
In the latter half of the 19th Century other sources of industrial
investment finance were the limited joint stock banks, formed as a
result of government legislation, which were very similar in operation
to the private banks (Cottrell, 1980). Industrialists also had the
option of applying for funds from the established London capital
market, which had originated from the financing of international trade
and commerce prior to the industrial revolution (Macmillan Report,
1931). However, the City-based bankers saw their role as agents to
the growing number of independent banks, both private and joint stock,
in the newly emerging industrial regions of the North, and ". . . the
development of this correspondent system . .. transformed the unit
country banks into a national banking system," (Cottrell, 1980, p14).
By the end of the First World War, five major institutions had
virtually oligopolised the United Kingdom banking market; namely
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Barclays Bank, Lloyds Bank, London County Westminster and Parr's Bank,
London Joint City and Midland Bank, and the National Provincial and
Union Bank of England (Thomas, 1978).
It is not clear to what extent the early country and joint stock banks
fulfilled the role of providing long-term finance to established
manufacturing concerns. However, Cottrell (1980) stated that bankers
in the late 1800s only rarely provided long-term capital to newly
established enterprises. By the turn of the century, however,
criticism was also levelled at existing financial institutions for
their failure to provide credit to both existing	 new industrial
firms (Cottrell, 1980). This contrasted with the banker/industrialist
relationship emerging at the same time in Europe, most noticeably in
Germany. According to the Report of the Macmillan Committee (1931),
the banks in Germany were compelled by the lack of private resources
and public sector assistance to provide permanent capital for
industrial development through new business formation in order to
compete with manufacturing industry in the United Kingdom.
Industrialists in the United Kingdom, however, had recourse to tap the
savings of independent local investors which continued to be an
important source of long-term capital throughout the 19th Century and
very early 20th Century (Macmillan Report, 1931). This investment
structure was soon to change.
An article in the September 1937 edition of The Economist pointed out
that:
"Before the war, the small industrial undertaking
obtained a very large proportion of its finance
without making a general appeal to the public. From
choice or necessity, industrialists now deem it worth
their while, in the periods when the market is
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active, to turn family businesses into public
companies with widely diffused shareholdings,"
(p508).
Thomas (1978) illustrated those factors which contributed towards the
emergence of the domestic new issue market after the First World War.
On the demand side, businesses were growing in terms of their optimal
size, sources of local private capital had largely disappeared, and
there was no facility for distributing the profits from one
organisation to other existing or new enterprises. On the supply
side, increases in personal taxation levels after the war resulted in
a reduction in the level of savings by local private investors. Those
savings that were available for investment tended to be deposited with
the growing number of formal financial institutions concerned with
investment, such as pension funds, unit trusts and insurance
companies. At this time, investors also demonstrated a preference for
holding in quoted firms shares which could be readily traded on the
market. The overall effect of these changes was to separate the
ownership and management of the organisation as Scott and Hughes
(1980) illustrate:
"Managerial restructuring was associated with a
transformation in the pattern of ownership. Family
shareholders were gradually reduced as a larger
proportion of shares were sold through the stock
exchange or sold to other interests. Many of these
shares eventually found their way into the hands of
the insurance companies, investment trusts, unit
trusts and pension funds which became the major
source of capital from the 192Os onwards. These
financial 'institutions' mobilised the resources of
large numbers of beneficiaries and invested the
funds in company stock and became the most
significant feature of the post-war capital market,"
(p259)
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The investment trusts of this period were largely accredited as the
original venture capital organisations in the United Kingdom,
especially those which maintained an investment strategy linked to
risk-embracing entrepreneurs (Clark, 1987). However, many of these
institutions quickly became less risk-oriented and more concerned with
quoted companies (Radcliffe Report, 1960) and the new issue market
dominated the industrial investment finance scene by the time of the
Macmillan Report in 1931.
2.3 THE MACMILLAN REPORT (1931)
In the opinion of the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry in
1931, the banking system, as it existed then, provided sufficient
short-term finance to industry. Indeed, the report even indicated
that this type of finance might be too freely available. There was
also little criticism of the role played by the banks in the provision
of medium-term capital; that is, finance provided over a period of
anywhere between two to five years. However, the committee singled
out for criticism the contribution of the financial institutions to
the long-term funding of industry in the United Kingdom. The relevant
paragraph of the report argued as follows:
"Coming back now to the more general question of the
relations between finance and industry, and in
particular to the provision of long-dated capital, we
believe that there is substance in the view that the
British financial organisation concentrated in the
City of London might with advantage be more closely
co-ordinated with British industry, particularly
large-scale industry, than is now the case; and that
in some respects the City is more highly organised to
provide capital to foreign countries than to British
industry. We believe this to be due in part to the
historical organisation of British Industry and to
the fact that industry, having grown up on strongly
individualistic lines, has been anxious to steer
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clear of anything which might savour of banking
control or even interference, this attitude
coinciding with the views which prevail in this
country as to the province of sound banking,"
(Macmillan Report, 1931, p171).
This would explain the observation by Thomas (1978) that the new issue
market enabled firms to reduce their reliance on bank funding.
Indeed, the then Chairman of the Midland Bank pointed out that "money
raised by new issues of capital had been used to pay off millions of
bank advances," (Thomas, 1978, p71). However, this option was
available only to larger manufacturing enterprises, since a major
finding of the Macmillan Co=ittee was that:
"... great difficulty is experienced by the smaller
and medium-sized businesses in raising the capital
which they may from time to time require, even when
the security offered is perfectly sound. To provide
adequate machinery for raising long-dated capital in
amounts not sufficiently large for public issue,
i.e., amounts ranging from small sums up to say
£200,000 or more, always presents difficulties. The
expense of a public issue is too great in proportion
to the capital raised, and therefore it is difficult
to interest the ordinary investor by the usual
method; the Investment Trust Companies do not look
with any great favour on small issues which would
have no free market and would require closely
watching; nor can any issuing house tie up its funds
in long-dated capital issues of which it cannot
dispose," (Macmillan Report, 1931, p173-174).
Thus, the Macmillan Committee revealed that the long-term investment
capital needs of small and medium-sized firms were not catered for by
the financial market; this became widely known as the "Macmillan Gap."
For example, companies which were unable to raise amounts of up to
£200,000 from their own resources also found that this amount was too
small to warrant a public market listing (Macmillan Report, 1931).
This lower limit to flotation had not changed by 1959, according to
the minutes of evidence of the Radcliffe Report (1960). However, the
Bolton Report in 1971 stated that the new issue market could only in
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reality support capitalisations of £250,000 or above. The
International Stock Exchange more recently quoted a figure of £700,000
as a minimum for public issue, but stated that sponsors preferred a
minimum market capitalisation of over £10 million (ISE, 1988/89).
The Macmillan Committee made a number of suggestions based on the
evidence of their deliberations, and foremost amongst these was the
recommendation to establish an institution which was solely concerned
with small industrial and. commercial issues in order to fill the
"Macmillan Cap." Paragraph 403 of the Macmillan Report (1931)
suggested the form that this new institution might take:
"While, however, we do not propose a change in the
character of present banking practice, we think that
the co-operation of the big banks is required both in
taking an interest in the share capital of such an
institution and being ready to provide such credit
facilities as the institution may require pending a
public issue. The best course might be if the
leading private institutions and the big banks were
to co-operate in creating one or more such concerns,"
(p173).
2.3.1 Response to the Macmillan Report
A formal organisation of the kind suggested by the Macmillan Committee
was not to see the light of day until 1945 when the Industrial and
Commercial Finance Corporation Limited (ICFC) was established (Thomas,
1978). Meanwhile, a number of City-based institutions seized the
opportunity to fulfil a quasi-venture capital role and specialise in
the provision of long term finance to small firms (Thomas, 1978).
Three institutions dominated this market; Charterhouse Industrial
Development Company Limited founded in 1934, Credit for Industry also
established in 1934, and Leadenhall Securities Incorporation which was
formed in 1935 (Bolton Report, 1971). According to Thomas (1978)
these financial institutions only had a limited amount of funds which
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proved insufficient to meet the capital demands from small businesses.
However, before World War Two, they were very often the only source of
long-term capital available to small firms in need of investment
funds.
During the Second World War a Steering Committee on Post War
Employment recommended that a new insitition be formed, similar to
that proposed by the Macmillan Committee, in order to facilitate
industrial reconstruction after the war (Thomas, 1978). To this end,
the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation Limited was
established with the combined finances of the clearing and Scottish
banks and the Bank of England (Bolton Report, 1971). The mission
statement of this new institution was to:
"... 'provide credit by means of loans or the
subscription of loan or share capital or otherwise
for industrial and commercial business or enterprises
in Great Britain, particularly in cases where the
existing facilities provided by banking institutions
and the Stock Exchange are not readily or easily
available,'" (Thomas, 1978, p123).
The Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation was supported
financially by the major banks, and the Radcliffe Committee maintained
that ".. . they [banks] are thereby doing indirectly business which
they would not normally do directly," (p291). Essentially, banks
preferred to be creditors to their clients rather than business
partners (Radcliffe Report, 1960). It would appear that the banks
were not comfortable with their relationship with the Industrial and
Commercial Finance Corporation, so much so that they decided that the
corporation should look to the open market for its sources of finance.
As it emerged, the financial institutions took up much of the share
issue resulting from the first public issue in 1959 (Thomas, 1978).
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According to Lord Piercy, the Chairman of the Industrial and
Commercial Finance Corporation in 1960, the corporation was prepared
to consider small investment amounts of even £5,000 to £15,000. Lord
Piercy considered these investments to be an integral and substantial
part of the operations of the institution. The justification for this
policy was contained in his statement to the Radcliffe Committee:
"It is rather the feeling that, if there is a need
for money which they [small firms] cannot raise
conveniently elsewhere and there is a case for them
having the money, then we ought to provide it. Of
course, a loan from us of £5,000 or £10,000 makes a
concern happier and in turn enables them to get more
facilities from the bank. So that in that way we are
probably doing more than £5,000 worth of good in
loaning £5,000," (Radcliffe Report, 1960, p886).
This lending policy of the Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation also took into account the "Gap" identified by the
Macmillan Committee since, initially, the Corporation could lend
amounts up to the £200,000 identified as the lower limit for flotation
purposes (Thomas, 1978). The research and development financial needs
of small innovative firms were also considered to be catered for by
the government funded National Research and Development Corporation
(NRDC) established in 1948 (Radcliffe Report, 1960). This
organisation provided investment capital in two forms: equity capital
in return for a minority stake in the business; or, loan capital which
was repaid by means of a negotiated levy on sales (Thomas, 1978).
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2.4 THE RADCLIFFE REPORT (1960)
Until the time of the Radcliffe Report there were three major
institutions attempting to fill the funding gap identified by the
Macmillan Committee. These were the private enterprise Charterhouse
Industrial Development Company, first referred to in Subsection 2.3.1,
the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation and the National
Research and Development Corporation, mentioned above. These three
organisations encompassed the range of private through to public
equity funding available to small companies. Nevertheless, the
Radcliffe Committee found that the lack of innovation funding for
small technology-related firms was still a problem at the time of
their investigations. Thomas (1978) commented that:
"In terms of the provision of ... venture capital the
Radcliffe Committee identified two problems; firstly,
that the needs of such [innovative] companies may be
large in relation to their existing capital structure
and earning prospects, larger in fact than most
institutions would accept, and secondly, the
increased risks attached to the commercial
exploitation of technical innovation," (p132).
Criticisms were levelled at the above three organisations in terms of
their lending strategies. The Charterhouse Industrial Development
Company chose to invest in the form of loan capital rather than
through equity participation, and concentrated on existing rather than
new enterprises (Thomas, 1978). The Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation did not publicise its operations well enough to industry,
relying predominantly on the banks to recommend the services of the
corporation to their clients, and it failed to allay fears about the
amount of participation and control it would require as a result of
investing in a firm (Radcliffe Report, 1960). This latter criticism
was also applied to the National Research and Development Corporation,
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since its ownership of commercial rights to inventions caused concern
about the issue of control amongst inventors/entrepreneurs (Radcliffe
Report, 1960). The Radcliffe Committee believed that all of these
criticisms were especially relevant to innovative companies which,
perhaps more than any other sector of the business community, had
suffered from the disappearance of the personal backer (Radcliffe
Report, 1960).
All three organisations are still evident in some form or other in the
United Kingdom venture capital industry today. Charterhouse is now a
major source of venture capital in the United Kingdom under the name
of Charterhouse Development Capital owned by The Royal Bank of
Scotland (Cary, 1987). The Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation went on to form part of the Investors in Industry Group,
also owned by the major banks (OECD, 1985). This group has become
known as 3i, from the initials of the previous name, and is now the
most pervasive investor on the venture capital scene in terms of loan
capital with a limited amount of equity funding (Cary, 1987).
Finally, the National Research and Development Corporation merged with
the National Enterprise Board in 1981 to form the British Technology
Group (BTG). Although not a formal venture capital organisation, the
British Technology Group is a player on the fringes of venture capital
funding (Gary, 1987). Both 3i and the British Technology Group will
be referred to in greater detail in Chapter 3 when the availability of
investment finance during the 1970s and l980s will be considered.
Consequent upon their review, the Radcliffe Committee made three main
recommendations relating to the financial facilities available to
small firms in general, and small high technology firms in particular:
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"First, Radcliffe recommended that the joint stock
banks should be ready to offer term loan facilities
'as an alternative to a running overdraft for
creditworthy industrial and commercial customers.'
Secondly, it was recommended that the upper limit on
the size of transactions in which ICFC were permitted
to engage 'should be reviewed in the light of the
change in the value of money since it was first fixed
at a level at which it will once again correspond to
the lowest practicable amount for market issue.'
Thirdly, Radcliffe recommended the creation of a
Corporation 'to facilitate the commercial
exploitation of a technical innovation.' As a
general point, the Radcliffe Committee suspected that
the small business community lacked information on
the financial services available through ICFC and its
competitors,' (Bolton Report, 1971, p155).
The response to these recommendations is incorporated in the 1971
Report of the Bolton Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms.
2.4.1 Response to the Radcliffe Report
The structural shortcomings highlighted by the Radcliffe Committee
were largely corrected over the next ten years. By 1970, many of the
banks offered term loan facilities, that is loans which were repayable
by instalments over a period of up to ten years; the Industrial and
Commercial Finance Corporation was no longer restricted in terms of an
upper limit to the amount it could invest; and the organisation
Technical Development Capital Ltd (TDC), a subsidiary of the
Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation, was created in 1962 to
complement the services of the National Research and Development
Corporation by providing capital to small innovative companies for
production and market development purposes (Bolton Report, 1971).
Technical Development Capital attracted a great deal of interest from
firms in a wide range of high technology industries, and was deemed to
be of such national economic importance that it was integrated with
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the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation in its first few
years of operation in order to give the organisation a sounder base
(Thomas, 1978). This division of the Industrial and Commercial
Finance Corporation became known as 3i Ventures with the change of
corporate name to 3i (Lorenz, 1985) and continues to operate as the
specialist technological investment arm of the 3i Group (Cary, 1987).
A small number of other private financial organisations, recognising
the market opportunity presented by the 'Radcliffe Gap' and the
formation of Technical Development Capital, established subsidiaries
which could specialise in the provision of production/marketing
finance where there was a perceived technological opportunity. These
organisations included merchant bank and investment trust subsidiaries
(Thomas, 1978). Small innovative firms in the United Kingdom also had
the opportunity to receive venture capital funds from United States
organisations which chose the 1960s to expand their operations
internationally (Thomas, 1978).
2.5 THE BOLTON REPORT (1971)
The Bolton Committee commissioned a report to evaluate the effect of
changes made during the 1960s to the financial provision for small
firms. Despite the intentions of the Radcliffe Committee, the
investment finance market for small firms had not improved by the time
of the Bolton Report. According to Lees (1971) small firms rarely
received term loans from financial institutions; the 1969-1970 Annual
Report of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation maintained
that the investment activities of the corporation had been curtailed
by a shortage of resources; and Technical Development Capital had
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offered finance to approximately only six per cent of the firms which
had approached the organisation for investment funds. A further study
for the Bolton Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms questioned "...
whether the existing structure of the finance market is capable of
providing ... risk capital" to small firms (Dunning, 1971, p59).
According to Bolton (1971):
"... the market facing the small firm is relatively
constricted; there are certain financial facilities
available to large firms which are not available to
small ones, such as access to the inter-company loan
market. Furthermore, for those facilities which are
available, small borrowers must frequently pay rather
more than large ones; this is true of overdrafts, of
term loans, of hire purchase finance and even of
equity raised by public flotation. ... we find it is
true that the great majority of small firms are
unable to raise capital on the stock exchange . .. ,"
(p187).
This signified to Dunning (1971) that the financial market for small
firms was imperfect and, in some cases, this resulted in the
misallocation of resources. Nonetheless, the Bolton Committee
maintained that:
in our view there is no imperfection in the
supply of finance as it now stands sufficiently
serious to warrant either the creation by Government
of a new institution or a substantial change in the
way existing ones are organised to do business.
There is now no gap corresponding to the famous
Macmillan Gap. This is not to say that existing
institutional arrangements are perfect, still less
that every small business will be able to find
finance of the type it needs at the price it can
afford to pay: but in spite of considerable efforts
we have identified no body of legitimate unsatisfied
demand significant enough to require radical changes
in the market. We are satisfied that if such a
demand were to develop, new competing sources of
supply would speedily arise to meet it, since few
sectors of the economy have shown such vitality, such
alacrity in exploiting new opportunities, as the
finance market," (Bolton Report, 1971, p188).
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An important and, perhaps, unavoidable constraining factor on the free
market successfully meeting the investment requirements of small
innovative firms is the relative cost of each transaction to the
financial institutions. Investments made in small firms are more
expensive in proportion to the transaction amount when compared with
financing larger companies (Bolton Report, 1971). An illustration of
this is contained in a report to the Bolton Committee. According to
the National Research and Development Corporation the costs of
investigating financial applications at that particular time were as
follows:
"... projects below £10,000, average 25-30 per cent;
on £10,000-25,000, 15 per cent; and on £25,000-
£50,000, 10 per cent of the sums advanced. In other
words, costs as a proportion of loan fall sharply as
the size of loan increases," (Lees, 1971, p52).
The Bolton Committee, in the conclusion to their report, predicted
that the financial market might not play a significant role in the
future development of small firms:
"... while there are some differences in the bases on
which small firms and large can raise money these are
mostly functions of inherent cost and scale
differences ... the role of the institutions, however
adaptable and sensitive to market needs they are, is
necessarily limited; if the small firm sector is to
be preserved, institutional finance can never take
the place of personal wealth and ploughed-back
profits," (Bolton Report, 1971, p348).
This final statement might appear regressive given that this was the
situation facing founders of small firms during the industrial
revolution of the late 1700s and early l800s.
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2.6 CONCLUSION
It is clear from the aforementioned evidence that small firms and, in
particular, small high technology firms have experienced difficulty in
raising external finance from institutional sources throughout this
century to the time of the Bolton Report. This has been the case
despite the attention drawn to the plight of the small firm by major
government enquiries on three separate occasions. The common theme of
these investigations was that, although small firms were at a
financial disadvantage when compared with their larger counterparts,
it was not necessarily within the remit of the financial institutions
to offer direct preferential assistance to their smaller clients.
Indeed, it was postulated that institutional finance might not play a
significant part in the formation and growth of small firms.
Therefore, the following chapter investigates the sources of
investment finance available to the small firm sector following the
Bolton Report, and the role various governments in the United Kingdom
have played in stimulating investment in the small firm sector.
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Chapter 3
INVESTMENT FINANCE AND GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOLLOWING THE BOLTON REPORT (1971)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1970s was a watershed in government assistance for small
companies. Prior to the Bolton Report in 1971, the dominant
philosophy was that 'big is beautiful' , and that economies of scale
could be achieved through a process of re-organisation into larger
manufacturing units (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). The small firm sector
received government assistance on an ad hoc basis rather than being
the target of specific coordinated industrial policies. However, in
the 1970s:
"The economic recession and attendant high level of
unemployment .. . amongst other things, forced a
closure of large manufacturing and production
organizations. The British Government therefore .
addressed itself to providing various stimuli to the
creation of new businesses particularly in the
technological fields where, it is recognized,
expansion, growth and employment will be achieved,"
(Dean, 1982, p101).
This faith in the potential of the small firm sector has not proved
unfounded. One of the most widely cited works in relation to
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employment in small firms was a study by Birch in the United States in
1979:
"... which purported to show that, between 1969 and
1976, firms/establishments employing less than 20
people created 66 per cent of all new jobs, half of
which were created in independent firms. While
Birch's results have been seriously questioned by a
number of policy analysts ... they have nevertheless
gained considerable acceptance among public policy
makers in a number of countries, including the UK,"
(Rothwell, 1985, p253).
Despite the overestimation of the figures by Birch, it is widely
accepted that small firms generate jobs at the same rate, or faster,
than larger enterprises (Storey et p 1., 1987). Dunne and Hughes
(1990) conducted a study of census data which illustrated that,
between 1963 and 1986, manufacturing firms employing fewer than 100
employees increased their share of employment at a greater rate than
companies of a greater size (see Table 3.1).
T.bL. 3.1 Sizs of firm by shari of •.ptoymsnt (.anufacturin9 industri.s
privet. s.ctor)
1963	 1979	 1986
Firms .mptoying 99 .mploy..s or Less	 14.0%
	
17.2%	 24.0%
Firms •mptoylng 100-499 •mptoy.es 	 15.6%
	
12.9%	 15.9%
Firms •mpLoying 500-999 •mptoyees	 7.7%
	
6.6%	 7.4%
Firms empLoying 1000 •mploy.es or more 	 62.7%
	
63.0%	 52.8%
Total
	
100.0%	 99.7%	 100.1%
Source: Dunn. and Hugh.s (1990)
According to the latest census figures available, firms employing
fewer than 100 employees account for almost a quarter of total
manufacturing employment	 one fifth of national output (Dunne and
Hughes, 1990). However, Storey et p 1. (1987) urge caution in the
-23-
interpretation of such figures since ".. . relatively few small
firms ... are both willing and able to create significant numbers of
jobs," (p325). The authors go on to argue that government policy
should be selective and focus on a few jç.y firms with job creation
potential. However, small firms in general, and small high technology
firms in particular, contribute towards economic development in other
ways by: applying new technologies to produce new products for markets
which are initially underdeveloped (Pratten, 1991); providing
competition for larger firms (Storey et p 1., 1987); producing and
selling products which involve a considerable service element,
including made-to-order goods and speedy delivery (Pratten, 1991);
and, supplying inputs to the manufacturing process of larger companies
which compete internationally (Storey et al., 1987). As such,
there would seem justification for operating a continuing small firms
policy in the United Kingdom.
This chapter charts the historical development of small firms policy
since 1970, and outlines the response of the private sector to public
sector stimuli in relation to small businesses.
3.2 THE PERIOD OF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNKENT 1970-1974
3.2.1 The public sector
The period since 1970 includes two changes of government, from
Conservative to Labour in 1974, and back to Conservative in 1979. The
first Conservative administration concentrated on improving the
general environment for the creation and growth of small firms, rather
than providing direct discriminatory assistance (Beesley and Wilson,
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1982). The Department of Industry established a Small Firms Division
in 1971 in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Bolton
Committee (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). This government department,
which still exists today, is responsible for ensuring that the
interests of small firms are taken into account when developing
government policy. The department also administers a regional network
of Small Firm Information Centres, first established in 1973, which
direct entrepreneurs to sources of local advice and aid, and also act
as a channel for information on nationally available assistance
(Beesley and Wilson, 1981). However, the concentration on indirect
government assistance did not have the desired effect of enabling
firms to grow according to their own resources as per the
recommendations of the Bolton Committee. A survey by the Department
of Industry found that public sector financial assistance was a
significant factor in the level of overall industrial investment in
the United Kingdom (Wilson Report, 1980). The growth in the use of
public sector funds was attributed to a number of factors, amongst
them the fact that:
"... private individuals have been running down their
direct holdings of company shares and been placing
their assets in the hands of the financial
institutions. ... since 1973 individuals have tended
to increase their savings and have placed them with
pension funds, insurance companies, building
societies and banks. Companies have then had to
borrow these funds back at a time when their own
financial outlook was poor - these remarks being, of
course, about relative changes rather than about
completely new patterns of behaviour. ... by no
means all the extra saving has gone to companies - at
least not directly. Some of it has gone back to
other individuals through building societies, and
much of it has been absorbed by the very large
increase in the borrowing of the public sector,"
(Wilson Report, 1980, p13).
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3.2.2 The private sector
The combined effect of increased personal savings and reduced irect
government assistance meant that new and expanding small firms
increasingly turned to the banks for investment funds. During the
first six years of the 1970s, seventy nine per cent of total
industrial borrowings was derived from bank sources (Thomas, 1978).
This exceptional rate was accredited to a sharp decline in the
availability of internal finance, and also the difficulty of raising
funds on the capital markets because of falling share prices and
increasing rates of interest (Thomas, 1978). However, at that time,
small firms were not treated in a particularly favourable manner by
the banks, according to the preliminary report of the Wilson Committee
in 1979. Typically, these institutions offered funds to their smaller
business clients at rates of interest which were around two per cent
higher than those offered to larger companies. In addition, small
businessmen were often asked for a high level of security in return
for the finance, and personal guarantees were frequently involved.
The financial institutions were cautious regarding the comparative
level of loan to share capital they considered acceptable for client
firms; that is, the debt to equity ratio. Most often equal
proportions of loan and equity finance were required, a 1:1 gearing
ratio. This attitude compared unfavourably with that of financial
institutions in other European countries, which were prepared to
furnish loan finance of up to three times the equity level, a 3:1
ratio (Wilson Report, 1979).
In terms of venture capital provision, the industry changed very
little during the 1970s. 3i, in the form of the Industrial and
Commercial Finance Corporation, remained the dominant investor in the
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shares of small companies in the 1970s (Clark, 1987). This was
largely accredited to its well-developed branch network (Lorenz, 1985)
and the fact that 3i benefited from its close links with the clearing
banks in terms of picking up investment opportunities which the banks
were unable to finance. Other players on the venture capital scene at
that time included the previously mentioned semi-state bodies and a
limited number of merchant and clearing banks (Lorenz, 1985).
3.3 THE PERIOD OF THE LABOUR GOVERM1ENT 1974-1979
3.3.1 The public sector
The new Labour government of 1974 recognised that a change of emphasis
was required in favour of direct discriminatory measures in relation
to small firms. The public sector organisation, the National
Enterprise Board (NEB) was established in 1975 by the Labour
administration. It was empowered to invest in the equity of high-risk
companies which were mainly located in government assisted areas,
regions formed to encourage industry to locate or re-locate in areas
of high unemployment (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). Government aid and
incentives which were not available on a national basis were made
available to firms in these regions, for example Regional Development
Grants and Regional Selective Assistance (see Subsection 3.5.4). Both
the National Enterprise Board and the assisted areas were altered in
the early 1980s, and Section 3.5 details theses changes and comments
on their effect.
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Also, during the Labour administration, two industrial development
bodies were established in recognition of the special regional
problems in Scotland and Wales. The Scottish Development Agency (SDA)
was established in 1975 and the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) in
1976. A discourse on the Scottish Development Agency is warranted
since a number of study firms are located in Scotland and, as such,
are likely to have had contact with this organisation. The newly
formed Scottish Development Agency was charged with the responsibility
"... to further economic development, safeguard employment and promote
industrial activities throughout Scotland," (Beesley and Wilson, 1981,
p275). Along with the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB)
founded in 1965, the Scottish Development Agency was concerned with
the provision of assistance solely in Scotland. The agency operated a
specialist Small Business Division (SBD) which was able to target aid
to firms employing 100 people or less and, according to Bienkowski and
Allen (1985):
"Short, medium or long-term loans, convertible loans,
share capital in the form of ordinary or preference
shares or any combination of these is available to
businesses in Scotland. The Scottish Development
Agency will consider projects across a broad spectrum
but it is particularly interested in new ventures and
companies planning expansion, businesses that have
short term financial problems but with good prospects
of long term return and businesses planning to enter
new fields or markets or to develop new products,"
(p468).
The Scottish Development Agency merged with the Training Agency
(Scotland) in 1991 to create Scottish Enterprise. This entirely new
body incorporates the objectives of the two former agencies, ". .. i.e.
to promote market-led economic development, growth of enterprise,
environmental improvements, job creation, reduced unemployment and
enhanced training" (p5), whilst devolving decision-making and
-28-
provision of services to local agencies which are better equipped to
judge the needs of local clients (Moore, 1990). A number of financial
assistance schemes are accessible directly from Scottish Enterprise:
development loans are generally available in the range of £5,000 to
£50,000 with guarantees required for amounts greater than £10,000;
venture funding entails equity participation for a period of 5 to 7
years with no upper financial limit, providing capital is obtained
simultaneously from other sources; assistance is available for
research and development proposals for European Community funding, and
this must be repaid if the application is successful; and businesses
located in rural areas may apply for a loan of between £10,000 and
£75,000, providing finance from other sources is forthcoming and the
loan is secured by the firm (Scottish Enterprise, 1991).
The nearest equivalent body in England to the Small Business Division
of the Scottish Development Agency is the Council for Small Industries
in Rural Areas (CoSIRA) formed in 1968 in order to fulfil a rural
development role. It is by no means as comprehensive in coverage as
was the Small Business Division of the Scottish Development Agency,
since it is concerned only with firms of fewer than twenty skilled
employees in rural areas or towns of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants
(Beesley and Wilson, 1981). This organisation provides financial
assistance for working capital, equipment and buildings but expects
the major share of the project funding to be sourced from the private
sector (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). Despite the intentions of this
organisation and the Scottish Development Agency to target small firms
for assistance, a study by the Wilson Committee in the late 1970s
found that they rarely concerned themselves with the problems of
firms (Wilson Report, 1979).
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In 1976, the Labour administration also took a hand in promoting
private venture capital provision by encouraging the financial
institutions to form another venture capital company, Equity Capital
for Industry. In its early stages, this firm specialised in the
provision of funds to auoted companies (Clark, 1987) rather than being
concerned with new and small businesses. Today, this organisation
operates as ECI Ventures and prefers to invest in projects involving
investments of between £1 million and £5 million (BVCA, l990a) which
generally means that new and small firms are excluded.
The Labour government decided to investigate the financial provision
for the small firm sector by commissioning two studies in the latter
part of the 1970s. The first, chaired by Lord Lever, led to the
conclusion that existing policies for the small business sector were
inadequate (Beesley and Wilson, 1981). The second study, chaired by
Sir Harold Wilson, made a comprehensive investigation of the economic
situation facing small firms in the late 1970s, and the financial
provision by the public and private sector for such firms at that
time. The information contained in the Wilson Report forms the basis
of the next subsection.
3.3.2 The private sector
Businesses experienced high rates of interest on their borrowings in
the late 1970s as the government attempted to combat inflation (Lawrence,
1988). Such government anti-inflationary policies were identified as
suppressing the level of actual investment activity on two fronts:
"... the cost of both medium-term loans and
overdrafts may rise suddenly ... and that this action
will depress demand for the firm's products at the
same time. The firm therefore risks finding itself
in a nasty squeeze from both sides," (Wilson Report,
1980, p147).
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These indirect restrictions on investment mostly affected rapidly
growing and innovative companies as the preliminary report of the
Wilson Committee argued:
"Firms expanding relatively fast are the most likely
to outgrow retained profits and their proprietors'
other resources. Only the more substantial ones then
have the option of seeking a public listing. Of the
remainder, the larger can seek assistance from the
merchant banks or, slightly lower down the scale, the
development capital companies. But, apart from the
ICFC, these institutions are normally reluctant to
consider propositions involving investment of less
than £50,000, their preferred minimum more usually
being around £100,000. The new organisation Equity
Capital for Industry (Ed), set up by the
institutions in an attempt to help fill the equity
gap, has set its minimum as high as £250,000. This
is well above the level where we believe the main
problems to exist," (Wilson Report, 1979, p11).
Many companies specialising in the provision of equity finance
deliberately avoided start-up investments because of the greater risks
involved with associated higher costs (Wilson Report, 1979). Even
organisations formed specifically to provide investment capital to
innovative small firms appeared to be failing to fulfil their purpose.
The National Research and Development Corporation was described as
being "... too expensive, too conservative in their attitude to risk
and too large and remote from small investors . . . ," and Technical
Development Capital was criticised for making ".. . less than 10
investments a year," (Wilson Report, 1979, p32). According to the
Wilson Committee:
"There can be little doubt that at the time of this
report there are deficiencies in the availability of
equity finance for small businesses and that this is
putting undesirable constraints on their rate of
creation and growth," (Wilson Report, 1979, p9).
This was a major conclusion of the Wilson Committee in its report to
the new Conservative government of 1979.
-31-
3.4 THE PERIOD OF THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 1979-
3.4.1 Public sector initiatives to encourage private sector
investment in small firms
The Conservative government initially demonstrated an interest in
continuing the more discriminatory form of policy in favour of small
firms which had been initiated by the Labour administration (Beesley
and Wilson, 1981). A number of direct and indirect policy measures,
introduced between 1980 and 1983, were aimed at providing a more
encouraging environment for entrepreneurs wishing to establish new
companies in all industrial sectors, including the newer technologies.
The trend was towards adoption of a business ethos similar to that of
the United States, in terms of greater risk and tolerance of failure
(Bank of England, 1982). Some of the first policy measures resulted
from recommendations made by the Wilson Committee in 1979 and 1980,
and these are detailed below.
THE LOAN GUARANTEE SCHEME (LGS)
A preliminary report by the Wilson Committee advised that:
"A publicly underwritten loan guarantee scheme, with
a limited subsidy element and some part of the risk
retained by the banks, should be set up on an
experimental basis as soon as possible .. . ," (Wilson
Report, 1979, p41).
In 1981, the government introduced the Loan Guarantee Scheme whereby
they stood as guarantor to companies which were otherwise unable to
raise finance (Batchelor, 1989). Initially, the government accepted
80 per cent of the risk of the investment, with the banks taking
responsibility for the remaining 20 per cent. Loans were granted for
between two and seven years and could amount to the sum of £75,000.
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The investee firms had to pay a premium for this finance, which was
normally three per cent of the guaranteed amount of the loan. This
figure was additional to the interest charge, which was usually 2-3
per cent above the base rate. The premium was intended to enable the
Loan Guarantee Scheme to become self-financing after an experimental
period (Greenhow, 1982). Since its inception, the upper limit to the
amount of the loan has changed to £100,000 at a premium of 2.5 per
cent (DoE, 1989) but a number of other modifications have affected the
popularity of the scheme. These will be expanded upon in Subsection
3.5.2.
BUSINESS START-UP SCHEME (BSS) AND BUSINESSS EXPANSION SCHEME (BES)
Another recommendation made by the Wilson Committee, and taken up by
the Conservative government was that:
"Steps should be taken to promote the creation of a
new type of institution, the Small Firm Investment
Company (SFIC), by the removal of the present fiscal
and other constraints on the spontaneous development
of such a medium. A specific limited relief of
personal taxation should be given for the purchase of
SFIC shares ... ," (Wilson Report, 1979, p4l).
The Business Start-up Scheme (BSS) was the result of this
recommendation. It was introduced in 1981, but was quickly replaced
by the Business Expansion Scheme (BES) in 1983 (Peters, 1983). These
schemes were introduced by the government in order to encourage
private individuals to invest in unquoted companies. In return,
individuals not only had the opportunity to reap the rewards of a
profitable investment, but also to obtain tax relief at their highest
rate on the amount invested up to a maximum of £40,000 per annum
providing the investment was maintained for a five year period
(Woodcock, 1986). According to Rothwell and Zegveld (1985) these
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schemes had an impact upon company start-ups in particular. This was
due mainly to the fact that the first scheme, the Business Start-up
Scheme, was specifically aimed at encouraging investment in new
business start-ups and firms of less than five years of age. This was
extended after the 1983 budget to allow financiers to invest in older
existing companies, and critical conient on this and other revisions
is contained in Subsection 3.5.3.
THE UNLISTED SECURITIES MARKET (USM)
Two further recommendations made by the Wilson Committee concern the
issue of small firms raising investment capital via a public listing.
They read as follows:
"The Department of Trade, Treasury and other
Departments concerned should consider how best to
promote the facilities of OTC [Over The Counter or
secondary] markets in this country and the case for
removing some of the impediments to their development
which are alleged to exist at present," (Wilson
Report, 1979, plel);
and:
"The case for changing the law to allow small
companies to raise equity in a redeemable form, and
other ways of allowing proprietors of small companies
to raise outside capital without risking their
overall control, should be given further
consideration by the Department of Trade, Treasury
and other Departments concerned ... ," (Wilson Report,
1979, p41).
The Unlisted Securities Market (USM) was formed in 1980 in order to
simplify the procedures and reduce the costs for smaller firms wishing
to seek a public listing (Wright and Jarret, 1981). According to
Woodcock (1986), an Unlisted Securities Market listing has the
advantage of "... allowing the owner to realise some of his or her own
accumulated wealth and widening the opportunities for a company to
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raise finance for its development," (p198). Thus, an organisation is
more readily able to sell equity in return for investment funds. A
further junior stock market, the Third Market, was formed in 1987 and
it has even less stringent requirements prior to listing than the
Unlisted Securities Market (ISE, 1988/89). Appendix 1 contains a
summary of the comparative levels of entry for the above two financial
markets as well as the full market.
In addition, the 1981 Companies Act permitted firms to re-purchase
their own shares from shareholders (Lorenz, 1985). Thus,
owners/entrepreneurs who were concerned about the ownership and/or
control of their firms, would be able to raise finance on the capital
market by issuing shares which could be redeemed at a future date.
The Act also encouraged the development of management buy-outs,
whereby existing managers could buy a company from the parent source,
and the promotion of the Business Start-up Scheme (BSS) involving
equity investments in small companies (see Chapter 4 for further
information).
The Unlisted Securities Market and the Business Start-up and Business
Expansion Schemes have been directly linked to the proliferation of
the United Kingdom venture capital industry in the 1980s. The
creation of the Unlisted Securities Market, and later the Third
Market, offered future exit mechanisms to venture capital
organisations and individuals prepared to invest in currently illiquid
investments (Little, 1977; Lorenz, 1985). According to Clark (1987)
the new policy measures implemented by the Conservative administration
in the early 1980s were just the sort of stimulus the venture capital
industry required:
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"Many British financial institutions, having invested
in American venture capital partnerships, naturally
began to wonder whether there might not be similar
opportunities closer to home. Conversely, certain
large US venture capital management firms ... which
had come to Britain to raise funds, decided to
establish venture capital pools for investment in the
UK," (pp75-76).
The aim of the government was to encourage the flow of funds to small
firms in recognition of their potential contribution in terms of the
regeneration of the economy following the recession. According to
Rothwell and Zegveld (1985):
"Just as governments have begun increasingly to
provide special funds to support the R&D activities
of existing SMFs [Small Manufacturing Firms] , so also
have they taken steps to increase the flow of venture
capital to stimulate the establishment and growth of
NTBFs [New Technology-Based Firms]," (p183).
Further comment on the development of the venture capital industry is
reserved until the following chapter, which considers the provision
made by the venture capital industry for the financing of small high
technology firms during the 1980s.
3.4.2 Other public sector initiatives
Other policy measures were introduced in the 1980s in order to
encourage free market entrepreneurship and business development. In
addition, siginificant regional policy changes were made during this
period.
ENTERPRISE ZONES
The original idea of the first scheme, Enterprise Zones, was ". . . to
create so many Hongkongs - centres of uncontrolled and entrepreneurial
capitalism - at various sites around Britain," (Economist, 1981, p54).
Companies located in Enterprise Zones were exempt from industrial and
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commercial property rates for a period of ten years. In addition,
these firms were awarded a 100 per cent allowance on corporation and
income tax for capital expenditure on industrial and commercial
building (Curran, 1986). Enterprise Zones were located in derelict
inner city areas and places of high unemployment (Economist, 1981),
and by 1987 there were 25 in operation throughout the United Kingdom.
In the same year, the government announced its intention not to create
any more Enterprise Zones in England, perhaps because the initiative
was costly both financially and in terms of the economic development
of regions not participating in the scheme. According to Taylor
(1987) the scheme cost the government £300 million between 1981 and
1986 and only succeeded in attracting "... investment into the zones
to the detriment of surrounding areas and ... thus only moved problems
around," (p6).
ENTERPRISE ALLOWANCE SCHEME
The Enterprise Allowance Scheme involves the payment of £40 per week
for a year to people who are out of work and who wish to start up new
businesses. The prospective candidates have to invest £1,000 of their
own money to qualify for the allowance. The £40 payment is designed
to compensate candidates for the loss of unemployment or supplementary
benefit (Mason and Harrison, 1986). This scheme has remained
relatively unchanged since its inception. Research conducted by the
National Audit Office found that the majority of enterprises (57 per
cent) started under this scheme are still operating up to three years
later (Batchelor, 1989).
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ENTERPRISE INITIATIVE
In 1988, the Department of Trade and Industry introduced the
Enterprise Initiative scheme whereby qualifying businesses benefit
from financial assistance with consultancy fees (Hamilton Fazey,
1988a). Consultancy advice is available under six topic headings;
design, marketing, quality management, manufacturing methods, business
planning and financial and information systems, to which the
government contributes 50 per cent of the cost (66 per cent in
assisted areas) of an approved consultant for between 5 and 15 days
(Financial Times, 1988). According to the Department of Trade and
Industry, demand for assistance under the Enterprise Initiative is
strong (Batchelor, 1989). There are indications that the operations
of the Enterprise Initiative will be privatised in future (Duffy,
1990). Therefore, it appears that the present Conservative government
believes that the private sector is better placed to stimulate
industrial growth in the United Kingdom. This is the subject of
debate in Section 3.5 of this chapter.
REGIONAL POLICY
Other significant changes to government measures made during the 1980s
relate to regional policy initiatives. The United Kingdom government
installed its first policies concerning economic development in the
regions prior to the Second World War, largely in response to high
unemployment in the early 1930s. Since then, according to Townsend
(1987):
"Much of the literature on regional policy arose from
the climate of the 1964-70 Labour governments, when
the policy was arguably at the heart of a national
strategy of thinking. The Conservative governments
of 1979 and 1983 did not believe in a strong regional
policy, and would have been unlikely to even if there
had been more national resources for it. They
retained regional policy as a domestic political
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necessity and, on the international scene, as a means
of attracting foreign investment and EEC [European
Economic Community] grants for 'assisted areas,'
(p237).
These 'assisted areas' in the 1970s consisted of: 'development areas'
where the local economy was severly depressed and a large percentage
of the workforce was unemployed; 'special development areas', which
were located within development areas, and where special incentives
were applicable because of the added effects of the demise of coal
mining; and 'intermediate areas' , which had been disadvantaged as a
result of neighbouring development areas (Law, 1980). However, the
assisted areas have been reduced in size and number during the 1980s
(Townsend, 1987) thereby curtailing the overall number of firms
eligible for assistance. Appendix 2 summarises the process of
assisted area cutbacks since 1978. In addition, the Conservative
government re-defined the grants and assistance available to firms
located in the 'assisted areas', and Subsection 3.5.4 details these
changes. Meanwhile, the following subsection considers the
involvement of the private sector in providing investment capital for
small businesses during the 1980s.
3.4.3 The private sector
At the same time as the public sector was attempting to respond to the
financial needs of small firms and stimulate venture capital
investments, entrepreneurs increasingly were able to obtain investment
capital from bank sources in the United Kingdom (Coggan, 1991). This
trend was attributed to expanding competition in the financial
services sector with overseas competitors, building societies and
venture capital funds compelling banks to re-evaluate their lending
strategies and customer relations (Financial Times, 1991a). During
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the 1980s large corporate customers increasingly turned to overseas
lending institutions, personal customers perceived advantages in
banking with building societies and, initially, venture capital
organisations responded favourably to the financial needs of small
firms (see Chapter 4) which were traditionally the domain of the
clearing banks. Perhaps the clearing banks perceived that their
monopoly on small business lending was under threat, thus explaining
the rush to establish and promote small business lending divisions in
the early to mid-1980s, despite the fact that small business loans are
more expensive per pound borrowed than loans to larger companies.
Another motivating factor might have been the publicity associated
with successful venture capital investments in the United States (see
Chapter 4) which encouraged banks to consider the small business
sector as worthy of their interest. In addition to establishing small
business lending units, many of the major clearing banks with
subsidiary in-house venture capital divisions became more active
players on the venture capital scene (Lorenz, 1985).
However, the tore liberal lending strategy of the banks in the 1980s
has been put to the test during the economic downturn of the
early 1990s. It is accepted that companies are more susceptible to
failure during a recession; nevertheless, record numbers of small firm
liquidations have been reported recently (Waters, 1991). It might be
argued that the ready availability of start-up capital enabled the
establishment of higher numbers of marginal companies to the extent
that the 'natural wastage rate' of small firms has been skewed.
However, the countervailing argument is that banks are discriminating
against a number of their smaller corporate clients by failing to pass
on interest rate cuts (Balls and Lapper, 1991) thereby exacerbating
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the liquidation figures. The banks state that the increased margins
on the loans to some small firms are a reflection of the risk-reward
ratio for these particular investments (Stephens and Lascelles, 1991).
Thus, some small firms are still expected to pay a higher loan premium
than larger companies, which was the situation facing small firms at
the time of the Wilson Committee investigations in the late 1970s.
This claim was investigated by the Department of the Treasury which
vindicated the banks of uncompetitive practices, but accused them of
not giving their smaller clients notice of changes to bank charges
(Stephens, 1991). However, the study "... stopped short of fully
exonerating the banks of criticisms that they have treated their small
business customers badly," (Marsh et p 1., 1991, p1).
This maltreatment is due to the sea-change in how bank managers view
small business loans in the 1990s as opposed to the early 1980s:
competition from venture capital organisations in the small business
lending sector has not materialised (see Chapter 4); declining first-
half profit figures of the clearing banks have been attributed largely
to losses on small business lending (Lascelles, 1991); and bank
managers are being compelled to manage individual bank branches as
profit centres (Martin and Barchard, 1991) with salaries being linked
to performance (Batchelor, 1991a). According to Batchelor (1991b)
these trends would ".. appear to presage a frostier climate for the
bank's small-business customers," (p13).
-41-
3.5 CRITICAL COMMENT ON PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT CAPITAL PROVISION
IN THE 1980s
This section focuses on the many existing schemes and organisations
which have been altered by the Conservative administration during the
1980s. The effect of these alterations has been the gradual erosion
of benefits to the small firm sector, especially with regard to the
provision of public sector risk capital (see Table 3.2).
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T.bL. 3.2 pubLic s.ctor sources of risk financ.
Institution!	 Start	 Targ.t	 OriginaL	 Current
schema	 year	 r.cipi.nts	 r.mit	 status
WROC	 1948	 ALL firm sizes	 V.nture capitaL,	 Hsrg.d with WEB
WEB	 1973	 ALl. fir. siz.s
BIG	 1981	 ALL firm sizes
LOS	 1981	 SmaLL firms
BSS	 1981	 Unquoted firms
of Less than
5 years of age
BES	 1983	 Unquoted firms
no ag. Limit
technicaL &	 to form BIG
patent info.,
.ark.ting a.rvfc.
SmaLL firm Loans,	 Merged with
regional. inv.st-	 NRDC to form
ment. technoLogy	 BTG
investment.
management of
pubLic companies
TechnoLogy	 About to b.co..
transfer,	 private sector
Inv.stment and
	
body
op.rat ions.
university.
industry Linkages
Gov.rn.ent	 Government
guaranteed 80% of
	 guarantees 70%
bank Loan at 3%
	
of Loan at 2.5%
pramit. no
	 prem1t.
personaL	 personaL assets
guarantee	 must b.
commited to
comm.rci aL
Loans first
MinimLa 5 year
	
R.pLaced by BES
Investment
period
Minimi. 5 year
	
£500,000 annuaL
investment	 Limit on amount
period. £5	 of fund (5m
annuaL Limit on	 for the private
amount of fund	 residentiaL
property
sector)
3.5.1 The British Technology Group (BTC)
One of the major themes of Conservative government policy since it
came to power in 1979 has been the transfer in emphasis from
assistance under the public sector to increasing reliance on the
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operations of the private sector in stimulating industrial growth.
Nowhere is this more evident than the reasoning behind the decision to
merge the National Enterprise Board with the National Research and
Development Corporation to form the British Technology Group in 1981.
Although termed a merger:
"... the Government decided that the role of the NEB
should be reduced as far as possible, in the belief
that the private sector would be more likely to make
a success of NEB-type investments, and that some
inefficient companies should be allowed to fail
rather than be propped up with taxpayers' money,"
(Cary, 1987, p357).
The government regards the BTG as a source of private sector finance
(Woodcock, 1985) even though it has only recently been put forward as
a candidate for privatisation (Fishlock, 1988). Meanwhile, the:
"British Technology Group is a self-financing public
organisation that licenses new scientific and
engineering products to industry and provides finance
for the development of new technology," (BTG, 1988,
p2).
3.5.2 The Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS)
The modifications to the Loan Guarantee Scheme resulted in two
important changes. Firstly, the government now guarantees a smaller
percentage of the bank loan obtained by the small firm, 70 per cent as
opposed to the original 80 per cent, albeit at a reduced premium of
2.5 per cent (Scottish Enterprise, 1991). Secondly, under the
original scheme the entrepreneur was not required to pledge personal
assets against a conventional loan before becoming eligible for a
guaranteed loan (Woodcock, 1985). According to Lorenz (1985) these
changes resulted from the observed high failure rate amongst firms
receiving guaranteed loans in the past. However, this high rate of
failure may also be attributed partly to the cost of the scheme to
small firms. It is not a cheap form of finance, as borrowers are
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required to pay a premium to the government over and above the
interest payable to the lending bank. Despite a number of notable
successes during the lifetime of the scheme, for example the book
retailer Waterstone's, it is predicted that the Loan Guarantee Scheme
will make only a modest contribution in future to the area of small
firm investment finance since demand has fallen in recent years
(Batchelor, 1989). This may be due in part to the reduced government
role since the scheme started. Presently, the Loan Guarantee Scheme
is the subject of a Department of Employment Review (Financial Times,
l99lb).
3.5.3 The Business Start-up Scheme (BSS) and Business Expansion
Scheme (BES)
Like the Loan Guarantee Scheme, modifications were made to the
Business Start-up Scheme within the first few years of operation.
According to Armitage (1984) and Dean (1984) the disappointing
response to the Business Start-up Scheme by private investors was the
reason for its replacement by the Business Expansion Scheme in the
1983 Finance Act. Dean (1984) believed that the 'disappointing
response' to the Business Start-up Scheme was due to the incorporation
of:
"... many convoluted and tortuous measures to prevent
the abuse and misuse [by the investor] of the [tax]
relief that finally nobody understood it, let alone
was able to to take advantage of it to any extent,"
(p49).
In simplifying the legislation and creating the new Business Expansion
Scheme version, the applicability of the initiative has been broadened
to encompass not only start-up and new businesses of less than five
years old (Armitage, 1984), but also Jj unquoted companies providing
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they do not operate in the agriculture or financial services
industries (Bienkowski and Allen, 1985). The Business Expansion
Scheme has also been revised over the years, and the 1988 budget
radically altered the nature of the scheme. The government imposed a
limit of £500,000 on the amount a Business Expansion Scheme fund could
raise in a year, causing disinterest amongst the sponsors who would
normally promote the scheme to its private investors (Fogel, 1988).
The exception to this new financial limit is private landlords, who
are able to obtain tax relief on the purchase of residential
properties of up to a total of £5 million each year, the previous
maximum amount allowed under the scheme (Taylor, 1988).
Previously, the Business Start-up Scheme had been restricted to
unquoted companies of less than five years of age. As such, it was an
appropriate funding mechanism for small firms which experienced
difficulties in raising equity finance, as identified by the
Macmillan, Radcliffe and Wilson Reports. It might be argued that by
eliminating some of the restrictions associated with the Business
Start-up Scheme, a greater number of firms overall were able to access
assistance. However, it may also be the case that investment in small
start-up firms was overshadowed by the perceived benefits of investing
in more established companies. The small firm investment role of the
Business Expansion Scheme was further diluted by changes made in the
1988 budget. Basically, these alterations meant that investment in
the private residential property sector became highly attractive.
This led Farmbrough (1988) to comment that the:
BES has become an effective vehicle for
government housing policy, but it is questionable
whether it is an effective means of raising capital
for new businesses in other areas. Indeed, the
scheme seems a long way from its original objective
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of providing a source of equity for start-up
businesses which might otherwise have found it
impossible to raise money ... ," (p2)•
Many of the Business Start-up Scheme and Business Expansion Scheme
funds operated under the management of approved private firms and,
since 1987, the number of funds in the United Kingdom has been
declining (see Chapter 4). Perhaps this is partly because the funds
initially established under the Business Expansion Scheme initiative
have performed no better and perhaps even worse than other private
sector investment funds, for example unit trusts (Goldstein-Jackson,
1990). It is difficult to tell whether this would have been the case
if the original aims behind the Business Start-up Scheme had remained
unchanged. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that large capital gains
are obtainable from long-term investment in small growth-oriented
companies (Larsen and Rogers, 1984).
3.5.4 Regional policy
In 1988, the Conservative administration abandoned the automatic award
of Regional Development Grants (RDGs) in favour of Regional Selective
Assistance (RSA) for companies located in the 'assisted areas'
(Harrison, 1988). Previously, manufacturing firms seeking to create
new, or expand existing, production capacity in the aforementioned
assisted development areas (see Subsection 3.4.2) were eligible for an
automatic Regional Development Grant. This was conditional upon the
project creating new jobs in firms employing more than 200 employees,
a provision which was waived for smaller companies. The amount of the
award could be 15 per cent of the capital expenditure or £3,000 for
each new full-time job, whichever proved to be higher. A ceiling of
£10,000 for each new job created limited the total amount of the
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capital expenditure award; however, this condition was also waived in
the case of small firms spending £500,000 or less on the new project
(Bienkowski and Allen, 1985). The maximum award for job creation
projects was forty per cent of the initial capital investment (DTI,
1984).
Until 1988, Regional Selective Assistance and Regional Development
Grants operated concurrently and it was possible for a company to be
awarded grants under both schemes (HMSO, 1984). Since then, however,
firms can only apply for Regional Selective Assistance which is
awarded at the discretion of government bodies. The amount of the
award is negotiable, and must be for projects in the assisted areas
where there is some perceived regional and national economic benefit,
or employment is safeguarded (Bienkowski et al., 1988). According to
Oakey (1988):
"... it is likely that the abolition of
geographically discriminative government incentives
will increase the level of government assistance
take-up in the South East of England. ... even
before the total abolition of regional development
assistance, the balance of government aid to industry
was changing in favour of the South East of Britain
,	 (p11).
The perceived reduction in regional policy expenditure is likely to
have an effect the Scottish subsample of firms in this study, however,
since the personal interview survey was conducted in 1989 and the
policy change occured in 1988, the effect on survey firms will be
limited.
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3.6 CONCLUSION
The concentration on the implementation of more indirect policy
measures, and the reduced effectiveness of existing government schemes
and delivery organisations, is likely to have had a detrimental effect
on the development of the small firm sector towards the end of the
1980s. The justification for this reduced government role may be the
apparent increasing tendency for the private sector to finance the
establishment and growth of companies. However, government action to
combat inflation in the early 1990s has had a direct effect on the
propensity and ability of small businesses to obtain bank finance.
Specifically, high interest rates discourage new borrowings, and high
default rates discourage the banks from lending to small firms. A
recessionary period might be the time for small businesses to consider
equity-based investment funds rather than loan capital. The following
chapter considers the response of the United Kingdom venture capital
industry to the financial needs of small firms, with specific regard
to the high technology manufacturing sector.
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Chapter 4
VENTURE CAPITAL PROVISION IN ThE UNITED KINGDOM
IN RELATION TO ThE UNITED STATES EXANPLE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
By the late 1980s, the provision of venture capital funding to small
manufacturing firms in general, and small high technology firms in
particular, appeared to be in sharp decline. This was the case
despite a high technology manufacturing investment orientation by
United Kingdom venture capital companies in the early 1980s. The
United States venture capital industry, by demonstrating that
significant returns could be achieved by investing in the equity of
small high technology companies, initially served as an example to
venture capital organisations in the United Kingdom. However, the
present venture capital focus in the United Kingdom is somewhat
different to the traditional investment orientation of the venture
capital industry in the United States. Later sections detail these
United Kingdom differences, whilst the following section describes the
developments in the United States venture capital industry which acted
as a 'point of departure' for these later United Kingdom developments.
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4.2 INVESTMENT ORIENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES VENTURE CAPITAL
INDUSTRY
4.2.1 Origins
The United States venture capital industry is strongly linked, both
historically and currently, with high technology industries. Prior to
the Second World War, venture capital investments in the United States
were primarily the domain of wealthy individuals and families, such as
the Rockefellers, Rothschilds and Whitneys (Bullock, 1983). These
pioneers were able to take a philanthropic view of their investment
strategy, leading Wilson (1986) to comment that, "... venture capital
[at that time] was more a rich man's whim than an industry," (p13).
The experimentations in venture capital before the Second World War,
however, laid the foundations for the institutionalisation of the
investment procedure in the late 1940s. One company, in particular,
made a significant impression on the venture capital scene under the
leadership of General George Doriot. He established the American
Research and Development Corporation (ARD) at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1946. This institution was designed
to "... finance the promotion of advanced technology developed in the
major United States universities," (OECD, 1985, p15). Thus, early
development of the venture capital industry was linked to the
exploitation of new technological developments.
It was to take ten years before the American Research and Development
Corporation started to make a profit on its investments, and the
following decade saw the corporation invest in its most successful
venture, Digital Equipment Corporation. This new enterprise received
$70,000 in return for a substantial 78 per cent of its equity in 1957.
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Fifteen years later this one investment realised the capital sum of
$350 million (Wilson, 1986). It must be stated that such a return was
an exception rather than the rule within the American Research and
Development Corporation. Nevertheless, it is likely that the Amercian
Research and Development Corporation example served to interest other
players in the venture capital scene in the 1950s and 1960s. Doriot
also provided these new investors with the role model of the "...
nurturing father-figure, a patient, helpful counsellor willing to
stay ... through good times and bad," (Wilson, 1986, p20).
The proliferation of the new venture capital investment companies in
the early 1960s was linked to the enactment of the United States Small
Business Investment Act in 1958. This enabled the creation of Small
Business Investment Companies (SBICs) which could invest capital,
borrowed at preferential rates of interest from the government, in the
equity of small firms (Bullock, 1983). Wilson (1986) stated that:
"... the SBIC program fueled the creation of today's
venture capital industry by drawing hundreds of new
players into the field of risk investment and by
funding some of the most important startups of the
1960s," (p22).
A number of these 'new players' set up as independent investment
companies, utilising the resources of both individual and
institutional investors (Pratt, 1983a). Large institutional
investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, were now
prepared to invest capital with a venture capital firm in anticipation
of exceptional returns from a portfolio of new high-risk companies
(Pratt, 1983a).
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The 1974-1975 recession, however, weakened the newly emerged venture
capital industry. Many portfolio companies were beginning to succeed,
only to be hit by a slump in the early to mid-1970s which threatened
their development. According to Perez (1984) "the majority of
venturers virtually abandoned high-risk deals in the mid 1970s for
safer leveraged buy-outs and investments in public companies," (p22).
However, a number of venture capital organisations were forced to
maintain their original investments, some for a longer period than
first envisaged, since the market for small company shares had all but
disappeared (Pratt, 1983a). This proved to be a fortuitous
occurrence, as venture capital providers began to work closely with
the management of the portfolio firms during the period of the
recession. In this way, the venture capital organisations discovered
the 'powerful value-added effect' of their long-term involvement,
since many of the investee firms eventually realised significant gains
in public offerings (Pratt, 1983b). These exceptional returns did not
escape the notice of institutional investors, as Wilson (1986) points
out:
the institutions have seen that by selecting and
nurturing a portfolio of new companies, a
professional venture capitalist can not only live
with risks that would discourage most investors but
in fact achieve rates of return strikingly higher
than other equity investment vehicles. It is equally
impressive that few long-term players in professional
venture capital have lost money," (p25).
Further stimuli to the development of the United States venture
capital industry were changes in the regulations concerning the
management of pension funds (Clark, 1987) and a reduction in the rate
of capital gains tax in 1978 (Pratt, 1983a). These developments
resulted in the industry 'rising like a phoenix from the ashes' after
a previously stagnant period during the mid-1970s (Pratt, 1983b). The
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impact of government policy on the development of the industry became
clear:
"A major cause of the US venture capital market
developing so unevenly appears to have been changes
in government policy, and especially in securities
regulations and taxation. The increase in capital
gains tax between 1969 and 1976 is thought to have
been one of the prime reasons why the supply of
private venture capital fell over this period: the
reductions in capital gains tax in 1978 and again in
1981 are similarly believed to have been an important
factor in the recent increase in supply," (Bank of
England, 1982, p512).
4.2.2 United States venture capital in the 1980s and beyond
By the early 1980s the industry had become 'healthy and vibrant,' as a
consequence of the greater supply of venture capital resulting in
greater demand from entrepreneurs and managers (Pratt, 1983a). The
industry now consisted of venture capital subsidiaries of banks, other
financial institutions and industrial companies, a number of private
venture capital companies and Small Business Investment Companies
(Bank of England, 1982). These financiers continued to provide a
range of classic early-stage and start-up venture capital services,
along with later-stage capital, with some investors specialising in
the provision of funds by type of industry and/or investment stage
(Pratt, 1983a). Despite the large number of players involved, Bullock
(1983) maintained that it was "... still an intimate industry with
most of the principals ... knowing each other, syndicating deals and
helping each other out ... ," (p22). Perhaps one of the reasons for
this intimacy was that the industry had remained strongly regional in
nature. Although a number of venture capital organisations were
located in the financial centres of New York, Chicago, San Francisco
and Los Angeles, most of the organisations solely dedicated to the
provision of venture capital finance could be found in areas of high
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technology industrial production, namely Boston and the Silicon Valley
area of California. Bullock (1983) identifies one consequence of this
regional orientation:
"As a result of this local bias, the deals financed
tend to reflect developments in the local industry
rather than vice versa. The industries in which
venture capitalists have been most active are
computers, computer peripherals, semi-conductors,
office equipment, CAD/CAN, some electronic defence
equipment, some medical equipment, some energy
sources and most recently genetic engineering,"
(p22).
However, this technological emphasis was to cause problems for the
industry in the latter half of the 1980s. Investment capital was
flooding into the United States venture capital industry which, in
turn, was invested in more and more high technology start-up ventures
(Dickson, 1990). Since the rationale for this investment strategy was
1 me-too' based, with venture capital organisations simply investing in
what were the fashionable sectors at the time, many of these start-ups
failed as a result of the generally poor quality of the original
investment decision (Clark, 1987). This situation was precipated by
falling share prices in quoted small high technology firms in the
latter part of 1983 (Clark, 1987) and the later stock market crash of
1987 (Dickson, 1990). Understandably, venture capital organisations
and their sources of funds became much more cautious, preferring
investments in later stage companies in sectors which were not
technology-based (Tait, 1991). The flow of funds to business start-
ups started to dry up by the late 1980s (Economist, 1989).
Nevertheless, a number of United States venture capitalists have
recognised that the current downturn presents an opportunity to invest
in quality' new companies in anticipation of achieving higher returns
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and, in the process, stimulating a cyclical upswing in business start-
up investments similar to that which occurred in the late 1970s
(Clark, 1987), (see Subsection 4.2.1). The managing director of the
specialist consultancy Venture Economics, Susan Lloyd, observed that
technology-based and early-stage investments continued at high levels
in the United States in the late 1980s (Batchelor, 1988a). Indeed,
one member of the United States venture capital industry predicted
"... a bright future for technology-based companies which can compete
globally and move new products quickly," (Dunrie, 1988, p6).
Therefore, entrepreneurs in the United States are still able to access
funding for the establishment of new companies. However, this trend
may not be entirely due to operations of the United States venture
capital industry, but partially the result of private individuals or
'business angels' steadfastly investing equity and expertise in small
business ventures (Batchelor, 1988b).
According to Mason et p 1. , (1991) there is a substantial informal
venture capital market in the United States providing new and growing
businesses with smaller sums of risk capital than the formal venture
capital community is prepared to invest. Indeed, research by Gaston
and Bell (1988) established that:
"Private investors or 'business angels' represent the
largest source of external equity capital for small
businesses in the US ... . Private individuals invest
at least two to three times the $4bn invested
annually by venture capital companies in the US,"
(Batchelor, 1990a, p17).
Technology-based firms in the United States, whether they require
start-up or development capital, are likely to obtain the required
finance from business angels (Wetzel, 1983). These investors tend to
be ex-entrepreneurs or business managers seeking to invest
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money and time in local start-up companies, typically in high
technology sectors (Mason et p 1., 1991). They invest small sums of
money, in the form of a minority equity shareholding, for a period of
anything up to ten years (Batchelor, 1988b). Business angels are
stimulated by the entrepreneurial atmosphere and seek to be actively
involved in their investee companies (Mason et p 1., 1991). In
essence, it would appear that the United States 'business angels' of
today embody the original venture capital ideal (see Chapter One).
4.3 INVESTMENT ORIENTATION OF ThE UNITED KINGDOM VENTURE CAPITAL
INDUSTRY
4.3.1 Investment strategy and industry focus
Initially it appeared that a similar relationship between venture
capital providers and high technology firms would follow in the United
Kingdom. In the early 1980s the venture capital industry responded
favourably to the financial needs of small firms, especially small
high technology firms. However, the emergence of the United Kingdom
venture capital industry was ill-timed to coincide with a period of
worldwide decline in certain high technology industries. According to
Foster (1986) the bottom fell out of the high technology sector
leading a number of venture capital organisations to divest their
technological commitments. As a result, Martin (1989) observed that
the electronics and other high technology sectors obtained a declining
share of overall United Kingdom venture capital investments during the
1980s, although the actual amount received increased. Understandably,
a number of United Kingdom venture capital organisations, having had
their fingers burnt with uprofitable investments in high technology
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companies, started to look for investment opportunities in more
commercial industrial sectors.
Table 4.1 illustrates that a wide variety of industries have attracted
the attention of venture capital providers throughout the years,
particularly those concerned with consumer products and/or services
(Clark, 1987). The number of companies in the consumer related sector
provided with venture capital funding has gone up from 96 in 1985 to
305 in 1990, and there was a two per cent increase over these six
years in terms of overall investments. Pratt (1990) maintained that
this investment orientation was to the detriment of high technology
manufacturing industries. This is borne out by Table 4.1, where the
number of computer related investments has increased from 71 in 1985
to 156 in 1990, but the trend was down from seventeen per cent of all
investments in 1985 to thirteen per cent in 1990. Likewise, the
number of electronics related investments has increased, but their
percentage share was down to five per cent in 1990 from nine per cent
in 1985.
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TabL. 4.1 BVCA* inv..tm.nt. by industry ssctor
1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Ssctor	 Ne.coa. % NO.COS. S Nocos. S No.cos. S No.co,. S No.cos. S
Consumer Retatad	 96	 23	 112	 25	 259	 22	 305	 23	 329	 25	 305	 25
L.I.ur.	 28	 23	 41	 55	 73	 39
R.taiting	 17	 16	 52	 49	 48	 56
Food	 11	 11	 39	 51	 36	 66
Product.	 22	 32	 66	 77	 100	 65
SsrvIc.,	 16	 24	 53	 61	 54	 77
Oth.r	 2	 6	 8	 12	 18	 2
Computer R.Lat.d	 71	 17	 64	 14	 117	 10	 127	 10	 139	 11	 156	 13
Computsrs	 9	 6	 12	 12	 22	 15
Graphics	 8	 6	 9	 14	 11	 8
P.riph.rats	 8	 12	 20	 21	 14	 15
S.rvicss	 6	 6	 18	 37	 19	 21
Softwar.	 32	 27	 45	 35	 65	 95
Oth.r	 8	 7	 13	 8	 8	 2
Electronics Related	 39	 9	 35	 8	 73	 6	 68	 5	 81	 6	 61	 5
Components	 12	 7	 20	 54	 30	 31
In.trum.ntation	 8	 9	 16	 2	 9	 8
Qthir	 19	 19	 37	 12	 42	 22
IndustriaL Products	 44	 10	 35	 8	 125	 11	 155	 12	 132	 10	 130	 11
Ch.micat.	 10	 8	 43	 27	 48	 54
Automation	 10	 6	 22	 36	 19	 12
Equipment/Machinery	 11	 10	 38	 68	 39	 37
Other	 13	 11	 22	 24	 26	 27
M.dicatf8iot.chnolopy	16	 4	 32	 7	 58	 5	 52	 4	 58	 5	 51	 4
Communicition.	 34	 8	 28	 6	 53	 5	 37	 3	 30	 2	 20	 2
Energy	7 	 2	 3	 1	 14	 1	 19	 1	 16	 1	 14	 1
Tran.ort.tion	 20	 5	 23	 5	 53	 5	 62	 5	 67	 5	 90	 7
Construction	 19	 5	 9	 2	 55	 5	 58	 4	 82	 6	 75	 6
Financial Services	 14	 3	 24	 5	 36	 3	 126	 9	 25	 2	 55	 5
Other Services	 33	 8	 64	 14	 190	 16	 109	 8	 147	 11	 91	 8
Other Manufacturin g
	31	 7	 24	 5	 141	 12	 208	 16	 196	 15	 173	 14
TOTAL	 424 101	 453 100 1174 101 1326 100 1302 100 1221 100
* This tabL. contains statistics from BVCA ..mb.rs only
Source: BVCA (1985; 1986; 1987a; 1988; 1989; 1990b)
A partial explanation for the declining interest in high technology
sectors could be the tendency for financial organisations in the
United Kingdom to pursue rapid short-term results (see later).
However, according to Rothwell and Zegveld (1985):
the American experience suggests that it takes
time to accumulate the knowledge necessary for the
operation of a successful venture capital system.
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This means that banks, other financial institutions
and governments that have recently entered the
venture capital field will need sufficient patience
to allow for this knowledge accumulation to occur.
It involves the acceptance of high risks in normally
risk averse institutions, as well as other
fundamental attitudinal and cultural changes. Such
changes cannot occur overnight. In the context of
reindustrialization, however, they are clearly
essential," (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985, pig2).
The question arises as to whether a high technology investment
strategy has been abandoned too soon to result in significant returns
to United Kingdom venture capital organisations.
4.3.2 Types of investor and source of funds
Table 4.2 demonstrates the development and maturation of the industry
during the decade by detailing the number of separate venture capital
investments by investor type since 1985, the earliest year for which
compatible statistics are available. The presentation of the figures
is impaired by the fact that there is no comprehensive database
available for the industry. This applies especially to the period
prior to 1983, before the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA)
was formed (Martin, 1989). The formation of the British Venture
Capital Association lent further emphasis to the recognition of the
venture capital industry in the United Kingdom. This organisation is
responsible for overseeing the standards and ethics of its members,
monitoring the development of the industry and representing the views
and interests of its members in meetings with professional
organisations and government (Lorenz, 1985).
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TsbL. 4.2 BVCAt investm.nts by investor type**
1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990
Investor Typ.
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 S	 No.	 S	 No.	 S
I ndep.nd.nt
- Private	 316	 37	 393	 41	 544	 32	 594	 31	 516	 28	 520	 30
• PubLic	 85	 10	 136	 14	 149	 9	 211	 11	 126	 7	 123	 7
Captive
- Bank	 151	 18	 153	 16	 173	 10	 207	 11	 284	 15	 213	 12
- P.nsion Fund
	 73	 9	 43	 5	 31	 2	 49	 3	 35	 2	 35	 2
- Other	 61	 7	 86	 9	 101	 6	 46	 2	 72	 4	 113	 7
31	 -	 -	 -	 -	 529	 31	 591	 31	 707	 38	 618	 36
BES	 126	 15	 96	 10	 115	 7	 78	 4	 37	 2	 25	 1
Governm.nt	 33	 4	 55	 6	 84	 5	 123	 7	 78	 4	 94	 5
TotaL	 843	 100	 962	 100	 1726 100 1899 100 1855 100 1741 100
This tabt. contains statistics from BVCA members onLy
Hany BVCA members manage more than on. investm.nt vehicle. Thes. may
be of the same or different types (e.g. a private institutionaLLy-
backed fund and a BES fund).
Source: BVCA (1985; 1986; 1987a; 1988; 1989; 1990b)
The different types of investor listed in Table 4.2 include a large
number of private independent venture capital funds, and also a number
of independent organisations which are publicly listed. The private
independent funds are financed by more than one institutional source
of capital, and the share markets provide funds for the public
independent organisations. On the other hand, captive venture capital
funds draw their finances from one parental source, either a bank,
pension fund or other financial institution. Many financial
organisations have established their own venture capital subsidiaries
or divisions in order to extend the financial services they offer.
The make-up and source of capital for 3± and Business Expansion Scheme
funds have been discussed in the previous chapter. It is via the
medium of Business Expansion Scheme funds that individuals in the
United Kingdom mainly play a role in the funding of the venture
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capital industry. However, a recent report by Mason et al. (1991)
indicated that private investors could become increasingly involved in
the funding of new, specifically technology-oriented, ventures (see
Subsection 4.3.6). Finally, there are a number of organisations which
are funded by the government either directly, for example Scottish
Enterprise (formerly known as the Scottish Development Agency) or
indirectly, for example through local authority initiatives (BVCA,
1989).
Noticeably, there has been a general declining trend in the percentage
of Business Expansion Scheme and pension fund investments. Table 4.2
demonstrates that Business Expansion Scheme funds made fifteen per
cent, and pension funds nine per cent, of all investments in 1985.
This compares with one per cent for Business Expansion Scheme funds
and two per cent for pension funds in 1990. Over this same period, the
percentage of investments made by the other investors has remained
more or less constant (see Table 4.2). In addition, the total number
of investments by all venture capital organisations has declined since
1988, although the 1990 figure is still more than twice that of 1985.
Perhaps this can be explained by the rush to take advantage of
investments in the early 1980s, and subsequent caution until their
success could be assessed. Alternatively, returns from early
investments which were less than expected might have prompted
investors to concentrate less on the venture capital sector. The
prevailing economic climate is also a factor, and the 1990/91
recession will have affected both the supply of, and demand for,
venture capital finance.
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4.3.3 Length of investment
As in the United States, City institutions have been a prominent
source of finance for the venture capital community in the United
Kingdom. However, these institutions have been criticised for viewing
investment on a time-scale different to that of industrialists
(Plender, 1990) a problem which has become known as 'short-termism'
(Holberton, 1991). It is argued that:
"... the operation of the UK capital market is
inimical to long term planning and investment because
the stock market and investors in it are driven by
short-term considerations, such as company profits
and dividend statements, and their need to perform,"
(Holberton, 1990, p17).
This has a particular effect on investment in industrial innovation,
as the United Kingdom Engineering Council indicated:
"The City seems to positively discourage investment
in innovation. While it likes to see adequate
research and development, it does not like it to be
at the expense of current profit growth. ... The
City thus acts as 'the master' instead of 'the
servant' of industry with the emphasis firmly on
short-term return," (House of Lords, 1991, p1.5).
The implication for venture capital investors is that they will tend
to seek investments which will produce results over the shorter rather
than longer term for their City-based financial backers. This is
expanded upon in the following subsection.
4.3.4 Investment strategy and investment stage
The tendency by the United Kingdom venture capital industry to pursue
short-term returns is illustrated by the trend in the late 1980s to
invest in later-stage investments, particularly management buy-outs,
as opposed to start-up and early stage investments. Management buy-
outs generally involve the expenditure of larger sums of capital, but
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offer a more secure investment over a shorter realisation period. The
reason for this is that the three important investment criteria of
venture capital organisations, namely management, market and
product/service, are more established than with start-up or early-stage
companies. Management buy-outs entail existing management teams
taking over established companies with developed products and markets.
As a result, the perceived investment risk for the venture capital
provider is reduced.
The justification for targeting management buy-out investments is that
they offer an important source of current income to the venture
capital organisation which is waiting for returns to materialise from
early-stage investments (Clark, 1987). However, this argument only
holds if the venture capital provider maintains a range of investments
by different financing stage; that is, some early-stage investments
held in the same portfolio as later stage financings. This does not
always occur since many funds specialise by investment stage, which
has repercussions in terms of this research. Martin (1989) explains:
"... in value terms the new and small firm sector is
by no means the primary focus of venture capital
activity. At the same time the growing concentration
on management buy-outs raises questions about the
meaning and purpose of venture capital, about whether
it is moving too far away from what many would regard
as its original and key role of backing new small
business ventures, TM (p399).
The emphasis on management buy-outs involving larger sums of capital
also means that the investment is more cost effective to the venture
capital provider than early-stage investments. The administration
costs per investment stay more or less the same regardless of the
investment size (interview evidence with a representative of Hambros
Advanced Technology Trust).
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4.3.5 Investment strategy and location
In terms of location the United Kingdom venture capital industry is
similar to that of the United States. Many venture capital
organisations cluster around major financial centres, and in the
United Kingdom London is notable in this respect:
"Of the 135 venture capital organizations listed as
members of the British Venture Capital Association at
the beginning of 1988, some 101 (or 75%) were located
or headquartered in London, and a further six were
based elsewhere in the South East region ... The main
provincial clusters of locally-based venture capital
firms that exist are extremely small in comparison,
namely Edinburgh (7), Birmingham (6), Cambridge (3),
and Glasgow and Cardiff (each with 2). In terms of
its organizational structure, then, the industry is
overwhelmingly skewed towards the southern half of
the country," (Martin, 1989, p393).
In terms of the location of the actual investments themselves:
"Greater London and the South East remained the
dominant sector, accounting for 42% of the companies
financed and for 61% of the amount invested.
Scotland was the only region to show a significant
increase in activity levels in terms of the number
of companies invested in, rising from 11% in 1989 to
14% in 1990. Total investment ... 7% ...," (BVCA,
1990b, p11).
Martin (1989) has observed that the South East and East Anglia regions
not only received a disproportionate share of total investments, but
also received a disproportionate share of total technological
investments over the years. This is attributed to many new and
growing businesses locating in the South East planning region and East
Anglia, and these regions being at the forefront of the economic
recovery of the United Kingdom during the mid to late 1980s. However,
the predominance of venture capital institutions in terms of supply
has had an equal, although independent, effect on the regional bias of
venture capital investments. Martin (1989) elaborates:
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"... the spatial proximity of, and hence the scope
for 'hands on' contact between, venture capital
managers and local client projects is of key
importance: all other things being equal, risk
aversion is likely to be an increasing function of
the locational separation between the venture
capitalist and the investees seeking venture finance.
Because of the concentration of venture capital
organizations in the London area, this factor may
well have served to impart regional bias in venture
investment in favour of the surrounding parts of
southern Britain which, being within convenient
travel distance and thus easy to monitor, are viewed
as rich in investment opportunities and 'low risk,'"
(p398).
This indicates that venture capital providers in the United Kingdom
set a high priority on the need for 'hands on' contact, allowing them
to 'nurture' and 'add value' to their investments by actively working
with investee companies. However, venture capital organisations in
the United Kingdom have tended to take a more 'responsive' investment
stance, waiting for the investee company to request assistance beyond
the provision of investment capital. Taylor (1983) sums up the
difference between the United Kingdom and the United States venture
capital industries in this respect:
N ... the 'responsive' investor has actually dominated
the scene [in the UK] since the 1940s in the shape of
ICFC. We therefore have had an implicit definition
of venture capital as being risk money and responsive
support, whereas in the US it has been equity finance
and active support," (p27).
A 'responsive' investm€.nt stance might be more manageable when not
investing in inexperienced companies attempting to take new products
to new markets; that is, United Kingdom venture capital organisations
can afford to take a more hands-off investment role with later-stage
investments in companies with established trading records.
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4.3.6 Private investors or 'business angels' in the United Kingdom
Evidence on business angel activity in the United Kingdom is primarily
limited to a study by Cohn Mason, Richard Harrison and Jennifer
Chaloner of the University of Southampton and the Univerity of Ulster
at Jordanstown (Mason et p 1., 1991). According to the researchers:
"... informal investors are playing an important role
in the financing of small businesses in the UK.
First, by making investments typically of under
£50,000, ..., a significant proportion of which is in
new and recently established businesses, informal
investors are contributing to the filling of the
equity gap. Second, entrepreneurs would seem more
likely to be able to raise finance from informal
investors than from venture capital funds.
informal investors have a lower rejection rate, are
more patient investors, and have lower rates of
return targets,N (Mason et p 1., 1991, p3te).
Like their counterparts in the United States, many business angels in
the United Kingdom are stimulated by the entrepreneurial process.
Typically, these informal investors are successful entrepreneurs
and/or businessmen who seek to invest small amounts of capital in
local ventures for two main purposes: one to obtain significant
financial gains from a successful investment, and two to be actively
involved in the management and development of investee firms (Mason
.L, 1991). However, in an earlier study, Harrison and Mason (1991)
hypothesised that United Kingdom business angels possessed certain
different characteristics and attitudes to business angels in the
United States. This was confirmed by their recent research (Mason
1991) which found that informal investors in the United Kingdom
invest considerably less per firm, are less patient, and have
expectations of higher rates of return and capital gains than their
counterparts in the United States. In addition, more informal
investors in the United Kingdom than in the United States claimed that
their investment portfolios were performing below expectation (Mason
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etal., 1991). This is likely to be a result of their flawed 'invest
less for less time and gain more' strategy. One final important
difference is that United Kingdom business angels expect to sell their
equity shareholding to someone outside the investee company, whereas
business angels in the United States mostly sell the shareholding back
to the investee firm (Mason et al., 1991). This tendency could deter
entrepreneurs wishing to maintain control of their ventures from
accepting finance from United Kingdom business angels.
4.4 A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES VENTURE
CAPITAL INDUSTRIES
4.4.1 Industry structure
Many venture capital organisations in the United States are
partnerships, whereby a small number of people with entrepreneurial or
business experience independently raise investment funds from larger
financial institutions (Clark, 1987). In contrast, many venture
capital operations in the United Kingdom are affiliated to larger
financial institutions, although they may have a certain amount of
decision-making independence, and the proportion of people with
entrepreneurial or industrial experience is much less in evidence
(Clark, 1987).	 Overall, the venture capital industry in the United
Kingdom appears to have adopted a more bureaucratic structure to that
of the United States (see also Subsection 4.4.2). This is almost
certainly a result of the later development of the United Kingdom
venture capital industry, as the following illustrates.
-68-
Figure 4.2 highlights some major developmental stages in the growth of
both the United Kingdom and United States venture capital industries,
and demonstrates that a number of parallels can be drawn between the
two countries. Both the 1958 Small Business Investment Act in the
United States and the 1981 Companies Act in the United Kingdom (see
Chapter 3) resulted in government initiated small business investment
vehicles; that is, Small Business Investment Companies in the United
States and the Business Start-up Scheme and Business Expansion Scheme
in the United Kingdom. These initiatives encouraged venture capital
funding on a large scale in the 1960s in the United States and the
1980s in the United Kingdom. The proliferation of venture capital
organisations in the United Kingdom in the early l980s coincided with
a time when venture capital investments, a long-established informal
feature of the United States financial system, became more formalised
and recognised as an industry (Orsenigo, 1989). This was largely a
result of the emerging involvement of large institutional investors in
the venture capital investment process in the United States (Wilson,
1986). Such large institutional investors in the United Kingdom have
been involved in venture capital funding from the beginning of the
formalised industry in the early 1980s, and as far back as the l940s
when the banks formed the Industrial and Commercial Finance
Corporation (see Chapter 2).
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1974
1978
Figurs 4.1 D.v.Lop.snt of the Unit.d States and United Kingdom vsnture capitaL
industries
United States
	
United Kingdom
S..LL Business Investment Act 1958
1960s ISmaLL BUsiness Invest.ent
Co.pani.s (SBIC5)
1st CYCLE PROLIFERATION OF
VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES
- LittLe institutionaL
invoLvement
Recession
Review/reLaxation of
financiaL reguLations
2nd CYCLE PROLIFERATION OF
VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES
- InstitutionaL invoLvement
Investment in new	 1980s
technoLogy-reLated ventures
1981	 Companies Act
1980s	 Business Start-Up Scheme (BSS)/
Business Expansion Scheme (BES)
1st CYCLE PROLIFERATION OF
VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES
- institutionaL invoLvement
I 1990	 Recession
I— ————————-1
1990s	 Review of financiaL reguLations?
2nd CYCLE PROLIFERATION OF
VENTURE CAPITAL COMPANIES?
11990s	 Investment In new technoLogy-
reLated ventures?
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Figure 4.1 illustrates that the United Kingdom venture capital
industry has generally mirrored the development of the United States
venture capital industry with a decreasing time lag. Therefore, there
has been a degree of convergence in the two industries. This will be
investigated in in the following subsection in terms of the relative
investment strategies pursued by the two venture capital industries.
In terms of industry structure, however, it might be postulated from
Figure 4.1 that the 1990s could see the United Kingdom government
review some of its financial regulations as it emerges from the
recession and, in turn, this could lead to a second upsurge in venture
capital activity (hence the question marks in Figure 4.1). In
addition, a governmental reappraisal of technology-related initiatives
may stimulate private sector investment in the new technologies. If
this stimulus is not forthcoming, the question arises as to whether
the government should be prepared to take responsibility for directljr
financing the development of important new technology-based
industries. The conclusion to this thesis will discuss the role the
government might play in terms of the provision of venture capital
type funding.
4.4.2 Investment strategy
Prior to the late 1980s, a number of differences were observed in the
modi operandi of the United States and United Kingdom venture capital
industries (see Table 4.3). Traditional venture capitalists in the
United States (Perez, 1984) primarily invested in new ventures with a
high technology content (Pratt, 1983c; Orsenigo, 1989) thus becoming
"... brokers of risk, .. ." (Wilson, 1986, p5). They sought to reduce
this risk by actively participating in the management of their
investee companies, bringing considerable experience in the form of
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previous similar investments and/or their own business ventures and
established commercial contacts, thus, adding value to the investment
(Timmons, 1983; Amit et p 1., 1990). Management participation was
facilitated by the fact that venture capitalists often obtained
majority shareholdings, giving them the opportunity to exercise
control if required (Bullock, 1983; Wilson, 1986; Clark, 1987).
Venture capitalists did not seek to maximise their short-term returns,
instead they invested in the form of equity and realised their
investments after a number of years when the investee company was
publicly listed or sold to another company (Wilson, 1986). The
spectacular investment successes of Digital Equipment Corporation,
Scientific Data Systems, Apple Computer, Compaq, Lotus and Genentech
in the United States (Hambrecht, 1984; Wilson, 1986; Economist, 1989;
Lancaster, 1991) encouraged other countries to develop venture
capital-type investments.
TabL. 4.3 Comparison of th. Investment Strategies of
th. Unit.d States and Unit.d klngdo. V.nturs
CapitaL Industriss Prior to the Lat. 1980.
United States	 Unit.d kingdom
Proportion of
high technoLogy	 HIGH	 LOW
inv.st..nts
Proportion of
	
HIGH	 LOW
equity acquired
LeveL of risk	 HIGH	 LOW
Degree of hands-
on InvoLvement	 HIGH	 LOW
Length of
invoLvement	 HIGH	 LOW
Bureaucratic
structure	 LOW	 HIGH
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However, Rothwell observed in 1985 that "the UK ... is at a relatively
early - and some would say confused - stage in adopting the techniques
and style of American venture capitalists," (p262). This 'confusion'
translated into a very different investment strategy amongst United
Kingdom venture capital organisations. The United Kingdom venture
capital industry tends to focus less on high technology investments
and more on the consumer product and/or service industries and, at the
same time, more established companies receive the major share of
venture capital funds in the form of management buy-out and other
later-stage investment capital (BVCA, 1985; 1986; 1987a; 1988; 1989;
1990b). Venture capital organisations rarely take a controlling
equity stake in the investee company except, perhaps, where a number
of financiers invest a large amount of funds in one company as a
syndicate (Lorenz, 1985). As a result, it is rare for the venture
capital organisation to become actively involved in the management of
the investee company (Dodgson and Rothwell, 1989) although many
appoint, or reserve the right to appoint, directors to the board of
management of the investee company (Lorenz, 1985). This investment
strategy by the United Kingdom venture capital industry has a
threefold effect; the level of risk of the investment is reduced, the
time until the realisation of the investment is reduced and the need
for hands-on contact is reduced. This reduced involvement with
investee companies means that United Kingdom venture capital
organisations are able to operate in a more standardised and, hence,
bureaucratic manner. Perhaps this investment orientation results from
the fact that a number of major players on the venture capital scene
were drawn from accountancy backgrounds and did not have industrial
experience (Clark, 1987). This has a twofold effect on venture
capital operations. First, venture capital personnel are more
-73-
qualified to assess the existing quantitative assets rather than the
technical potential of prospective investments. Second, they are more
able to assist with the financial, rather than management, operations
of investee companies.
Clark (1987) predicted that the reorganisation of the United States
venture capital industry in the 1980s, specifically the establishment
of venture capital subsidiaries by large financial institutions, might
lead to 'bureaucratic inertia' in future. Although venture capital
organisations in the United States are not 'inert' currently, they do
appear to be tending towards a bureaucratic structure similar to that
of United Kingdom venture capital providers. In particular, the
investment orientations of the two industries are converging on later-
stage investments to the detriment of business start-ups (Durr, 1991)
which is the result of institutional pressure on venture capital
investors to show early, albeit potentially lower, returns (Economist,
1989; Tait, 1991). That is not to say that the operations of the two
venture capital industries are unacceptable. However, it is important
that the United Kingdom government recognises two factors: the United
Kingdom venture capital industry is not responding favourably to the
financial needs of high risk technology-based ventures; and informal
investors in the United Kingdom do not appear to be filling this
funding gap as readily as United States business angels.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
The trend in the early 1980s towards less automatic, more indirect
forms of government assistance resulted in an environment conducive to
the emergence of the United Kingdom venture capital industry.
However, it is clear that, no matter how encouraging the environment,
the private sector will always tend to neglect certain areas of
business which are not attractive in the short term but which,
nonetheless, may be important in terms of the future economic
development of the United Kingdom. In such circumstances, it might be
politic for the government to take a more active role in the promotion
of initially unattractive areas of business.
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to investigate the
relationship which exists currently between the venture capital
industry and small high technology firms in the United Kingdom in
order to recommend appropriate government action. The investigation
can be made more relevant by taking a regional perspective and
attempting to evaluate whether, with the removal of direct government
assistance in the regions, the poorly developed venture capital market
outside of the South East area has any effect on the growth of small
high technology manufacturing firms in the regions. This study
samples small firms from the electronics sector in the core area of
the South East of England and the more peripheral region of Scotland,
in order to attempt a critique on the effectiveness of the private
sector provision of venture capital funds to such companies. Chapter
5 outlines the methodology used in generating the data for this
research, and Chapters 6 through to 10 analyse the results.
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Chapter 5
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METhODOLOGY
5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to set the design of this research in context, the following
subsection initially highlights the major hypotheses to be tested in
subsequent chapters.
5.1.1 Research questions
This study proposes to investigate the relationship between producers
of venture capital finance, venture capital organisations, and
important consumers of these funds, small high technology
manufacturing firms. A comprehensive review of relevant literature
resulted in the following hypotheses.
Firms do not tend to approach the most suitable
financial organisation or choose the most
appropriate financial instrument for their needs.
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Ideally, the entrepreneur should have a clear understanding of the
precise nature of his financial requirements when seeking additional
external capital (Williams, 1987). For example, it should be
established whether the finance is required to supplement working
capital, 'shore-up' the firm in times of trouble, support growth, fund
specific projects, or is for some other objective. This should help
the entrepreneur determine what type of finance is required and
identify the most appropriate financiers.
The growth of small high technology manufacturing
firms in the United Kingdom is, inter qua,
improved by the adoption of venture capital
finance.
High technology entrepreneurs requiring start-up and development
capital may decide that venture capital funding is appropriate,
especially given the evidence of the relationship between venture
capitalists and high technology firms in the United States. The
presence of, and ease of access to, venture capital funding in a
prevailing entrepreneurial climate in the United States has resulted
in the creation and proliferation of new businesses in emerging
technological industries (Pratt, 1982).
Firms located in the South East of England are at
an advantage when compared with similar firms
located elsewhere because of the concentration of
both venture capital organisations and investment
deals in this region.
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Venture capital institutions located in the South
East of England are not responding to the latent
demand for venture capital finance by companies in
more peripheral regions, for example Scotland.
The fact that the majority of United Kingdom venture capital providers
are not only based in London, but also invest a disproportionate
amount of funds in the Greater London and South East of England areas
(Mason, 1987) might mean that firms located in more peripheral areas
are disadvantaged. Firms based in the South East have access to a
greater availability of venture capital funds, reputedly involving
better financial terms and access to extensive local contact networks
in comparison to other financial organisations.
Venture capital funding is 'crowding out' other
sources of finance by providing similar financial
services and imposing similar conditions in order
to reduce the risk of the investment.
It is alleged that Nventure capital is hardly venturesome
[since] ... funds behave more like banks," (Batchelor, 1987, p20).
Criticisms have been levelled at venture capital organisations in the
United Kingdom for duplicating existing financial services in the
pursuit of rapid, risk free returns (Batchelor, 1990b). In addition,
management buy-outs involving large sums of capital gained popularity
in the United Kingdom to the detriment of early-stage investments
(Batchelor, 1988a) leading to the supposition that the 'equity gap' is
still a problem affecting the growth of small high technology firms.
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The ability to obtain venture capital funding
depends upon the nature of the initial contact
between the investor and investee and/or the
quality of the business plan in terms of
management, market and product criteria.
The preferred course of action for a company applying for venture
capital funds, according to venture capital organisations, is a
personal introduction to the potential investor by a third party
rather than an unsolicited call (Pratt, 1983c). Venture capital
providers have encouraged entrepreneurs to establish contact through
familiar intermediaries like accountants, bankers or lawyers (Clark,
1987). Thus, venture capital organisations can evaluate investment
opportunities in relation to the judgement of the intermediaries, who
might have forwarded 'good' or 'bad' investments in the past. Once
contact has been established, the decision to pursue the investment
opportunity is largely determined by the quality of the business plan
(Timmons, 1981). Typically, the investigation consists of ". . . an
independent study of the technical features of . . . [the] product,
verification of the marketing information, and a reference check on
key personnel," (Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1983, p57).
The propensity to apply for venture capital
funds depends upon the ethos of the founding
entrepreneur in terms of the ownership and
control of the company.
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The provision of traditional venture capital funding often involves
the transference of a sometimes substantial shareholding which results
in some loss of control for the original owner (Forrest, 1987). If
the entrepreneur puts a high value on the ownership of the company,
then he may not be willing to to apply for venture capital funds
because of the need to concede equity. To investigate the effect of
the ethos of the founder on the propensity to apply for venture
capital funding, firms which have 	 applied for venture capital are
included in the sample along with companies which have obtained this
finance. A third category of survey firm is included in the study to
account for the situation where firms applied for venture capital
finance but did not receive it, because either the company was refused
the money, or the entrepreneur decided not to accept the venture
capital offer.
The research questions set out above will be expanded upon and
investigated in greater detail in the individual empirical chapters
later in this thesis.
5.2 MAIN RESEARCH METHODS
5.2.1 Qualitative versus quantitative research methods
There is much debate over whether qualitative or quantitative research
techniques are more effective for gathering information on fluid and
complex business organisations. It is argued that quantitative
research allows the measurement of certain organisational
characteristics, whilst a qualitative methodology attaches meanings to
events (Daft, 1983). Nevertheless, both quantitative and qualitative
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methods have their failings. The main emphasis of qualitative
research is on the interpretations of the subjects under study, and
this entails the collection of rich and detailed unstructured
information over time. Such information comes under criticism for
being anecdotal and difficult to analyse and generalise to other
situations (Bryman, 1989). On the other hand, quantitative or sample
survey research often involves the collection of structured data based
on pre-determined questions. This does not necessarily allow the
respondent to convey, or the researcher to learn of, underlying events
(Bryman, 1989). The way the questionnaire is constructed, or the
manner in which the questions are asked, may also affect the response
of interviewees to the extent that they provide 'socially desirable'
answers (Marsh, 1984). However, according to Crompton and Jones
(1988):
"... organizational research ... is not a mutually
exclusive decision between quantitative and
qualitative methodology. In reality it is very
difficult to study organizations without using both
sorts of methods. In any event quantitative data
always rests on qualitative distinctions. ... the
issue turns on the appropriateness of methods, not
with taking sides in the debate between qualitative
and quantitative methodologies," (p72-73).
5.2.2 The personal interview survey
The chosen method of research for this study was the personal
interview survey, in the opinion of Kerlinger (1986) "... the most
powerful and useful tool of social scientific survey research,"
(p379). The interview instrument could take a number of forms; from
being highly structured through to being totally unstructured. The
questions and their sequence could be in a fixed order, ensuring that
any variations between responses were attributed to the differences
between respondents. However, such a structured interview format
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assumes that respondents have a common vocabulary and that they will
all interpret the questions in the same way (Nachmias & Nachmias,
1982). On the other hand, an unstructured interview could be employed
with the focus on the subjective experiences of the respondents. This
would allow repondents considerable scope to describe how easy or how
difficult it was to find investment capital (Nachniias & Nachmias,
1982). Acknowledging that both variations had their advantages, the
interview schedule of this research contained a combination of
structured and unstructured questions in order to combine quantitative
ansi qualititative information. Therefore, both factual data and the
views and opinions of the interviewees could be collected, neither of
which on their own would have fully addressed the research questions.
However, there are problems associated with personal interview survey
methods. First, if a postal questionnaire survey is conducted prior
to the main interview the subjects might be over-sensitive to the aims
of the research, a problem termed premeasurement. Second, selection
errors may be encountered if the selected groups are initially unequal
in terms of propensity to apply for venture capital funding. Third,
measurement and timing errors arise when the research is undertaken at
an inappropriate time to reveal the effect of the dependent variable
(Aaker & Day, 1983). For example, a firm may have received venture
capital finance recently, and its full effect on the organisation
might not be felt for some time. It is believed that awareness of
such problems has helped to eliminate or limit their effects when
conducting this research and interpreting its results. The personal
interview questionnaire was piloted with three firms based in the
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South West region of England in order to identify any possible
difficulties. A number of minor modifications were made as a result,
and the final version of the questionnaire is contained in Appendix 3.
5.2.3 Contextual interviews with venture capital organisations
In order to supplement the information provided by the small high
technology manufacturing firms in this survey, information of a more
qualitative nature was sought from those organisations supplying
venture capital finance. Initially, the different types of venture
capital providers were identified, for example bank subsidiaries,
independent venture capital firms or semi-State bodies. These
organisations were stratified according to location and whether they
had a high technology focus to their investment strategy, and nine
were then selected to take part in an unstructured interview survey.
Appendix 4 details the general questions discussed during the
interviews. The selection process was structured in order to include
3i and the Scottish Enterprise (formerly the Scottish Development
Agency), which are prominent players in the venture capital
marketplace. The remaining interviewees comprised a cross-section of
types of venture capital firm, including merchant bank subsidiaries
and independent organisations, in the two survey regions. Thus, it
was possible to form a picture of the delivery of venture capital by
these organisations, the conditions they offered and their attitudes
to the small high technology manufacturing sector.
The contextual information obtained from the venture capital
organisations provides a useful balance to the experiences and views
of the small high technology firms. These interviews also proved
extremely helpful in identifying current trends in the venture capital
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industry. This information is incorporated into the thesis largely in
the form of anecdotal evidence, in order to oppose or lend support to
particular arguments derived from the literature review and the small
firms survey.
5.3 RESEARCH SANPLE
5.3.1 Selection of the study firms - population
Kelly (1987) indicated that firms located in the South East of England
had access to better financial advice than firms in other regions.
This observation was based on regional variations in the take up of
external funds, as evinced by the majority of Unlisted Securities
Market (USM) listed companies located in the South East of England.
This has significant implications for the development of firms in the
regions, especially when:
"... new firm formation would appear to be further
intensifying existing patterns of concentration of
the electronics industry in the expanded South
Eastern core at the expense of intermediate and
peripheral areas," (Kelly, 1987, p133).
Taking these two observations together, it would appear that external
financial sources in the South East of England are involved in funding
new and existing firms in the high technology electronics industry.
However, of the areas outside of the South East of England, Scotland
is particularly noticeable for its strong financial community (Hood
and Young, 1984) and also its contribution to employment in the
electronics industry (Young and Stewart, 1986). Thus, Scotland was
selected as a comparison region for the South East of England, since
the electronics industry and financial sector are strongly represented
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in both communities. A number of other studies have sampled companies
in Scotland and the South East of England when undertaking similar
comparative research (Oakey, 1984a; Breheny and McQuaid, 1985; Kelly,
1987; Oakey et p 1., 1988). The study regions were chosen in order to
test for the hypothesised financial advantage of local venture capital
funding for firms located in the South Eastern 'core' region, when
compared with a sample of firms from the 'peripheral' region of
Scotland.
5.3.2 Defining the study firms
SMALL FIRMS
In any research concerning small high technology manufacturing firms a
necessary prerequisite is the definition of a 'small firm' and, within
that classification, a 'high technology small firm' . One of the first
studies to single out the small firm for investigative attention was
the Bolton Report in 1971, which also attempted a qualitative
definition for such firms:
"Firstly, in economic terms, a small firm is one that
has a relatively small share of its market.
Secondly, an essential characteristic of a small firm
is that it is managed by its owners or part-owners in
a personalised way, and not through the medium of a
formalised management structure. Thirdly, it is also
independent in the sense that it does not form part
of a larger enterprise and that the owner-managers
should be free from outside control in taking their
principal decisions," (Bolton Report, 1971, p1).
The Bolton Committee had problems in converting this definition into a
more quantitative guide for use by researchers. Table 5.1 shows that
numerical definitions were eventually adopted and these were based on
the number of employees 	 turnover. These definitions were updated
by a later government study, the Wilson Report in 1979, which adjusted
the turnover definitions to take account of inflation (also shown in
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Table 5.1). These definitions, however, do not facilitate comparisons
across the different economic sectors (Curran, 1986). The Bolton
Inquiry acknowledged that the definitions were inadequate, and
maintained that a universal quantitative definition of small firms was
impossible to achieve because of substantial variations in the number
of employees, assets and turnover between industries (Curran &
Stanworth, 1982).
TabL. 5.1 Definition. of s.atL fir.. In specific industri.a
INDUSTRY
	
DEFINITION	 REVISED DEFINITION *
(according to the	 (according to the
Bolton R.port, 1971)	 WiLson Report. 1979)
Manufacturing	 200 empLoy... or Less	 Stays the same
RetaiLing	 Turnov.r £50,000 or Less p...
	
£185,000 pa. turnover
Wholesale Trades
	
Turnover £200,000 or Less pa. 	 £730,000 p... turnover
Construction
	
25 empLoyees or Less	 Stays the same
Mining/Quarrying	 25 ..pLoy.es or Less	 Stays the earn.
Motor Trades
	
Turnover £100,000 or Less p.a. 	 £365,000 pa. turnover
MisceLlaneous Services	 Turnover £50,000 or Less p... 	 £185,000 pa. turnover
Road Transport	 5 v.hicles or Less 	 Stays the same
Catering	 ALL .xcLuding multiples and 	 Stays the same
brewery managed pubs
* Wilson Report. 1979. adjusted th. turnover definitions to take infLation into
accOunt (1978 prices).
Sourc.	 BoLton Report. 1971 and WiLson Report. 1979
Many researchers consider the above small manufacturing firm
definition to be unrealistic and inapplicable for research purposes,
since the upper limit of 200 employees is far too high (Curran, 1986).
Stanworth and Curran (1981) point out that, "... many of the
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significant social characteristics of the small firm become severely
attenuated 'well before the number of participants reaches 200,"
(p153). Nevertheless, many researchers have used the Bolton
definition of small firms of '200 employees' as the benchmark for
their own studies involving manufacturing firms. Oakey (1984a)
surveyed independent small high technology manufacturing firms
employing fewer than 200 employees. Tamari (1981) collected data on
small manufacturing firms employing less than 200 workers in the
United Kingdom, France, Israel and Japan, but encountered a problem
in the United States where a classification of 'less than five
million dollar assets' had to be adopted. This illustrates that
studies across different industrial sectors
	 surveys involving
the same industry in different countries are hindered by incompatible
definitions of small firms. A number of researchers, when
considering the problem of definition, have arrived at their own
description of a small firm. For example, Hertz (1982) maintained
that "a small business is a business that is managed by not more than
3 managers,	 whose workforce does not exceed 100 persons," (p433).
This corresponds with the view of Curran (1986) that many
investigators have adopted a definition involving '100 or less'
employees, and an even lower number on occasion; for example, Binks
(1980) studied small firms employing less than thirty people.
It would appear from the above discussion that a commonly agreed
definition of a 'small firm' is difficult to achieve. Therefore,
after an extensive literature review, this researcher decided to use
the Bolton classification of the small manufacturing firm, comprising
200 employees or less.
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HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRNS
Similar problems have been encountered when searching for a universal
definition of 'high technology' firms, leading researchers to attempt
their own descriptions. A number of reasons have been put forward to
justify the need for a high technology definition: first, the term
'high technology' has been applied to many spurious products by the
media; second, it is important to recognise and measure the growth
sectors in industry for economic development purposes; third, high
technology firms should be identifiable for government planning and
assistance purposes; and finally, as was argued with small firms,
investigators require a definition standard for comparative research
(Oakey et a1., 1988).
Three types of 'high technology' definition have been identified in
the available literature: occupational classifications relating to the
level of Research and Development (R&D) employment (Glasmeier et p1.,
1983); counts of the number of innovations or the number of patents
per sector (Pavitt, 1982); and the rate of growth of the firm in
output and/or employment terms (Weiss, 1983).
The occupational definition of high technology industry is an input
measure, and indicates the ratio of engineers, scientists,
technologists and others to remaining workers in the firm or industry
(Breheny & McQuaid, 1987). However, this has led to some spurious
high technology categories, for example soap being linked with the
electronics and aerospace industries (Oakey et p 1., 1988). The level
of R & D expenditure is another input measure, but there is a tendency
for this to be underestimated in the small firm (Oakey et p 1., 1988).
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This is due to the informal nature of research and development
activity in the small firm where much work may be undertaken outside
working hours.
It has been suggested that output measures are a more direct measure
of the contribution of a firm to the economy than input measures
(Oakey et p1., 1988) and perhaps this may be a more appropriate way to
define high technology industry. Attempts have been made to record
the number of innovations or the number of registered patents as
indicators of the level of technology. However, Oakey et p 1. (1988)
pointed out that many registered patents and innovations do not
necessarily contribute to the success of the firm, and such a
definition may overestimate the worth of the firm. The final
definition, rate of growth in terms of output or employment in the
company, is evaluated by Kelly (1986). Over the period 1975 to 1983
when output across a range of industries was declining, certain
sectors continued to grow in terms of both output and employment, and
the computer industry was cited as one. However, some industries
which might instinctively be termed 'high technology,' such as
electronics or information technology, experienced a period of decline
when other non-technological sectors prospered. These definitional
problems confirm the observation of Oakey et p 1. (1988) that, "..
there is no direct measure of the degree to which industries are 'high
technology ... ,'" (p41).
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5.3.3 Choice of study industry and regions
Study firms considered to be high technology were sampled from the
Radio, Radar and Electronic Capital Goods industry, Minimum List
Heading (MLH) 367 (HMSO, 1979). Breheny and McQuaid (1985) identified
MLII 367 as a high technology industrial classification but later
expressed doubts about the extent to which firms in this category
could be termed 'high technology' (Breheny and McQuaid, 1987).
However, it is not the remit of this research to define what
constitutes a high technology firm and, as Oakey et p 1. (1988) point
out, "... the key parameters designed by ... analysts as delimiters
of a high-technology industry" and, for that matter, small firms "...
are based on hypotheses of the researchers," (p38). Therefore, the
study firms were selected on the basis of having a high technological
content to their products and, along with employing 200 people or
less, the companies were also required to have been established
indeveridentiv, although their current status was immaterial. The
reason for this latter criterion was that companies initially formed
as independent enterprises would not have a parental source of income
to cushion the start-up/early growth stage of development. Firms
established as subsidiaries would not have the same relevance to a
study of venture capital needs as those formed independently.
Being aware of the possible failings of MLH 367 listed firms to meet
the 'high technology' requirement, it was decided to update the
industrial classification and reconcile it with the more recent
revised Standard Industrial Classification (CSO, 1980). Appendix 5
illustrates which of the Activity Headings under the more recent
classification correspond with the old MLII categorisation. In
summary, the study industry comprises firms belonging to Class 34,
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electrical and electronic engineering, and Class 37, instrument
engineering. Within these classifications the following Activity
Headings were selected: 3433, alarms and signalling equipment; 3435,
electrical equipment for industrial use not elsewhere specified; 3443,
radio and electronic capital goods; 3454/2, other electronic equipment
not elsewhere specified; 3710, measuring, checking and precision
instruments and apparatus; and 3732, optical precision instruments
(HMSO 1986a; 1986b; 1986c; 1986d; 1986e).
Breheny and McQuaid (1985) established that high technology firms
classified under MLII 367, according to the 1968 Standard Industrial
Classification, were well represented in the two target research areas
of Scotland and the South East of England. Therefore, it was decided
to include in the sample fl the relevant firms in Scotland, and to
concentrate on the firms located in the English counties north of
London which bordered approximately on the 'Mll corridor,' that is
Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire. This English sub-
region was chosen partly because of the recent research interest
generated by what has become known as the ICambridge Phenomenon.'
Segal Quince and Partners (1985) identified that national, regional
and technological factors combined to create a seed-bed environment
for new technology-based firms in Cambridge and, accordingly, high
technology electronics companies have thrived in this setting.
The next task involved identifying directory sources of firms
belonging to these industrial classifications and located in the two
study regions. A number of directories were consulted in order to
determine the best sources of information on the selected study
industry. In addition to this, information was sought from county
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councils for the three South Eastern counties and the Scottish
Development Agency (SDA) for the whole of Scotland. The latter
sources proved most helpful in providing accurate up-to-date
information on the particular sectors of high technology industry of
interest to this research. Cambridgeshire and Bedfordshire County
Councils supplied computer printouts of all firms in these areas
according to their SIC and employment levels, and these were specified
as being current and accurate for the year 1988. An industrial
register of companies was provided by Hertfordshire County Council,
compiled from their business databank in 1988, and this enabled the
selection of study firms according to industrial groupings and
employment size.
The Scottish sample was selected from the SDA publication "Electronics
and Support Companies in Scotland, 1988", also derived from a database
source. This directory clearly listed the employment size of the
firm, and gave a description of the main area of productive activity
from which it was possible to determine the SIC. Every care was taken
to ensure that the overall sample consisted of the universe of
relevant firms as far as possible. This involved checking Scottish
regional council directories for firms missing from the SDA
publication. As there was no equivalent to the SDA directory for the
South Eastern subsample, the county council information was the only
source. In all, 535 companies were identified in both regions, 355 in
Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire and 180 in Scotland,
which met the twofold requirement of belonging to the stipulated SICs
and employing 200 people or less. It was not possible to determine at
this stage whether the sample firms were formed independently.
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5.3.4 The postal questionnaire survey
An initial postal questionnaire survey was employed to perform two
functions. First, the elimination of firms which were primarily
concerned with the provision of services and/or which had been
established as subsidiaries of other companies. Second, it enabled
the collection of basic information on the general impact of venture
capital on the study industry, and on the size and origins of the
individual firms. This questionnaire was piloted with electronics
firms based in the South West region of England and modified prior to
the full-scale survey. Appendix 6 contains the final version of the
postal questionnaire.
For the main study, 535 firms in Scotland and the South East of
England were sent this brief two page postal questionnaire, a covering
letter explaining the purpose of the research (see Appendix 7) and a
business reply envelope. The initial reponse rate to this mailing was
an encouraging 46 per cent consisting of 246 returned questionnaires.
However, the exclusion of firms established as subsidiaries of other
companies, service companies and those which had gone out of business
resulted in a reduced useable response rate of 33 per cent. Although
this falls within the standard acceptable response range of 30 to 50
per cent for a postal questionnaire survey (Harvey, 1987) it was
considered prudent to attempt to increase the overall rate by
undertaking a follow-up survey. Copies of the questionnaire and the
original covering letter were sent to the non-respondents, together
with a second covering letter (Appendix 8) and a business reply
envelope. A period of six weeks lapsed between the mailing of the
original postal survey and the follow-up, although this interval
included a Christmas holiday period. The follow-up survey had the
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desired conducive effect, and resulted in an increased overall
response rate of 58 per cent (310 returned questionnaires). When
those firms which were not relevant or had ceased trading were
excluded, the response rate was reduced to 42 per cent consisting of
154 useable questionnaires from an effective universe of 371 firms.
5.3.5 Selection of the study firms - sample
As a result of the postal questionnaire survey, the number of
respondent firms in both regions relevant to the study had been
established. The 154 sample firms employed 200 employees or less, had
been established as independent enterprises and were concerned mainly
with the manufacture of products. A further filtration process was
employed to enable the selection of personal interview firms according
to their venture capital status. The firms were categorised in terms
of whether they had eceived Menture apital funds (RVC), whether they
had liot taken up enture .apital (NyC), either due to refusal on their
part or on the part of the provider, or whether they had Qt had any
.ontact with venture capital organisations (NOC). Whilst the
interview questionnaire contained some questions common to all the
respondents, the above categorisation enabled particular questions to
be asked of specific groups of respondents.
Tables 5.2 to 5.4 illustrate the proportions of these three categories
of firm in the sample according to the location of company and the
number of employees. As far as possible, the same number of firms
were sampled randomly from each category and location according to
size. This was constrained by the fact that there were only 33 firms
in total in receipt of venture capital finance, sixteen from Scotland
and seventeen based in the South East, and that there were only fifteen
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companies in the Scottish subsample not receiving venture capital
funds (see Table 5.4). Therefore, the proposed overall sample size
was 90 finns consisting of fifteen companies from each of the three
venture capital categories in both regions. The initial sampling
procedure posed a few problems in that there were not always enough
firms of the correct employment size in each of the categories to
sample on a random basis. Occasionally firms selected themselves
because of the limited overall numbers involved and, in a few
instances, a shortfall meant that the nearest firm in terms of the
number of employees was included in a particular category.
TabLe 5.2 Firms rsceiving vsntur. capitaL finance (RVCs) by Location
and size of firm
E.pLoy.. nu.b.rs
1 -25	 26-50	 51 -100	 101 -200	 TotaL
n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
South East
En9tand	 6	 (42.9)	 4	 (50.0)	 6	 (85.7)	 1	 (25.0)	 17	 (51.5)
Scotland	 8	 (57.1)	 4	 (50.0)	 1	 (14.3)	 3	 (75.0)	 16	 (48.5)
Total	 14 (100.0)	 8 (100.0)	 7 (100.0)	 4 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)
TabLe 5.3 Firms not r.c.Iving venture capital financ. (MVCs) by
location and siz. of firm
Employ., numbers
1 -25	 26- 50	 51 - 100	 101 -200	 Total
n	 (X)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
South East
EngLand	 21	 (77.8)	 5	 (55.6)	 2	 (50.0)	 4	 (50.0)	 32	 (66.7)
Scotland	 6	 (22.2)	 4	 (44.4)	 2	 (50.0)	 4	 (50.0)	 16	 (33.3)
Total	 27 (100.0)	 9 (100.0)	 4	 (100.0)	 8	 (100.0)	 48 (100.0)
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TabL. 5.4 Fir.. which ha y, had no contact with vsnturs capitaL
organisation. (HOC.) by Location and siz, of fir.
EmpLoy.. nu.b.rs
	
- 25	 26 - 50	 51 - 100	 101 - 200	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
South East
	
EngLand	 43	 (81.1)	 8	 (66.7)	 6 (100.0)	 1	 (50.0)	 58	 (79.5)
	
ScotLand	 10	 (18.9)	 4	 (33.3)	 0	 (0.0)	 1	 (50.0)	 15	 (20.5)
TotaL	 53 (100.0) 12 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 2 (100.0)	 73 (100.0)
The ninety selected companies were then sent a letter (Appendix 9)
attempting to enlist their cooperation for the next interview phase of
the research. Inevitably, a small number of companies withdrew at
this stage, either because of a policy of not giving interviews, or
due to time constraints on the firm. As far as possible, these
withdrawals were replaced by randomly sampling according to size from
the remaining pool of initial relevant respondents. Ultimately, it was
not possible to maintain the original aim of interviewing 90 companies.
Replacement of the withdrawals was constrained by the overall limited
number of firms available for interview in Scotland (that is, 47 in
total). Ultimately, a substantial 83 companies agreed to participate
in the interview stage of the study, a shortfall of only seven on the
original target sample size.
5.3.6 The design of the research
The research proposes to test for the effect of availability and
choice of venture capital finance, and propensity to apply for, and
receive, such funds in both Scotland and the South East of England.
Therefore, the research design includes two primary independent
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variables, location and venture capital status (see Figure 5.1). With
such a design three statistical tests can be conducted. The
differences between proportions, represented by the letter P in the
diagram, can be tested amongst A 1 , A2 and A3 , venture capital status
for B 1 and B 2 , location; and also for the interaction of A and B
(Kerlinger, 1986).
Figure 5.1 Ths res..rch design
LOCATION
B 1
	 2
(ScotLand)	 (SE EngLand)
A1
vC
	 (with venture
capitaL - RVC)
EA
NP
	
A2
TI
	
(rsfus.d venture
capitaL - NVC)
UT
R A	 A3
E L	 (no need of venture
capitaL - NOC)
A1
—6-
R
0
GROWTH	
A2
U
I
—H-
A3
1' Bl	 1'B2
Source: adaptsd from KerLinger. 1986. p 282
This research design will, therefore, allow the testing of the
hypotheses outlined earlier in Subsection 5.1.1.
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5.4 PRELIMINARY STATISTICS FROM THE POSTAL SURVEY
5.4.1 Statistical approach employed during the data analysis
Before proceeding to a brief overview of the results of the postal
questionnaire survey, it is important to establish the reasons for the
choice of statistical technique employed in the analysis of these
mainly categorical survey data. Since these data are categorical, it
would be incorrect to assume that the population under study was
normally distributed (Rowntree, 1984). This presents particular
problems for the interpretation of the results, since many statistical
techniques assume that the population distribution is normal.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to test for significant differences
between categorical data with non-parametric tests, which make no
assumptions about the normality of the parameters of the population
distribution (Rowntree, 1984). In the current case, the aim is to
determine whether the differences observed in the proportions of the
three venture capital status categories in the two geographical
regions are significant.
The non-parametric chi-square statistic can be applied when the
population is classified into three or more mutually exclusive
categories (Bradley and South, 1981). The general form of the chi-
square (x 2 ) test statistic is as follows:
k
'	 ( O
	
- E
	
)2
)	 withdf=k - d -1
i=1
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Where:
k = the number of categories
E = the expected number of sample observations in the th category
Oj = the actual number of sample observations observed in the 1th
category
d = the number of parameters that have to be estimated from the
sample data (Bradley & South, 1981).
The df, or degrees of freedom, "... reflects the number of
observations that are free to vary after certain restrictions have
been placed on the data," (Siegel, 1956, p44). For example, if the
information on thirty firms is classified into two categories such as
Scotland and the South East of England, then when it is known that
twelve firms have been assigned to the Scottish category, the other
eighteen firms are known to occur in the South East category.
Therefore, the df = 1 in this example because with two categories and
a fixed number of firms, "... as soon as the number of cases in one
category is ascertained then the number of cases in the other category
is determined," (Siegel, 1956, p4 1+). The Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSSX) contains a standard program for producing
contingency tables (CROSSTABS) and the chi-square statistic can be
calculated from the contingency tables via the STATISTICS 1 command.
The data presented in this and subsequent chapters were analysed in
this form using the SPSSX program.
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5.4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of non-parametric statistics
The major advantage of non-parametric statistical tests is that they
do not rely on the assumption that the population is normally
distributed. This is important when sample sizes are small because
non-parametric statistics have to be used if the exact nature of the
population is unknown (Siegel, 1956). These statistical tests can
also be used with data that are categorical, or concerned with
classifications, as in the case of this research. In addition, non-
parametric tests are generally easier to conduct and understand than
parametric tests (Levin, 1987) although this has not been a
contributory factor in the decision to use the chi-square statistic
for the analysis of these data.
There are a number of disadvantages associated with using non-
parametric statistical tests including the fact that "they are often
not as efficient or 'sharp' as parametric tests," (Levin, 1987, p627).
Because broad categories are used instead of actual figures, a certain
amount of information is lost, leading Siegel (1956) to comment that
nonparametric statistical tests are wasteful of data," (Siegel,
1956, p33). Because detailed information is lost when the data is
categorised, it is more difficult to detect differences between
categories. Therefore, non-parametric tests require such differences
to be much greater if significant results are to be obtained
(Rowntree, 1984).
These are some of the general disadvantages associated with all non-
parametric statistical tests, but there are also disadvantages
specific to the chi-square test. If the expected frequencies in a
chi-square test are small, then the value of the chi-square statistic
-100-
will be overestimated and could lead to misinterpretation of the
result. There is a generally accepted rule that when there is an
expected frequency of less than five in a contingency table, the chi-
square statistic should not be used (Everitt, 1977; Levin, 1987).
However, Norusis (1986) has determined that the chi-square statistic
may be used as long as the number of cells with an expected frequency
of less than five does not exceed 20 per cent of the total. It is
also possible to collapse a table to combine categories if there is
more than one cell with an expected frequency of less than five.
However, this results in the loss of information (Levin, 1987) and can
have an effect on the conclusions drawn from the table (Everitt,
1977). Awareness of such failings will limit the possibility of
consequent misinterpretation.
It should be noted that the chi-square statistic is a bivariate form
of analysis involving the comparison of two variables; that is, it is
a measure of association. A number of proponents prefer inultivariate
analytical methods whereby multiple causes are identified for the
'effect', and the strength of the these relationships is estimated;
that is, it is a measure of dependency (Kerlinger, 1986). Basically,
large numerical data sets lend themselves more readily to multivariate
forms of analysis and bivariate methods are useful for analysing
smaller categorical data sets. Fine detail may be lost when using
multivariate forms of analysis on categorical data from smaller
samples, since this form of analysis can often act as a 'black box' in
which causal relationships are established without any indication of
]y or	 Bivariate methods are useful for analysing individual
pairs of variables in detail, building 'associations' between any
number of variables through a step-by-step approach. Incidentally,
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this also increases the likelihood of obtaining significant results,
although this did not contribute to the decision to use the chi-square
statistic. The chi-square result and significance level are only
given with tables in this thesis when the result is significant; that
is, when there is a less than 5 per cent possibility ( < 0.05) that
the result obtained is due to chance (Kerlinger, 1986).
There now follows a general statistical overview of the 154 firms
which replied to the postal questionnaire survey. Although caution is
necessary in the interpretation of the following results due to the
lack of information concerning the non-respondents, the data are
useful in providing background information to the five subsequent
empirical chapters.
5.4.3 Age of the postal survey firms
Table 5.5 dichotomises the age of the 154 postal survey firms in terms
of whether they were founded prior to 1980, or from 1980 onwards. The
table categorises the location of the South Eastern firms according to
the three individual counties of Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and
Bedfordshire, and the Scottish firms are grouped together. The
locational analysis in later chapters will combine the three English
counties into one category. For the moment, however, it is useful to
consider the counties separately. It is clear from Table 5.5 that the
Cambridgeshire and Scottish areas have experienced a greater number of
technological start-ups in the target industry relative to the other
two regions. Twenty eight of the Cambridgeshire-based firms (49 per
cent) and 19 firms from Scotland (40 per cent) had been established
within the last ten years. This compares with 4 firms (16 per cent)
in both Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire. This table is significant at
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the =O.004 level following a chi-square test, and confirms the
aforementioned findings of a number of authors that Cambridgeshire and
Scotland are productive seed-beds for a number of high technology
firms.
TbL. 5.5 Ag. of postaL survey fir.s by Location
Caubs.	 Hirts.	 Bids.	 ScotLand	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
EstabLished
pre-1980
	
29 (50.9)	 21 (84.0)	 21 (84.0)	 28 (59.6)	 99 (64.3)
EstabLished
1980+
	
28 (49.1)	 4 (16.0)	 4 (16.0)	 19 (40.4)	 55 (35.7)
TotaL	 57 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 47 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
ChI-squar. (3 d.f.) - 13.382	 p.O.004
5.4.4 Independent status of the postal survey firms
As stated earlier, this research is only concerned with those firms
which were established as independent enterprises. That is not to
say, however, that firms which were originally founded independently
but subsequently became acquired could not be included in the sample.
Indeed, those firms which have been aquired may have an interesting
financial history in the pre- and post-acquisition phases. According
to Table 5.6, the majority of respondent firms (118 companies or 77
per cent) have remained independent since formation, whilst only 35
companies (23 per cent) had been acquired. Considering this table on
a regional basis, it appears that the Cambridgeshire-based firms are
particularly noteworthy for maintaining their independent status.
Fifty one of the companies operating in the Cambridgeshire area (90
per cent) were independent at the time of the survey. This compares
with 19 firms (76 per cent) in Hertfordshire, 32 enterprises (70 per
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cent) in Scotland and 16 companies (64 per cent) in Bedfordshire. The
chi-square test on these data was significant at the =0.03l level.
This significance might be explained by the fact that the majority of
firms located in Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire and Scotland had been
formed prior to 1980, whereas almost half (49 per cent) of the
Cambridgeshire-based companies had been established since that date.
Thus, Cambridgeshire firms are younger and may not have reached the
stage where the founder has chosen, or has been forced, to sell-out.
It may also be the case that the general industrial infrastructure of
the region is conducive to the birth and independent growth of young,
small high technology companies (Segal Quince and Partners, 1985)
reducing the number which need to sell out to survive.
T.bL. 5.6 Ind.psnd.nt status of postaL surv.y firms by Location
Cambs.	 H.rts.	 B.ds.	 ScotLand	 TotaL
r	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
Ind.p.ndsnt	 51 (89.5)	 19 (76.0)	 16 (64.0)	 32 (69.6) 118 (77.1)
Acquir.d	 6 (10.5)	 6 (24.0)	 9 (36.0)	 14 (30.4)	 35 (22.9)
TotaL	 57 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 46 (100.0) 153 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (3 d.f.) .8.876	 p. 0.031
5.4.5 Size of the postal survey firms
Table 5.7 indicates that most of the firms replying to the postal
questionnaire survey employed 25 full-time staff or less. Ninety four
firms (61 per cent) belonged to this size range, compared with only 29
companies (19 per cent) employing between 26 and 50 people, 17 firms
(11 per cent) with between 51 and 100 employees and 14 enterprises (9
per cent) employing over 100 members of staff. Interestingly, the
Scottish-based firms are prominent in the larger category of 101 to
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200 employees, but this difference is not significant. Similarly,
Table 5.8 does not exhibit any significant difference between company
size in terms of the number of employees and the age of the survey
firm. It is noteworthy, however, that a slightly higher percentage of
firms established within the last ten years employed 25 or less full-
time people; 40 companies (73 per cent) compared with 54 firms (55 per
cent) in the pre-1980 establishment category. This would seem
reasonable as the older firms have had a longer time period in which
to grow in size. Both Table 5.7 and 5.8 would also appear to support
the argument that, generally speaking, 'small' in terms of high
technology firms is of the order of 50, or maybe even 25 employees or
less
TabL. 5.7 Six. of postaL surv.y fir, in tsr.. of •.ptoy..nt by Location
Ca.bs.	 Hsrts.	 Bids.	 ScotLand	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
EmpLoy...
	
1 - 25	 40 (70.2)	 14 (56.0)	 16 (64.0)	 24 (51.1)	 94 (61.0)
	
26 - 50	 8 (14.0)	 3 (12.0)	 6 (24.0)	 12 (25.5)	 29 (18.8)
	
51 - 100	 6 (10.5)	 6 (24.0)	 2	 (8.0)	 3	 (6.4)	 17 (11.0)
	
101 - 200	 3	 (5.3)	 2	 (8.0)	 1	 (4.0)	 8 (17.0)	 16	 (9.1)
TotaL	 57 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 47 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
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TabLe 5.8 Size of postaL survey fir. in tsr.s of
..ptoy.ent by year of formation
Year of formation
Pre-1980	 1980 onwards	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
EmpLoyees
	
- 25	 54	 (54.5)	 40	 (72.7)	 94	 (61.0)
	
26 - 50	 21	 (21.2)	 8	 (14.5)	 29	 (18.8)
	
51 - 100	 13	 (13.1)	 4	 (7.3)	 17	 (11.0)
	
101 - 200	 11	 (11.1)	 3	 (5.5)	 14	 (9.1)
TotaL	 99 (100.0)	 55 (100.0)	 154 (100.0)
5.4.6 Main product of the postal survey firms
The postal questionnaire survey was also a useful method of confirming
the industrial classification of the study firms. The respondents
were asked to specify the main product of the firm in terms of the
largest contributor to gross sales during the last financial year, and
Appendix 5 provides examples of products and the categories to which
they have been assigned. Although not significant, Table 5.9 does
exhibit some interesting regional data. Firms based in Scotland,
Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire were mostly concerned with the
manufacture of precision instrumentation. In all three cases, more
than 70 per cent of the firms in the three regions gave this response
(36 firms in Scotland, 19 in Hertfordshire and 16 in Bedfordshire).
Cambridgeshire also had a sizeable number of respondent firms
manufacturing precision instrumentation (35 firms or 61 per cent) but
is also noticeable for the highest incidence of respondent firms
producing electronic capital goods (22 firms or 39 per cent).
Overall, Table 5.9 illustrates that the majority of firms in the
-106-
sample (106 in number or 70.2 per cent) were more concerned with the
production of precision instrumentation than the manufacture of
electronic capital goods.
TbL. 59 Main productiva aria of postaL survay fir.. by Location
Ca.bs.	 Harts.	 Bids.	 ScotLand	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Pr.clsion
Instru..nts	 25 (43.9)	 13 (52.0)	 15 (68.2)	 32 (68.1)	 85 (56.3)
Hadical prac.
instru..nts	 10 (17.5)	 6 (24.0)	 1	 (4.5)	 4	 (8.5)	 21	 (13.9)
ELectronic
	
capitaL goods 22 (38.6)
	
6 (24.0)	 6 (27.3)	 11 (23.4)	 45 (29.8)
TotaL	 57 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 47 (100.0) 151 (100.0)
5.4.7 Postal survey firm contact with venture capital organisations
An important function of the postal questionnaire survey was to
ascertain both the incidence of contact with venture capital
organisations, and the occurrence of venture capital funding. There
was no significant difference in level of contact with venture capital
providers between the different age categories of respondent firms.
There was, however, a significant and interesting result with regard
to the location of the postal survey companies. Table 5.10
illustrates that the majority of firms located in Scotland (68 per
cent) and Cambridgeshire (56 per cent) had some form of contact with
suppliers of venture capital finance prior to the survey (32 firms in
both regions). In contrast, 17 companies (68 per cent) in
Hertfordshire and 16 firms (64 per cent) in Bedfordshire had not been
approached, or had chosen not to approach venture capital
organisations for investment finance. This table was significant at
the =0.0O8 level following a chi-square test. It may be possible to
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connect this result to the aforementioned observation that Scotland
and Cambridgeshire have experienced a high level of technological
start-ups in the study industry. The next subsection considers these
findings in relation to the incidence of venture capital funding and
location of the postal survey firms.
TabL. 5.10 lncid.nc. of postaL survay fir. contact with v.nturs capitaL
organisations by Location
Cambs.	 Harts.	 Bids.	 ScotLand	 TotaL
n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Contact	 32 (56.1)	 8 (32.0)	 9 (36.0)	 32 (68.1)	 81 (52.6)
No contact	 25 (43.9)	 17 (68.0)	 16 (64.0)	 15 (31.9)	 73 (47.4)
TotaL	 57 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 47 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (3 d.f.) = 11.825 	 pO.008
It emerges that there is a significant association between initial
contact with venture capital providers and the size of the survey
firm. Those firms with higher levels of turnover and number of
employees are more likely to have had discussions with venture capital
organisations (see Tables 5.11 and 5.12). Thirty nine of the
respondent firms (63 per cent) with a turnover of one million pounds
or over had spoken to representatives of venture capital institutions,
compared with only 4 firms (24 per cent) with a turnover of less than
one hundred thousand pounds (Table 5.11). Likewise, 12 of the survey
firms (86 per cent) employing over 100 members of staff had contact
with providers of venture capital finance, compared with 41 companies
(44 per cent) with up to 25 full-time employees (Table 5.12). Both
Table 5.11 and 5.12 are significant after a chi-square statistical
test at the level of	 O.O3l and =O.O14 respectively. These results
partly explain the previous observation that Scottish respondents had
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a higher degree of contact with venture financiers than those located
in the South East region, since it was also noted that a higher number
of respondent firms in Scotland employed between 100 and 200 members
of staff. It is not possible to determine the direction of the
relationship between 'contact' and 'growth' of the survey firms; that
is, it is not clear whether contact causes growth or growth attracts
contact from venture capital providers. However, when it comes to
actually receiving venture capital finance, it emerges that there is
no significant correlation with the size of the survey firm.
TaM. 5.11 Incid.nc. of postaL .urv.y fir. contact with vsntur. capitaL
organis.tions by L.v.L of turnov.r
L.v.L of turnovsr (E000s)
o - 99	 100 - 499	 500 - 999	 1,000 +	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
Contact	 4 (23.5)	 21 (67.7)	 17 (54.8)	 39 (62.9)	 81 (52.6)
No contact	 13 (76.5)	 23 (52.3)	 14 (45.2)	 23 (37.1)	 73 (47.4)
TotaL	 17 (100.0)	 44 (100.0)	 31 (100.0)	 62 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (3 d.f.) = 8.883 	 p.0.031
TabL. 5.12 Incid.nc. of postaL survey fir, contact with venturi capitaL
organisations by .mpLoy.snt L.v.L
Employ.. nuab.rs
I - 25	 26 - 50	 51 - 100	 101 - 200	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Contact	 41	 (43.6)	 17	 (58.6)	 11	 (64.7)	 12	 (85.7)	 81	 (52.6)
No contact 53
	 (56.4)	 12	 (41.1)	 6	 (35.3)	 2	 (14.3)	 73	 (47.4)
Total	 94 (100.0)	 29 (100.0)	 17 (100.0)	 14 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) - 10.621 	 p • 0.014
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5.4.8 Postal survey firms and the incidence of venture capital funding
Overall, of the 154 firms responding to the postal questionnaire
survey, 73 (47 per cent) had not had any form of contact with venture
capital organisations (NOCs); 48 (31 per cent) after either initial
enquiries to or overtures from the financiers had not taken up the
capital (NVCs); and 33 companies (21 per cent) had obtained venture
capital funds (RVCs). Table 5.13 also illustrates that there is a
stronger tendency for recently formed companies to acquire venture
capital funds. Seventeen firms (31 per cent) founded within the last
decade have received venture capital finance, compared with 16
companies (16 per cent) established prior to 1980; and only 21 newer
companies (38 per cent) as opposed to 52 older firms (53 per cent)
had no contact with venture capital providers. The chapters based on
the interview survey data will attempt to determine whether this
tendency is due to the recent emergence of the venture capital
industry in the United Kingdom and/or a particular attraction to
early stage investments by venture capital providers.
TaM. 5.13 Incid.nc. of v.nturs capital. funding in postal surv.y
firms by y.ar of for.ation
Y.ar of formation
Pr.-1980	 1980 onwards	 Total.
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
R.c.iv.d v.ntur.
	
capital (RVC)
	 16	 (16.2)	 17	 (30.9)	 33	 (21.4)
Not r.c.iv.d v.nturs
	
capitaL (NVC)
	 31	 (31.3)	 17	 (30.9)	 48	 (31.2)
	
No Contact (NOC)
	 52	 (52.5)	 21	 (38.2)	 73	 (47.4)
Total.	 99 (100.0)	 55 (100.0)	 154 (100.0)
Chi . squar. (2 d.f.)	 5.125	 p	 0.077
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The most interesting result to emerge from the preliminary analysis of
the impact of venture capital on the study industry lies in the
relationship between the take up of venture capital funds and location
of the survey firm. Table 5.14 indicates that a significant 16 firms
(34 per cent) operating in Scotland had received venture capital
funds, compared with only 13 companies (23 per cent) in Cambridgeshire
and 2 enterprises (8 per cent) in both Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire
(chi-square test significant at the =O.023 level). Indeed, the
majority of firms (over 60 per cent) located in the latter two
counties had not had contact with venture capital organisations.
Perhaps this indicates that firms in the South East are more self-
reliant and do not require venture capital assistance.
TabL. 5.14 Incld.nc. of v.nturs capitaL funding in poitaL surv.y fir.. by
Location
C..bs.	 H.rts.	 B.ds.	 ScotLand	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (X)
Rscsiv,d vanturs
capitaL (RVC)
	 13 (22.8)	 2	 (8.0)	 2	 (8.0)	 16 (34.0)	 33 (21.4)
Not r.c.iv.d
(NVC)	 19 (33.3)	 6 (24.0)	 7 (28.0)	 16 (34.0)	 48 (31.2)
	
No contact (NOC) 25 (43.9) 17 (68.0)
	 16 (64.0)	 15 (31.9)	 73 (47.4)
TotaL	 57 (100.0) 25 (100.0)
	 25 (100.0)	 47 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
	
Chi-squar. (6 d.f.) - 14.671	 p = 0.023
This is a very significant result which could entail the re j ection of
one of the major hypotheses of the research. If this result is
confirmed by the survey data from the personal interview sample, then
it could	 be claimed that Scotland is at a disadvantage compared
with the South East of England in terms of the supply of venture capital
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finance. This hypothesis will be tested along with others in the
following empirical chapters which mainly comprise data gathered from
the personal interview survey.
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Chapter 6
DECISIONS ON FUNDING SOURCES AND THEIR APPLICATION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 Sources of investment finance
The requirement for start-up funds is fundamental to any business.
However, decisions concerning the source(s) of this initial finance
present a complex picture. The entrepreneur may have the opportunity
to utilise personal sources of capital, such as savings and/or those
of family and friends, before approaching financial institutions. If
personal money is not available, the small business founder is
compelled to become involved, at an early stage, in a search for
external capital. Banks tend to be among the first of the possible
sources approached by entrepreneurs at the start-up stage (Haslett,
1981), and loans are frequently secured against personal guarantees.
This requirement is exercised since start-up businesses do not have
the commercial assets against which to secure a more commercial type
business loan (Mayer and Goldstein, 1961). Young (1985) arrived at
the conclusion that "most high-technology start-up companies are not
in their early stages candidates for bank borrowing . . . ," (p190) and
this supports the findings of Oakey (1985) that many small high
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technology firms are established by means of personal finances. One
advantage of this early independency is that it demonstrates the
commitment of the entrepreneur when attempting to raise subsequent
additional finance from external institutional sources at a later date
(Gibb and Ritchie, 1982; Williams, 1987).
Ideally, entrepreneurs should seek to obtain the most appropriate type
of finance for their need (Williams, 1987); for example, short term
bank funding for working capital requirements and long term equity
capital for prolonged research and development purposes. However,
previous research indicates that there are two forces at work which
impede this process. On the demand side, there is a tendency on the
part of the entrepreneur to limit applications for external finance to
his own bank (Gibb and Ritchie, 1982). This limited search behaviour
suggests that entrepreneurs may not always be aware of the complete
range of fund raising opportunities available and how to take
advantage of them (Gibbons and Watkins, 1981; Haslett, 1981).
Additionally, on the supply side, there is a perceived lack of
adequate finance available for the technology-based firm both at
start-up and later development stages (Gibbons and Watkins, 1981;
Grieve Smith and Fleck, 1989). It has been postulated that it is not
the scarcity of information on sources and types of finance or even
the lack of finance itself that is the problem, but rather the
confusion caused by the vast array of complex financial instruments
with associated terms and conditions (Woodcock, 1985). Often these
demand and supply problems interact and lead to the entrepreneur
making inappropriate approaches to financiers. For example, the
entrepreneur may apply for ". . . short term finance such as overdraft
facilities for the purchase of plant and equipment," (Binks et p1.,
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1988, p271); or ask for "... long-term finance from his clearing
bank," (Woodcock, 1985, p9). This sort of behaviour means that
entrepreneurs may be paying more for their investment capital than is
necessary and, as such, they are inappropriate choices.
6.1.2 Investment finance and growth
A potentially serious problem arising from this incongruity is that a
number of firms which are possible high fliers may experience
unnecessary growing pains. For instance, a firm in its early stages
may exhaust the available supply of a particular type of finance, such
as an increased overdraft facility, which might have been applied more
appropriately at a later stage, perhaps to fund. working capital
requirements during a rapid growth phase (Binks et p 1., 1988). It is
precisely during such an expansionary phase that the need for finance
by the small innovative company may be at its greatest level since
start-up (Oliver, 1981). If the firm is generating sufficient profits
then it is likely that these will be used to finance growth since many
small firms try to avoid making use of outside capital (Grieve Smith
and Fleck, 1987). However, there is evidence to suggest that firms
making use of external investment finance achieve more rapid progress
and tend to be more innovative than those depending entirely on
'ploughed back' profits (Oakey, 1984b). It should be remembered that
the investment strategy of the firm will partially depend upon the
prevailing economic climate since, for example, companies may pursue a
more politic rationalisation strategy rather than invest in new
product development during a period of high interest rates.
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6.1.3 Disadvantages of external finance
Once the firm has decided to seek external support it must then
address the question of which source of capital to utilise. The
entrepreneur, having depleted his own personal resources at start-up,
is required usually to provide collateral in return for bank finance
and more often than not this takes the form of his own house (Lorenz,
1985). Thus, Binks et p 1. (1988) have observed that smaller firms are
not encouraged to grow by the use of bank funds because of the
penalties incurred, both in terms of security requirements and the
costs of obtaining the funds. Other available sources of capital
include public sector finance in the form of grants and/or loans, but
research has shown that the processes involved in applying for
government assistance can be protracted and complicated (Oakey,
1984b). Moreover, the amounts obtained from government sources
constitute only a minimal, albeit welcome addition to the finances of
a firm (Oakey et p 1., 1988). This would imply that entrepreneurs are
unlikely to rely solely on government grants and/or loans to support
the development of their companies.
The entrepreneur may also have the opportunity to raise equity
capital, over and above that already provided by himself and/or family
and friends, in return for a stake in the business (Wilson Report,
1979). However, some small businessmen are reluctant to surrender
part ownership of their company fearing that this could lead to
eventual loss of control (Lorenz, 1985; Woodcock, 1986; Grieve Smith
and Fleck, 1987; Oakey et p 1., 1988). The entrepreneur may even delay
plans for expansion if the only financial option involves
relinquishing part of the equity of his company (Wilson Report, 1979).
Nevertheless, equity finance is an effective alternative for the
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entrepreneur wishing to invest in the future growth of the firm at a
time when its current financial structure does not permit the
acquisition of additional loan capital (Lorenz, 1985).
It is important to note from the above discussion that "the terms on
which capital is available, from the banks, venture capital funds and
other financial institutions, ... have an important bearing on the
type of strategy followed," (Grieve Smith and Fleck, 1989, p216).
This raises the issue of whether entrepreneurs are aware of the rang,
of fund raising opportunities available and whether they approach the
most appropriate source of finance for their particular venture.
6.2 START-UP FINANCE
The Wilson Report (1979) identified two consequences of the 'equity
gap' first discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. First, a distinct
lack of funds available for new start-ups and, second, difficulty in
obtaining development capital for established companies. This section
considers the former issue by looking at the sources and amounts of
finance accessed by the interview surve y firms at start-up. The
latter concern will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of
this chapter.
6.2.1 Internal versus external sources
The majority of respondents in this study (53 firms or 74 per cent)
stated that their main source of start-up capital was internal to the
firm (Table 6.1). A small number of firms were unable to specify the
exact origin of this internal capital since they were founded a number
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of years ago, and the original founders were no longer with the
company. However, the internal sources cited were mainly personal
monies, comprising the savings of the founder, redundancy money and/or
funds obtained by re-mortgaging personal property (37 firms) and
finance obtained from family members (5 firms). These results bear
out the findings of previous studies where personal finances were used.
most often to establish new businesses. The main source of start-up
finance was correlated with the location variable, however, this did
not appear to have an effect on whether internal or external funds
were used at start-up.
T.bL. 6.1 Main sourc. of start-up capitaL ov.r ti..
Y.ar fir, was found.d
Pr. 1960	 1960-1969	 1970-1979	 1980-	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Int.rnat	 3 (100.0)	 6	 (85.7)	 24	 (77.4)	 20	 (64.5)	 53	 (73.6)
Ext.rnat	 0	 (0.0)	 1	 (14.3)	 7	 (22.6)	 11	 (35.5)	 19	 (26.4)
TotaL	 3	 (100.0)	 7 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)	 72 (100.0)
Table 6.1 also illustrates a declining tendency as age increases for
firms to make use of external capital as the main financial means of
starting the company. Eleven firms (36 per cent) founded in the 1980s
used external funds compared with 7 in the l970s (23 per cent) one
company (14 per cent) in the 1960s, and no firms prior to 1960. These
nineteen companies were investigated in greater detail in order to
determine the source of the external start-up finance. Banks are a
traditional source of finance for the business community, and there
has been a marginal increase in the extent to which they have been
used as a source of start-up capital in recent years (2 firms or 29
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per cent in the 1970s and 5 firms or 46 per cent in the 1980s). This
may be a reflection of increased marketing efforts in the light of
competition, not only from other banks but also from a rising number
of venture capital organisations. Interestingly, venture capital as a
source of start-up finance was also accessed by 2 respondent firms (29
per cent) in the 1970s and 5 companies (46 per cent) in the 1980s.
Venture capitalism is a relatively new phenomenon and the recent
increase in its usage may be due to growing awareness of its
availability, and also a consequence of the sheer volume of funds
chasing investment opportunities as the venture capital industry grew
throughout the 1980s. Although actual numbers are small, over one
third of the survey firms utilising external start-up finance (7 firms
or 37 per cent) accessed venture capital funds for this purpose.
However, putting this in the context of the total sample, only 8 per
cent of the survey firms received venture capital finance to start up
in business. This is not surprising since many commentators maintain
that venture capital organisations are not interested in start-up
ventures, especially those involving high technology products (see
also Chapter 4 and the forthcoming arguments in Chapter 7).
Table 6.2 considers the source of start-up finance with regard to
whether the firm at any stage adopted venture capital funding. A
total of 27 companies (38 per cent) had received venture capital
finance and, of these, 12 firms (63 per cent) had been established
with mainly external capital and 15 firms (28 per cent) founded with
internal capital. This result shows a significant difference at the
level of =O.007 following a chi-square test, but account should be
taken of the fact that seven of the twelve externally financed start-
ups used venture capital finance to finance the start-up. However,
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the remaining five firms had employed other external start-up funds,
and did not appear to be averse to making use of venture capital
funding at a later stage. Internally financed start-ups are prevalent
in the two non-adopter classifications where firms either had no
contact with venture capital providers in the first place (NOCs) or
investigated the possibility of venture capital funding only to refuse
or be refused the finance (NVCs). This may be due to a number of
factors, for example, the relative costs of venture capital compared
with other forms of finance, or the reluctance to relinquish equity as
part of the deal. Such issues will be investigated in greater detail
in subsequent chapters.
TabLe 6.2 Incid.nc. of vsntur. capital, funding by main sourc, of
start-up financ.
Int.rnat	 Ext.rnat	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (IL)	 n	 (IL)
R.c.iv.d v•ntur. capital. (RVC)
Not r,c.iv.d v.nturs
capital. (NVC)
No contact with vsntur.
capitaLists (HOC)
15	 (28.3)	 12	 (63.2)	 27	 (37.5)
26	 (49.1)	 2	 (10.5)	 28	 (38.9)
12	 (22.6)	 5	 (26.3)	 17	 (23.6)
TotaL	 53 (100.0)	 19 (100.0)	 72 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.)
	
10.997	 p = 0.007
6.2.2 Amount of start-up finance
Having looked at the internal/external nature of the main source of
start-up funds acquired by entrepreneurs to establish their companies,
it is useful to examine the amounts obtained from these sources. The
amount of start-up finance used by the respondent companies was
dichotomised into broad categories, resulting in the emergence of a
strong trend (Table 6.3). Forty one firms (80 per cent) using mainly
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internal funds for start-up accessed amounts of up to £25,000. On the
other hand, only six firms (38 per cent) utilised start-up capital of
£25,000 or less in the category where the main source was external in
origin. Further investigation of these figures revealed that 11 of
the 41 firms using internal capital of less than £25,000 in value,
required only one thousand pounds or less to establish the company.
The industrial sub-sectors in which the firms operate were
subsequently analysed to see if there was a requirement for greater or
smaller amounts of start-up capital in specific areas of operation.
However, the results showed that this was evenly distributed
throughout each of the industrial classifications. Likewise, the
location of the firm did not appear to have any effect on the quantity
of money obtained at start-up.
T.bt. 6.3 A.ount of start-up capitaL by .ain source of
start-up finance
InternaL	 ExternaL	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Up to £25.000	 41	 (80.4)	 6	 (37.5)	 47	 (70.1)
Over £25.000	 10	 (19.6)	 10	 (62.5)	 20	 (29.9)
TotaL	 51	 (100.0)	 16 (100.0)	 67 (100.0)
Another interesting result with regard to the amount of capital at
start-up was that firms established in the 1970s and l980s utilised
greater sums of money in the process (Table 6.4). No companies
founded prior to 1970 used more than £25,000, however, 16 firms (52
per cent) established in the l980s required finance in excess of this
amount. Since many firms still required less than £25,000 to start-up
in recent years, this trend may not be due to inflation resulting in
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increasing start-up costs over time, but rather a reflection of the
greater use of external finance, and. the amounts generally available
from these sources. Amongst the external sources of capital, the
banks provided start-up finance in both the less than and the greater
than £25,000 categories, with one founder accessing £140,000. On the
other hand, the seven entrepreneurs using venture capital received
between £50,000 and one million pounds to establish their companies.
By generally providing amounts in excess of banks, it would seem that
venture capital organisations are filling a gap in the market for
larger single amounts of start-up capital. The unique aspects of
venture capital funding will be considered in detail in Chapter 10.
TabL. 6.4 Amount of start-up capital by y.ar of formation
Year fir. wee founded
Pr. 1960	 1960-1969	 1970-1979	 1980-	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 r	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Up to £25.000	 2 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 24	 (85.7)	 15	 (48.4)	 47	 (70.1)
Ov.r £25,000	 0	 (0.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 4	 (14.3)	 16	 (51.6)	 20	 (29.9)
TotaL	 2 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 28 (100.0)	 31 (100.0)	 67 (100.0)
6.3 SUBSEQUENT FINANCE
The following analysis of sources of post-establishment funds excludes
a detailed treatment of the use of venture capital finance, since this
will be investigated in greater detail in Chapter 7. Nonetheless,
there may be some reference in the following sections of this chapter
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as to whether firms have taken up venture capital finance, either at
start-up or at a later stage, in order to provide complete information
about the financial history of the survey firms.
6.3.1 First source of external finance after start-up
In order to ascertain whether the repondents were aware of the range
of funding opportunities available, information was sought on the
first source of external finance obtained by the company after
establishment. Nine of the 53 survey firms (17 per cent) which used
internal sources of start-up capital had not approached external
financiers (Table 6.5). Since six of these companies had been founded
prior to 1980, the absence of external funds cannot be attributed
solely to the youth of these enterprises. More significantly, with
the exception of one firm, all were achieving substantial profit
levels, enabling them to continue operating without external finance.
TabL. 6.5 Incldenc. of subs.qu.nt •xt.rnat lnv.st..nt by main
source of start-up capitaL
InternaL	 ExternaL	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Adoptsd subasquent
•xt.rnaL finance	 44	 (83.0)	 14	 (73.7)	 58	 (80.6)
Not adopt.d subsequent
externaL finance	 9	 (17.0)	 5	 (26.3)	 14	 (19.4)
TotaL
	
53 (100.0)	 19 (100.0)	 72 (100.0)
Fourteen firms (74 per cent) already familiar with external capital
through the start-up process made use of subsequent external finance,
compared with 44 companies (83 per cent) which had previously only
employed internal funds (Table 6.5). This marginal increase in
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percentage terms may be a reflection of the generally smaller amounts
of capital available at start-up from internal sources causing some
entrepreneurs to seek early additional external funds. Likewise, a
number of those businesses established with greater amounts of
external capital may be able to stabilise and sustain their position
without recourse to additional external sources of finance.
6.3.2 Reasons for seeking external finance after start-up
Before interpreting the data contained in Table 6.6, it is useful to
define the requirements mentioned by the survey firms as leading to their
first use of external capital after start-up. These fall broadly into
three categories; working capital, finance for the purchase of major
assets, and development capital.
All firms require a certain level of capital to fund their day-to-day
operations and, if this is not available in-house, entrepreneurs will
have to apply to external sources to supplement their working capital
needs. Banks are a common source of such finance and many small firms
make extensive use of overdraft facilities. A higher level of
investment involving a different type of financial instrument is
required when the company decides to purchase major assets such as
plant and machinery. The external financial options available to the
firm include traditional high street bank loans, funds from merchant
banks, financial agreements with finance or credit houses, private
individual funds and venture capital finance. The final need
identified by the survey firms, the requirement for development
capital, is differentiated from the requirement for funds to purchase
fixed assets since the former implies that development takes place
within the existing infrastructure of the firm. Development capital
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includes the research and development effort of the company. Indeed,
the requirement for finance to maintain research and development may
be constant and cumulatively large when compared with the purchase of
one-off fixed assets.
Table 6.6 shows that the main stimulus in the search for external
funds after start-up in both the South East of England and Scotland
was the requirement for working capital (17 firms, 55 per cent and 15
firms, 47 per cent respectively). This was also the case for firms
across all the industrial classifications in this study. There was a
slight regional variation in terms of the second most cited
requirement for subsequent external finance. Nine of the Scottish
firms (28 per cent) indicated that their first search for external
capital after start-up was set in motion by the need for development
funds, compared with 5 firms (16 per cent) in the South East of
England. In the English subsample, the necessity to purchase plant
and machinery was the second most common requirement for post-
establishment funds. Examination of the combined Scotland and South
East figures over time revealed a change in emphasis in terms of the
second most popular stimulus; from purchasing assets in the 1970s to
the need for development capital in the 1980s. This switch may be due
partly to the advice given to entrepreneurs that they should avoid
spending large amounts of capital on plant and machinery in the
formative years of the firm, and use hire purchasing and leasing
facilities. It should be pointed out that the discrepancy in the
total number of firms adopting subsequent external finance between
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 is due to a number of respondents who did not know
the source of start-up capital.
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TabLe 6.6 Major r.quiremsnt for subsequent externaL financ, by
region
South East	 ScotLand	 TotaL
EngLand
r	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Working capitaL	 17	 (54.8)	 15	 (46.9)	 32	 (50.8)
D.v.Lop..nt capitaL
	 5	 (16.1)	 9	 (28.1)	 14	 (22.2)
Purchasing of asssts
	 6	 (19.4)	 5	 (15.6)	 11	 (17.5)
Other	 3	 (9.7)	 3	 (9.4)	 6	 (9.5)
TotaL	 31	 (100.0)	 32	 (100.0)	 63	 (100.0)
6.3.3 External sources of finance after start-up
BA1K SOURCES
Investigation of the external sources approached for post-
establishment capital revealed that 6 firms (43 per cent) which made
use of bank finance at start-up vent back to that same provider.
Further analysis was undertaken to determine whether this was a case
of staying with a tried and tested source, rather than approaching the
most appropriate financier for the identified need. Some of the
companies obtained bank loans	 extended overdrafts when approaching
their bank for the first time after start-up, and the following data
take this into account. In three cases bank loans were used for
cashflow purposes, and in two instances companies used the more
traditional bank overdraft facility. In terms of purchasing fixed
assets, two firms used the more traditional bank loan whilst one
respondent worked with an extended existing overdraft facility.
Generally speaking, firms would be expected to use bank overdrafts in
preference to loans to fund working capital requirements, since
overdraft interest is calculated only on the outstanding amount of the
balance, albeit at a higher rate than with a bank loan. Perhaps some
companies have been overextending themselves by purchasing assets with
-126-
an overdraft or, conversely, by taking out loans to finance their
daily operations. Such transactions would be termed inappropriate in
terms of minimising the exposure of a firm to financial risk.
Interestingly, a number of survey firms which had used only internal
funds to start-up subsequently applied for more appropriate types of
external finance. Three firms obtained bank loans to fulfil
requirements for fixed assets, and the working capital needs of 12
companies were largely met by bank overdraft facilities. Nonetheless,
10 previously internally-funded companies used less appropriate
financial sources of working capital, including bank loans, government
agency/authority grants and Loan Guarantee Scheme funds. It may be
that these firms simply accessed
	 available funds in order to
maintain operations.
GOVERNMENT SOURCES
Two companies, initially established with external capital, were
seeking further funds for development purposes, and received grants or
loans from government sources. However, government funding was more
in evidence amongst firms approaching external financiers for the
first time after start-up. These firms simply may have been taking
advantage of government incentives, or the public sector may have been
their last resort if they were unable to obtain funds from private
sector sources. Government finance was also used by two previously
internally-funded companies to purchase plant and machinery, and a
similar number approached finance/credit houses for this purpose.
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Overall, fourteen firms did not appear to use the most appropriate
source of finance for their particular needs (see Subsection 6.1.1).
Surprisingly, firms which were approaching external financiers for the
first time tended to make more appropriate connections between the
need for funds and the source of finance. It is possible that
previously internally funded businesses were more inclined to seek out
current information and assistance when going to external financiers
for the first time. It might be the case that these financiers then
recommend appropriate finance for the particular requirements of the
firm. On the other hand, perhaps entrepreneurs which utilised
external capital at start-up did not seek out current information
because they believed they were familiar with the available external
financial options. Therefore, they might have applied for finance
according to the dated, situation specific information gathered at
start-up.
Table 6.7 examines the sources of subsequent finance in a little more
detail. Firms located in the South East of England made more
extensive use of bank loans and overdrafts (24 firms or 80 per cent)
than Scottish-based companies (12 in number or 39 per cent) resulting
in a significance level of =O.001 after a chi-square test. Scottish
companies mostly utilised government incentives and a number of other
sparsely represented sources including private individuals,
finance/credit houses and an ex-parent company. This result is not
surprising since small firms located in Scotland had access to
regional grants and loans not available to firms in the South East,
although such incentives are declining in number (see Chapter 3). It
is likely that, in the past, banks have been an alternative source to
public sector finance in the South East of England.
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TabL. 6.1 Sourc. of subs.qu.nt •xt•rnat financ. by r.glon
South Eaat	 Scotland	 Total
England
n	 (%)	 n	 CX)	 n	 (%)
Bank sourc..	 24	 (80.0)	 12	 (38.7)	 36	 (59.0)
Gov.rn.nt .ourcsa
and oth.r	 6	 (20.0)	 19	 (61.3)	 25	 (41.0)
TotaL	 30 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)	 61	 (100.0)
ChI-squars (1 d.f.) - 10.747	 p - 0.001
6.3.4 Amounts obtained from external sources after start-up
With reference to the amounts of finance required according to the
needs identified by the entrepreneur and the sources used, it emerged
that firms in the South East of England obtained greater amounts of
initial external capital after start-up. Seventeen firms (65 per
cent) based in the South East of England accessed finance in excess of
£50,000, compared with a lesser eleven companies (41 per cent) in
Scotland. Firms in the South Eastern sub-sample were neither larger
nor exhibited greater growth than their Scottish counterparts, and so
these factors did not appear to be the cause of a greater need for
capital.
The conditions imposed on the firm in return for finance are of added
interest in the light of the identified difference in predominant
sources in the two survey regions. Eighteen English firms (34 per
cent) were required to provide security, either in the form of a
personal guarantee or a first charge on the assets of the company.
This compared with a similar requirement for only 12 firms (23 per
cent) in the Scottish region. However, four other Scottish companies
were asked to sign a default agreement in return for government funds.
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These entrepreneurs promised to repay the full amount of the loan if
the company ceased operating within a certain period of time, thus
preventing them writing off the loss. Therefore, it would seem that
conditions applied to public sector finance accessed by a number of
Scottish companies did not essentially differ from the arrangements
made between other survey firms and their bankers.
6.3.5 Largest source of external finance after start-up
Thirty nine of the survey firms indicated that their first injection
of external finance after start-up was also their largest. The
remaining nineteen respondents who had received another larger
injection of external funds were asked the same questions as before;
that is, the requirement for, and source of, the finance. This was an
attempt to gauge whether, over time, they had made the most
appropriate connection between the identified need for finance and the
source of funds. Again, working capital emerged as the most common
reason for seeking additional external finance, with eight companies
(42 per cent) giving this response. Fifteen of the above companies
(79 per cent) also used their first injection of external funds for
this purpose.
Banks were the main source of the largest tranche of investment
capital for 7 firms (78 per cent) based in the South East of England
and also 7 companies (70 per cent) in Scotland, and they provided
amounts in the range of £45,000 to £1.5 million. Extended bank
overdraft facilities were utilised by five companies (26 per cent) to
supplement working capital, and a further 4 firms (21 per cent)
accessed bank loan finance to purchase plant and machinery. However,
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five survey firms (26 per cent) used loana obtained from various
sources to finance their working capital requirements. This compares
with the first injection of external finance after start-up, where
fourteen companies (24 per cent) used loans for working capital
purposes. This indicates that awareness of more appropriate types of
finance was still not evident in some survey firms. As before, banks
required guarantees involving security and/or floating interest
charges on the amount of the loan.
6.4 FINANCE AND GROWTH
Finance provided on favourable terms to small high technology firms
with the potential to grow should encourage those companies to pursue
a strategy of expansion. Given the discussion on investment amounts
and associated conditions outlined above, this section considers some
of the factors influencing the propensity of the small firm to grow.
However, a measure of growth is only available for those firms founded
prior to 1984, since this variable involves the calculation of the
percentage difference in turnover per employee between 1984 and 1989.
Firstly, considering the effect the source of start-uo finance has on
the propensity to grow, Table 6.8 illustrates that 28 firms (67 per
cent) which utilised mainly internal funds expanded over the five
years. A marginally higher percentage of firms (9 in number, 75 per
cent) founded with external capital also experienced a period of
growth. Clearly the age of the firm should be taken into account,
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although Table 6.9 does not indicate any significant pattern of
results in percentage terms for firms in either the 'growth' or 'no
growth' categories.
TabL. 6.8 Incid.nc. of growth (1984-1989) by .ource of
Itart-up capital
Int.rnat	 Ext.rnat	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Growth	 28	 (66.7)	 9	 (75.0)	 37	 (68.5)
No growth	 14	 (33.3)
	 3	 (25.0)	 17	 (31.5)
TotaL	 42 (100.0)	 12 (100.0)	 54 (100.0)
TabL. 69 incid.nc. of growth by ysar of formation
Tsar firm was found.d
Pr. 1960	 1960-1969	 1970-1979	 1980-	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Growth	 3 (100.0)	 3	 (50.0)	 20	 (76.9)	 11	 (57.9)	 37	 (68.5)
No growth	 0	 (0.0)	 3	 (50.0)	 6	 (23.1)	 8	 (42.1)	 17	 (31.5)
TotaL	 3 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 26 (100.0)	 19 (100.0)	 54 (100.0)
Table 6.10 illustrates that a marginally greater percentage of firms
(10 in number, 71 per cent) experienced growth with start-up capital
in the range of £25,000 and over, than did companies established with
amounts of up to £25,000 (25 in number, 66 per cent). Although
internally funded start-ups tended to have access to generally smaller
amounts of finance, this does not appear to have adversely affected
relative growth levels. Indeed, the six largest respondent companies
in terms of the number of people employed had been established with
mainly internal capital, although their size can be attributed partly
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to age since five were established before 1980. Two companies founded
in the 1980s were obliged to provide personal guarantees in return for
bank finance, and they were currently experiencing a period of no
growth. One of these entrepreneurs had to offer his own house as
security for a loan, resulting in a considerable amount of pressure
being brought to bear during a downturn in business.
T.bL. 6.10 lncld.nc. of growth by .aourtt of start-up capital.
Up to £25.000	 Ov.r £25.000	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 i	 (X)	 i	 (%)
6rowth	 25	 (65.8)	 10	 (71.4)	 35	 (67.3)
No growth	 13	 (34.2)	 4	 (28.6)	 17	 (32.7)
TotaL	 38 (100.0)	 14 (100.0)	 52 (100.0)
Thirteen firms (87 per cent) which had not sought post start-up
external capital were growing, compared with 29 companies (63 per
cent) which had taken up further external funds (see Table 6.11).
This suggests that some companies were able to grow within their
internally-generated means, whilst others were expanding at a rate
which exceeded their current levels of profit generation. The
remaining 17 firms adopting external finance exhibited no growth, and
they may have been distress borrowing in an attempt to maintain a
viable business, or investing heavily in the firm with a view to
growing in future. Investigation of the particular sources of capital
revealed that bank funding was most evident with firms in the growth
category. What is not clear, however, is whether the banks tended to
target growing firms, or whether bank finance facilitated growth in
the survey firms. Table 6.12 illustrates that banks supplied the
initial external funds after start-up for 20 expanding companies (69
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per cent) and, similiarly, the largest injection of funds for 11 such
firms (85 per cent). On the other hand, government funds were
accessed after start-up by a greater percentage of firms experiencing
no growth or a period of decline than by growing companies. Five
declining or no growth firms (33 per cent) received government
finance, compared with 7 growing companies (24 per cent). To a
limited extent, this might indicate that public sector finance is
finding its way to a number of firms which are not obvious candidates
for more commercial sources of funds. However, only one survey firm
used government funds for its largest injection of external capital,
and this perhaps confirms the observation that the public sector is
not a source of substantial amounts of investment capital, but may
be useful as a source of 'top up' finance.
TabLe 6.11 IncIdence of Growth by whether adopted subsequent
•xt.rnat investment
	
Not •dopt.d subsequent Adopted subsequent
	
TotaL
•xt.rnat finance	 •xternat finance
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Growth	 13	 (86.7)
	
29	 (63.0)	 42	 (68.9)
No Growth	 2	 (13.3)
	
17	 (37.0)	 19	 (31.1)
TotaL	 15 (100.0)
	
46 (100.0)	 61	 (100.0)
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Tabs. 6.12 Sourc. of subs.qusnt •xt.rnaL financ. by incidanc. of growth
InitiaL injection aft.r start-up	 Largsst injection aft.r start-up
Growth	 No growth	 TotaL	 Growth	 No growth	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
	
Banks
	
20 (69.0)	 6 (40.0) 26 (59.1) 11 (84.6)	 2 (50.0) 13 (76.5)
Govern-
	
..nt
	
7 (24.1)	 5 (33.3) 12 (27.3)
	
1	 (7.7)	 0	 (0.0)	 1	 (5.9)
	
Oth.r
	
2	 (6.9)	 4 (26.7)	 6 (13.6)	 1	 (7.7)	 2 (50.0)	 3 (17.6)
TotaL
	
29 (100.0) 15 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 13 (100.0)
	 4 (100.0) 17 (100.0)
In relating the growth of the firm to the conditions attached to the
first injection of external finance after start-up, it emerged that
only 5 firms (36 per cent) experiencing no growth were required to
supply security, compared with 18 or 72 per cent of companies in an
expansionary phase. This might be a reflection of the sums of capital
involved. It also demonstrates that the necessity to provide
guarantees did not deter a number of firms from pursuing a programme
of growth. Thirteen firms (76 per cent) which had taken on larger
amounts of external funding used this to finance further cashflow
requirements, the purchase of fixed assets and the general growth of
the firm. The remaining 4 firms (23 per cent) appeared in the no
growth or decline category, where the major requirement for
additional external capital was the need to purchase plant and
machinery. It is not clear whether these firms were attempting to
turnaround a currently negative position by further investment in the
company, or whether their lack of growth was due to an overextension
of resources in the first place.
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6.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In accordance with the findings of a number of other research studies,
the main source of funds used to establish the majority of firms in
this survey proved to be internal. Although external start-up capital
has become more prevalent in recent years, with a number of financial
sources being used by the survey firms including venture capital
organisations. It is noticeable that externally-funded start-ups
generally gained access to greater amounts of capital than companies
using mainly internal finance. After the start-up process, there was
little evidence of entrepreneurs choosing the most appropriate
financial instruments for their requirements, either initially or over
time. This could indicate that firms take advantage of whatever types
of capital are most readily available at the time regardless of the
source. Generally, banks were a major source of further finance to
firms based in the South East of England and government sources of
capital were more in evidence in the Scottish subsample, although the
amounts obtained from the public sector were less than those from the
private sector. Bank funding was also accessed by growth-oriented
companies. However, there was no correlation between propensity to
grow and location of the survey firms.
It is not clear whether it was the decision of entrepreneurs to use
internal capital at start-up, or whether they were unable to raise
external finance because of a lack of personally held collateral.
However, the increase in the use of external start-up capital for
companies founded in the last two decades might indicate an underlying
convergence of the interests of investors and entrepreneurs. On the
delivery side, the ready availability of investment finance in the
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1980s and the resulting increase in competition between the financial
institutions might have encouraged the relaxation of stringent
requirements for collateral. On the acceptance side, the increasing
level of knowledge on the part of the entrepreneur, in terms of the
sources of external funds and the requirements of financiers, might
have encouraged more applications to financial institutions. The
generally greater amounts of start-up finance available from external
sources could give the company considerable leeway to become well
established before looking for further funds, whereas those firms
using limited internal capital may have to get involved in the search
for external capital almost immediately after starting the business.
This would help to explain the finding that more firms founded with
internal funds elected to approach financial institutions for further
funding at a later stage.
The incidence of firms utilising overdraft facilities to purchase
fixed assets and bank loans to finance working capital requirements
might indicate that firms simply make use of the first form of finance
they are able to obtain. However, this is obviously not in the
interests of either the entrepreneur or the financier, since with more
appropriate funding there will be less likelihood of the firm
defaulting on any agreements underpinning the transaction. Clearly,
companies should be encouraged to seek current information on
available alternative sources and types of finance, and financial
institutions should facilitate the search for the time-constrained
small firm. Indeed, the onus may lie with the providers of finance
since they are experienced in the provision of funds to industrial
Customers.
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The conditions attached to the receipt of external finance in both
survey regions were similar in nature, despite the prevalence of bank
funding in the English subsample and government finance in generally
smaller amounts in Scotland. This might suggest that, in the absence
of government finance, firms located in Scotland could access greater
amounts of capital from banks without more extreme conditions being
attached to the investment. Although there was evidence to indicate
that government funding was available to firms which had no
alternative source of finance, public sector funds did not appear to
fulfil within the firm an essentially different role from that of the
banks.
Finally, the results did not provide any evidence that firms making
extensive use of external sources of start-up finance experienced
growth when internally funded establishments showed no growth.
Nor was there any indication that security requirements associated
with external finance deterred firms from pursuing a strategy of
growth. However, that is not to say that greater growth might be
achieved by externally funded firms save for the guarantees required
by the financier. The conditions attached to the extension of finance
might compel entrepreneurs to be over cautious and not pursue a
vigorous growth strategy, thereby over-ensuring that the business
remains solvent and that control by the founder is maintained.
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Chapter 7
THE DISTRIBUTION AND IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE ON SURVEY FIRMS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.1.1 Venture capital and high technology manufacturing firms
Venture capital has been cited as a major determinant, and venture
capital organisations major beneficiaries, of the phenomenal growth of
new high technology firms in the Silicon Valley region of California
(Hambrecht, 1984). Although venture capital funding comprises a
relatively small amount of total funds available to new and existing
enterprises in the United States, it is strongly associated with a
number of rapidly growing companies (McMurtry, 1986). In light of the
this evidence, this chapter investigates whether the existence of
venture capital in the United Kingdom has produced an impact on the
growth of small high technology manufacturing firms in the South East
of England and Scotland.
Previous research on companies from different industrial sectors in
the United Kingdom which used venture capital funds showed that firms
experienced accelerated growth in terms of turnover, profit, employee
numbers and exports in the years just prior to flotation (BVCA,
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1987b). Companies with a specific technological focus exhibited
higher rates of growth in profits and research and development (R&D)
expenditure than in turnover (BVCA, 1987b). Perhaps this is an
indication that these companies achieved R&D investment independence
by dint of retained profits. This is encouraging given that many
early stage technology-based companies experience difficulty in
raising finance for R&D (Cumming, 1983; Oakey et p 1., 1990). Major
losses are often incurred in product development stages where R&D
expenditure is high (Grieve Smith and Fleck, 1987; Archer, 1989) and
private sector investment sources are often unable to sustain such
losses for indeterminate periods of time (Beevor, 1981). Traditional
venture capital investors relieve this problem by taking an equity
stake in the business in return for investment funds. They are
prepared to forego short term income associated with interest payments
on loans, in order to benefit from potentially higher returns when
selling the shareholding in the longer term (Hall, 1987). Venture
capital funding appears an appropriate way to finance the innovation
process in small high technology manufacturing firms.
7.1.2 Industries attractive to venture capitalists
The increasing presence of venture capital in the financial
marketplace (Stoy Hayward, 1989) and the growing importance attached
to new technology-based enterprises (Oakey et p 1., 1988) inevitably
led to the view that, taken either independently or in combination,
they are important vehicles for revitalising Western developed
economies (New Scientist, 1987). According to Dr Franklin, managing
director of the United States banking company the Boston Capital
Group, "it's well known that if you put knowledgeable capital in close
proximity with new technology you are bound to get companies springing
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up," (Anderson, 1988, p16). This view is confirmed by Chapman (1986)
who states that "it is acknowledged that the greatest risks and
perhaps the greatest potential rewards are associated with start-up
finance and with science-based ventures where the accent is on
exploiting unproven technology," (Chapman, 1986, pi). Perhaps in
recognition of this, the electronics and computer-related sectors were
popular investment targets for venture capital organisations between
1981 and 1985 (BVCA, 1987b).
Recently, however, the electronics industry has fallen from favour and
more popular sectors include consumer-related industries, financial
services, industrial products, computer-related businesses,
construction and transportation (BVCA, 1988). A representative of
Murray Johnstone Limited, the Glasgow-based venture capital fund,
confirmed in a recent personal interview that venture capital
providers have been flooding out of high technology ventures,
suffering major losses in the process. As explained in Chapter 4,
there were a large number of investments made in high technology
sectors in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the burgeoning United
Kingdom venture capital industry, perhaps echoing the past investment
behaviour of venture capital organisations in the United States.
However, according to a representative of Prelude Technology
Investments, a Cambridge-based venture capital fund, "quite a lot of
investments were made in the early 1980s by funds run by non-
technologists" (interview evidence). These investments coincided with
a period when small high technology firms began to experience intense
competition from larger companies in the same industry (Andrews, 1988)
and, as a result, there was a downturn in their performance. In
reaction to this decline, a number of venture capital providers re-
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focused their efforts in the late 1980s on less high technology-based
industries and later stage investments (Chapman, 1986; BVCA, 1987b;
BVCA, 1988). Indeed, Murray Johnstone Ltd are moving away from
investing in early-stage technology as the following interview
evidence indicates; "development capital and management buy-outs/-ins
have met our target, technology has not. If we can't make money in
this sector, we won't raise money". An attempt will be made to
determine whether this trend in the supply of venture capital is
evident amongst the small high technology manufacturing firms in this
survey, especially given recent observations that the British
electronics industry offered plenty of potential (Smitham, 1987) and
that science-based ventures received sufficient venture capital
support (Chapman, 1986).
7.1.3 Location of venture capital sources
Chapter 4 illustrated that the United Kingdom venture capital industry
is strongly regional in nature, both in terms of location of venture
capital organisations and investments. This contrasts with the
findings of Kozmetsky et p 1. (1985) regarding the United States where,
although ". .. venture capital funds are committed to major financial
centers, venture capitalists endeavor to distribute their attention
geographically," (p35) although this is less noticeable with dedicated
high technology venture capital funds (Bullock, 1983). However,
Florida and Kenney (1987) found that the concentration of investors in
general, and venture capitalists in particular, in California, New
York and New England facilitated the exchange of information, the
syndication of investments and the mobilisation of resources over
short periods of time. Similarly, Bale (1976) observed that the
availability of finance in the United Kingdom was ". . . far from
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ubiquitous, and for small firms the availability of local pools of
financial capital may be critical," (p32). The emphasis on the
localised nature of the provision of finance is important, not only
for the above reasons of availability, but also because of the
advantages accruing to an investment from local knowledge and
expertise, commitment and convenience (Bain and Reid, 1984).
A number of previous studies have pointed to the success that Scotland
has experienced in attracting venture capital investment (Chapman,
1986; BVCA, 1987b; Mason, 1987) although it is not clear whether this
finance is sourced from Scottish venture capital organisations.
Nevertheless, the amount invested in Scotland only comprises a
fraction of the volume of funds available to firms in the South East
of England (BVCA, 1988). The selection of study firms in Scotland and
the South East of England is designed to test for regional differences
in the supply of venture capital funds, since any spatial clustering
of venture capital provision in the South East will have significant
implications for industrial development in other areas.
7.2 DISTRIBUTION OF VENTURE CAPITAL WITHIN SURVEY FIRNS
Chapter 5 explained how the stratified sample of study firms was drawn
from the sampling frame to consist of almost equal numbers of
companies in three venture capital categories: firms which have
received venture capital funds (RVCs); firms which have had contact
with venture capital organisations but have
	 taken up the finance
(NVCs); and companies which have had no contact with venture capital
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institutions (NOCs). The following section proposes to analyse the
general characteristics of the small high technology manufacturing
firms in this survey with regard to their venture capital status.
7.2.1 Incidence of venture capital funding
In terms of the age of the firm, Table 7.1 illustrates that 22 firms
(44 per cent) founded prior to 1980 had not received venture capital
(NyC), either having refused or been refused such finance. This
compares with a lesser 8 firms (24 per cent) established in recent
years. A similar pattern emerges for the survey firms in the 'no
contact' (NOC) category, however, the opposite trend is apparent when
firms have received venture capital funding (RVC). Eighteen firms (55
per cent) founded in the 1980s had received venture capital funds,
compared with only thirteen of the older companies (26 per cent).
Table 7.1 indicates a significant difference at the value of =0.029
following a chi-square test. Further investigation revealed that only
seven of the 31 companies listed as RVCs (23 per cent) had actually
used venture capital to finance the establishment of the firm. Since
venture capital is a relatively recent source of external investment
finance in the United Kingdom, it was expected that its adoption would
be skewed towards the latter part of the last ten to fifteen years.
This time scale corresponds with the increase in both the number of
venture capital organisations and the amount of funds available.
Nonetheless, Table 7.1 is concerned with the founding date of the
survey firms, and this implies that either venture capital providers
are attracted to younger firms, or that recently formed enterprises
are more inclined to apply for and receive venture capital funding.
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TabL. 7.1 tncd.nc. of v.nturs capitaL funding by ysar of foraation
Ysar fir. was found.d
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
R.ciiv.d vsntur. capitaL (RVC)
	 13	 (26.0)	 18	 (54.5)	 31	 (37.3)
ot r.c.iv.d vintur. capitaL (NYC)
	 22	 (44.0)	 8	 (24.2)	 30	 (36.1)
No contact with vsnturs 	 15	 (30.0)	 7	 (21.2)	 22	 (26.5)
capitaLists (HOC)
TotaL	 50	 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) - 7.063	 p - 0.029
Firms which had been in contact with venture capital organisations,
that is RVC and NVC companies, were also asked whether they had been
refused venture capital funds at any stage. A chi-square result
significant at the = O.039 level in Table 7.2 revealed that older
companies were less likely to have been refused than firms established
within the last decade. The majority of firms founded in 1980 or
later (13 in number or 54 per cent) had been turned down for venture
capital finance, compared with 7 companies (26 per cent) established
prior to that date. It should be pointed out that this table is
concerned with the specific instance where venture capital providers
have refused to invest in survey firms, and any anomalies between
Tables 7.2 and 7.1 are caused by firms declining the opportunity of
venture capital funding. The higher refusal rate for firms
established over the last decade would appear to contradict the
conclusion drawn from Table 7.1. However, Table 7.3 offers a possible
explanation for this apparent discrepancy. Most of the firms (18 in
number or 62 per cent) which utilised venture capital funding had., at
some previous stage, received some form of rejection from venture
capital providers. Only 2 companies (9 per cent) had been
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consistently refused venture capital funding. These results were
significant at the =0.000l level following a chi-square test. Since
the majority of firms which receive venture capital funds are
occasionally refused this form of finance, this suggests that, in many
cases, the firm itself initiates contact with venture capital
organisations. This will be investigated in Chapter 8 in relation to
the role the business plan plays in the acquisition of venture capital
funds, and in Chapter 10 when considering the operations of the
venture capital market. Summarising Tables 7.1 to 7.3, it appears
that more survey firms established over the last ten years applied for
venture capital funds and, in consequence, a higher number of such
firms were exposed to being refused the finance.
TabLe 7.2 Whether r.fus.d venturi capitaL financ, by year of formation
Year fir, was founded
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)
Refused venture capitaL	 7	 (25.9)	 13	 (54.2)	 20	 (39.2)
Not refused v.ntur. capitaL	 20	 (74.1)	 11	 (45.8)	 31	 (60.8)
TotaL	 27 (100.0)	 24 (100.0)	 51 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) - 4.251	 p - 0.039
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TabLa 7.3 Wh.th.r refus.d vsntur. capitaL financ. by incid.nc. of v.nturs
capitaL fundin9
	
R.c.iv.d	 Not rsc.iv.d	 Total
v.nturs capital v.nturs capitaL
	
(RYC)	 (NYC)
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (S)
R.fus.d v.nturs capital	 18	 (62.1)	 2	 (9.1)	 20	 (39.2)
Not rsfus.d vsnturs capitaL	 11	 (37.9)	 20	 (90.9)	 31	 (60.8)
TotaL	 29 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 51 (100.0)
Chi-squars (1 d.f.) - 14.730	 p- 0.0001
7.2.2 Location
This subsection considers whether the location of the survey firms has
an effect on their propensity to obtain funds from venture capital
organisations. However, any regional difference in venture capital
status would not be evident from the 83 personal interviewee firms due
to the otherwise justified use of the stratified random sampling
technique described in Chapter 5, since the survey companies were
selected in equal numbers according to the two variables of location
and venture capital status. However, the regional question can be
approached from a different angle by considering the data obtained
during the postal questionnaire phase of the research (see Chapter 5).
The following introductory table is the same as Table 5.10 contained
in Chapter 5, with the exception that data are presented in a more
aggregate form. Table 7.4 illustrates that just over half (81
companies, 53 per cent) of the 154 respondents to the postal
questionnaire survey had some form of contact with venture capital
organisations, that is RVC and NyC firms. It is also significant that
32 firms (68 per cent) located in Scotland had dealings with providers
of venture capital finance, compared with 49 (46 per cent) of South
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Eastern companies (chi-square test significant at the =O.Ol3 level).
Interestingly, 16 firms (34 per cent) located in Scotland, and 17
companies (a much smaller 16 per cent) based in the South East of
England, received venture capital funds. This result is surprising
given the hypothesis that the concentration of venture capital
organisations and investments in the South East will have a
deleterious effect on firms located in peripheral areas. However, it
should be remembered that the South East comprised a larger population
of electronics firms, and there were also a number of firms about
which there was no information because they did not respond to the
initial postal survey. Also, given the recent emergence of venture
capital firms in the more peripheral regions, it might have been
expected that Scotland would benefit from an appreciable provision of
venture capital finance. It was not anticipated, however, that the
outcome would so strikingly imply that Scottish firms benefited
proportionately more from the supply of venture capital funds in
comparison to companies located in the South East of England.
TabL. 7.4 Incid.ncs of vinturs capitaL funding by Location of postal surv.y
fir.
South East	 ScotLand	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
R.c.jv.d v.nturi capitaL (RVC)
	 17	 (15.9)	 16	 (34.0)	 33	 (21.4)
Hot r.c.iv.d v.nturs capitaL (N yC)	 32	 (29.9)	 16	 (34.0)	 48	 (31.2)
Ho contact with vanturs
	 58	 (54.2)	 15	 (31.9)	 73	 (47.4)
capitaLists (HOC)
TotaL	 107	 (100.0)	 47 (100.0) 154 (100.0)
Chi-squars (2 d.f.) = 8.625 	 p	 0.013
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With regard to the location of the venture capital organisations in
relation to the personal interview survey firms, Table 7.5 indicates
that 9 Scottish firms (32 per cent) had been in communication with
venture capital providers in the South East. On the other hand, no
English respondent companies had talked with Scottish-based venture
capital funds. As might be expected, this table is significant at the
chi-square test level of =O.00OO1. Thus, there is the implication
that Scottish firms benefit not only from their association with
indigenous financial organisations, but also from contact with a
significant minority of South Eastern venture capital providers.
TsbL. 7.5 Location of v.nturi capitaL provid.r by
Location of int.rvi.w fir.. in contact with
this. financi.rs
Surv.y fir. Location
South East	 ScotLand	 Total
i	 (%)	 i	 (%)	 n	 (S)
South East	 30 (100.0)	 9	 (32.1)	 39	 (67.2)
ScotLand	 0	 (0.0)	 19	 (67.9)	 19	 (32.8)
30 (100.0)	 28 (100.0)	 58 (100.0)
Chi-squars (1 d.f.)	 30.275	 p. 0.00001
Table 7.6 expands on the information contained in Table 7.5, and
illustrates that 4 companies (27 per cent) receiving venture capital
in Scotland obtained this finance from South Eastern-based venture
capital organisations. All of these firms fell into a higher
technology categorisation (see Subsection 7.3.2). Since it will be
established in the following chapter that survey firms mostly
initiated contact with venture capital providers, it may be that
Scottish firms requiring investment funds for technologically
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sophisticated R&D work chose to approach specialist financiers who
were more likely to be found in number in the South East of England.
Interestingly, this evidence contradicts the often stated requirement
of venture capital organisations that investments should be local in
nature in order to facilitate the monitoring process.
Ta6Ls 1.6 Location of v.ntur. capitaL provid.r by
Location of Int.rvi.w firms r.c.iving v.nturs
capitaL funds
RVC surv.y firm Location
South East	 ScotLand	 TotaL
n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)
South East	 15 (100.0)	 4	 (26.7)	 19	 (63.3)
ScotLand	 0	 (0.0)	 11	 (73.3)	 11	 (36.7)
15 (100.0)	 15 (100.0)	 30 (100.0)
Chi-squars (1 d.f.) = 17.368 	 p= 0.00003
7.3 IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL ON SURVEY FIRMS
7.3.1 Performance of survey firms
Having survived the trauma of start-up and the often precarious first
few years of operation, it is reasonable to assume that older firms
will be experiencing higher levels of turnover, profit and employment
than newer firms in the same industry. This pattern emerges in Table
7.7, where the three individually significant crosstabulations of
turnover, profit and number of employees by year of formation have
been summarised. The majority of firms (33 in number, 81 per cent)
which experienced turnover levels in the range of £500,000 and over
had been founded prior to 1980. Similarly, the greater number of
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firms (43 or 71 per cent) in the older age category were achieving
profit levels in excess of £100,000 . This compares with a much
reduced number of firms founded within the last ten years achieving
high turnover and profit levels; eight firms (20 per cent) had a
turnover figure of more than £500,000 and 18 firms (30 per cent) had a
profit of more than £100,000.
TabL. 7.7 Turnov.r. profit and ..ptoy.. L.v.Ls by year of
for.at ion
Vsar fir. was found.d
Prior to	 1980	 Significance
1980	 onwards	 (eviL
Turnover (0.5H+)
	 HIGH	 LOW	 Chi-squar.
No. of firms
	 33	 8	 p. 0.0002
S of firms	 80.5%	 19.5%
Profit (GIOOK+)	 HIGH	 LOW	 Chi-squar.
No. of fIrms	 43	 18	 p - 0.002
S of fIrms	 70.5%	 29.5%
EmpLoyees (51+)	 HIGH	 LOW	 Chi-squar.
No. of firms	 22	 3	 p - 0.0007
(S of firms)	 88%	 12%
Caution is necessary when interpreting the results in the last part of
Table 7.7, where a significant 22 firms (88 per cent) which had been
established prior to the l980s employed over fifty employees. A very
small number of younger companies (3 or 12 per cent) fell into the 51
employees and over category. The problem of interpretation centres
around the difficulty experienced in defining the precise size of a
small firm (see Chapter 5, Subsection 5.3.2). A high level of
turnover may be attained with a relatively low number of employees in
new technology-based industries due to the high value added per
worker, and the tendency to sub-contract work out. Therefore,
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employment could be substantially lower per unit of output than in the
more traditional manufacturing sectors. From a public policy
viewpoint, however, it is important to encourage employment generating
firms, and there is some evidence from Table 7.7 that small high
technology firms have employment creation potential over time.
Summarising these results together with the evidence presented in
Subsection 7.2.1, younger firms experiencing low levels of turnover,
perhaps operating at a loss and employing fewer than 25 employees were
likely to have applied for venture capital finance. This conforms to
the ideal of the venture capital providers of nurturing currently low
profile small firms through their formative years, until they are
attractive profitable companies ready to be floated on the public
markets. In order to fulfil this ideal, the firm should progress from
its low turnover/negative profit position once it has adopted venture
capital funds. Consequently, the following subsection investigates
propensity to grow, and this is allied to the degree of technological
sophistication within the company.
7.3.2 Venture capital as a source of growth finance
At this stage it was considered useful to create a new variable for
analysis in this and subsequent chapters. The earlier literature
review illustrated that venture capital funds were synonymous with
technology-based companies in the United States since high technology
firms involved in leading-edge research attracted the most interest
from venture capitalists. In order to obtain some measure of whether
venture capital finance in this country gravitated towards particular
investment opportunities, the types of technology in which the survey
firms were involved were subdivided by degree of technical
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sophistication. Working on the principle that the higher the R&D
spend and the larger the number of R&D employees, the greater the
level of technical commitment, the input measure of R&D was considered
a reasonable approximation to the technological sophistication of the
firm. The percentage change in R&D expenditure and R&D employment
over the five years prior to the study were also included in the
calculation, thus taking into account the changing emphasis placed on
R&D endeavours. Therefore, the variable created to distinguish
between the differing levels of technological sophistication within
the survey firms consisted of a combination of current and historical
R&D expenditure and R&D staffing levels. Appendix 10 details the
exact method by which the technological sophistication definition was
derived. Firms scoring high on this rating scale were termed 'high
technology,' and 'low technology' companies comprised the lower rated
group.
Table 7.8 cross-tabulates technological sophistication against the
percentage change in the number of employees between 1984 and 1989.
Significantly, firms which exhibited no growth or a decline in
employment levels over the five year period tended to be in the low
technology category (chi-square test significant at	 O.016 level).
Eleven low technology firms (37 per cent) had either not recruited
employees or had shed labour. This compares with only 5 firms (13 per
cent) in the high technology category which were not growing in terms
of employees. On the other hand, 24 high technology companies (63 per
cent) had increased their workforce by over 50 per cent, compared with
a lesser 9 firms (30 per cent) in the low technology category. The
age of the firm should be taken into account when interpreting these
figures, and Table 7.9 illustrates that 22 companies (67 per cent)
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founded over the last decade fell into the high technology category,
compared with 21 older companies (a lesser 42 per cent). This table
is significant at the .=O.O28 level following a chi-square test,
demonstrating that the younger firms in this sample are more
technologically sophisticated, according to the measurement employed,
and exhibit reasonable growth in terms of employee numbers. The
following paragraphs investigate other growth variables before drawing
an overall conclusion.
TabL. 7.8 E.pLoyss growth by t.chrioLogical sophistication
High	 Low	 TotaL
	
t.chnoLogy	 technoLogy
	
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
D.cLins - 0%	 5	 (13.2)	 11	 (36.7)	 16	 (23.5)
I - 50%	 9	 (23.7)	 10	 (33.3)	 19	 (27.9)
51 - 100%	 24	 (63.2)	 9	 (30.0)	 33	 (48.5)
TotaL	 38 (100.0)	 30 (100.0)	 68 (100.0)
Chi-squars (2 d.f.) • 8.294 	 p. 0.016
T.bts 7.9 TechnoLogicaL sophistication by year of foruation
Year fir. was found.d
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onward,
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
High technoLogy	 21	 (42.0)	 22	 (66.7)	 43	 (51.8)
Low technoLogy	 29	 (58.0)	 11	 (33.3)	 40	 (48.2)
TotaL	 50 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-square (1 d.f.) • 4.845 	 p.0.028
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H.gativi - 0%
1 - 50%
51 - 100%
TotaL
The study by the BVCA (1987b) used turnover, profit and export figures
as well as employment levels to arrive at some measure of growth. The
application of the first of these criteria to the firms in this survey
is illustrated in Table 7.10. Although not statistically significant,
24 firms (69 per cent) in the high technology category exhibited a 51-
100 per cent increase in the level of turnover, compared with only 12
low technology firms (46 per cent). The variables calculated from the
percentage change in profit and export levels between 1984 and 1989
did not display a similar pattern to growth in turnover and employee
levels. However, Table 7.11 does indicate that firms which exhibited
higher levels of exports in 1989 tended to fall into the
technologically more sophisticated category. This table marginally
fails to be significant at the 	 O.007 level because it does not meet
the requirement that less than 20 per cent of the cells have an
expected frequency of less than five, the level being 33 per cent.
Nevertheless, it is still noteworthy that only one high technology
firm (2 per cent) had not sold any of its products abroad in 1989,
compared with 8 (21 per cent) of the companies in the lower technology
category. Similarly, the strongest current levels of exports were
displayed by 16 high technology firms (37 per cent) and only 6 (15 per
cent) low technology respondent companies.
T.bL. 7.10 Turnovsr growth by t.chnoLogicat
.ophi.ticat ion
High	 Low	 TotaL
technoLogy	 technoLogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
3	 (8.6)	 5	 (19.2)	 8	 (13.1)
8	 (22.9)	 9	 (34.6)	 17	 (27.9)
24	 (68.6)	 12	 (46.2)	 36	 (59.0)
35 (100.0)	 26 (100.0)	 61	 (100.0)
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TbL. 7.11 Psrc.ntag. of •xporta in 1989 by t.chnotoglcaL
.ophisticat Ion
High	 Low
	
TotaL
tschnotogy	 t.chnotoQy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 rt	 (%)
0%	 1	 (2.3)	 8	 (20.5)
	
9	 (11.0)
• 50%	 26	 (60.5)	 25	 (64.1)
	
51	 (62.2)
51 - 100%	 16	 (37.2)	 6	 (15.4)
	
22	 (26.8)
TotaL	 43 (100.0)	 39 (100.0)	 82 (100.0)
It appears that high technology firms, generally demonstrating a
stronger commitment to R&D in terms of R&D expenditure and. dedicated
R&D staff, reaped the rewards of this investment with higher
employment figures and increased turnover over time, and a generally
greater level of exports. Since it has also been shown that the
higher technology firms were mostly founded over the last decade,
these firms may have a greater scope for growth in terms of employment
and/or turnover when compared with their older counterparts. Moreover,
given the observation that the recipients of venture capital funds
tend to be younger firms (see Table 7.1) it would be expected that
these companies would also have a high technology orientation.
Consequently, the relationship between technological sophistication
and venture capital status was investigated in order to determine
whether growth-oriented companies were more likely to have adopted
venture capital funds. Table 7.12 illustrates that 20 companies (47
per cent) in the high technology category had actually received
venture capital finance, compared with 11 or 28 per cent of the low
technology firms surveyed. The percentage difference between high and
low technology firms was minimal in the category where firms had
either been refused venture capital finance, or had decided not to
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take it up (NyC). However, of those firms which had not had any
contact with venture capital organisations (NOCs), 15 (38 per cent)
were termed low technology, whilst 7 (16 per cent) fell into the high
technology category. The chi-square test on the data presented in
this table produced a result significant at the 	 O.O62 level. Since
this level marginally exceeds the normally accepted 	 O.O5 level,
Table 7.13 was produced to eliminate the effect that the N yC category
(contact with venture capital organisations but no take up of funds)
was having on Table 7.12. This re-organisation of the data is
justified on the grounds that the NVC category is a grey grouping with
many possible causes for the lack of venture capital take up, whereas
the other two categories are more clear-cut. Table 7.13 demonstrates
that the elimination of the NVC category results in a much increased
significance level of =O.O19, indicating a strong relationship
between the higher technology firms in this survey and the adoption of
venture capital funds.
TabLs 7.12 Incid.nc. of v•nturs capital funding by technological
sophistication
High	 Low	 Total
technology	 t.chnotogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Rsc.ived ventura capital (RVC) 	 20	 (46.5)	 11	 (27.5)	 31	 (37.3)
Not rsc.iv.d venture capital (HVC) 	 16	 (37.2)	 14	 (35.0)	 30	 (36.1)
No contact with venture	 7	 (16.3)	 15	 (37.5)	 22	 (26.5)
capitaLists (HOC)
TotaL	 43	 (100.0)	 40 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.)
	 5.554	 p • 0.062
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TabIs 7.13 lncid.nc. of v.ntur. capital funding (r.duc.d cat.goriss) by
t.chnotogicat sophistication
High	 Low	 Total
t.chnotogy	 tschnotogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
R.c.Iv.d vsnturi capitaL (RVC)	 20	 (74.1)	 11	 (62.3)	 31	 (58.5)
No contact with v.nturs
capitaLists (NOC)
	
7	 (25.9)	 15	 (57.7)	 22	 (41.5)
Total
	
27 (100.0)	 26 (100.0)	 53 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) • 5.505	 p. 0.019
Overall, 36 or 84 per cent of the higher technology firms and 25 or 63
per cent of the lower technology companies had some form of contact
with venture capitalists. This might indicate that United Kingdom
venture capital organisations have a strong technology-based
investment orientation and seek out such investment opportunities.
However, given the evidence of Chapter 4, it would seem more likely
that a high research and development commitment compels small high
technology firms to apply for venture capital funds (see Chapter 10).
7.4 SUNMARY AND CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that older firms displayed a higher level of
turnover, profit and employment, companies of ten years old or less
were more likely to have received venture capital funding. However,
younger firms did not automatically received this finance. Rather, it
was common for eventual recipients to have been refused venture
capital funds prior to a successful application. These younger firms
also displayed a greater propensity to be 'high technology' as
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measured by R&D inputs, and exhibited a higher rate of turnover and
employee growth and a stronger export orientation than their older
non-adopting counterparts. It was also interesting to note that a
number of Scottish firms sought and received venture capital finance
from venture capital organisations based in the South East of England.
However, regardless of whether the companies were located in Scotland
or the South East of England, high or low technology, young or old
and/or high or low growth oriented, the majority demonstrated a
requirement for investment funds by establishing contact with venture
capital providers.
In the past, venture capital organisations have chosen to invest in
particular industrial sectors in the belief that one successful
investment bodes well for the prospects of other firms in the same
industry. These financiers tended to adopt a 'herding instinct' when
compiling their investment portfolios whereby, if one venture capital
organisation demonstrated a good return on investments in a particular
sector, then other venture capital providers would target firms in the
same industry. This 'herding together can work to the detriment of
firms with good growth potential if other previous investments in that
general sector have failed to show a satisfactory return.
Understandably, having had their fingers burnt once, venture capital
firms would avoid investing in similar situations in future and look
for attractive alternative opportunities. The introduction to this
chapter indicated that venture capital organisations are at present
withdrawing from high technology investments, although this trend may
not be apparent from the study since it is not longitudinal in nature.
However, there would still appear to be venture capital organisati.ons
prepared to invest in firms in high technology sectors which
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demonstrate the ability to grow. The 'growth potential' of a firm is
important to venture capital providers who make investment decisions
based not on high profit or turnover levels, but on firms showing
future potential even with currently negative performance figures.
The successful applicants are then able to grow either at their
'natural' rate as a result of receiving the venture capital funding,
or they are required to become growth oriented in order to realise the
best possible return for the financier. The latter statement is more
likely given the evidence in Chapter 4 of the short-term orientation
of venture capital organisations and their financial backers.
In addition, it is extremely interesting to note that the hypothesised
disparity in the distribution of venture capital exists within the
target sector, not in terms of a disproportionate number of firms in
the South East attracting such finance, but in terms of venture
capital providers from both regions investing in Scottish firms. This
indicates that Southern-based venture capital organisations are
prepared to invest at some distance, perhaps because they perceive
these projects to be exceptional, especially since a commonly
expressed complaint concerns the dearth of suitable investment
opportunities. However, investing on a remote basis implies that
contact between the investor and investee is not 'hands-on.' This
will be investigated in detail in relation to the firms in this survey
in Chapter 10.
The regional result could have been a precursor to the recent
development of regionally based venture capital funds. Furthermore,
the involvement of venture capital organisations with remotely based
firms could lead to syndicated deals with local venture capital
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providers who, in turn, might be a source of further syndicated
investment opportunities. In this way, South Eastern venture capital
orgariisations are able to take advantage of the demand for venture
capital funds in the regions without having to bear the costs of
establishing offices outside the London area. Notwithstanding the
previous comments, the strong significance level associated with Table
7.6, which investigated the location of venture capital investors by
the location of recipient firms, suggests that there is still a
certain amount of investment parochialism associated with the
distribution of venture capital funding in the United Kingdom.
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Chapter 8
BUSINESS PLANS; THEIR ROLE IN THE ACQUISITION OF
VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 Formulation of business plans
The business plan of the potential investee firm may prove to be
the ". .. principal tool in raising capital from the venture capital
investor," (Timmons et p 1., 1977, p418). However, most venture
capital organisations receive many more plans than they have time to
consider and, as a result, they tend to pay more attention to those
plans which have been referred by a source respected by the financier
(Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 1983). Therefore, it may be important for
applicant companies to identify intermediaries who are instrumental in
fostering deals between investee firms and venture capital
organisations. However, this application procedure only facilitates
access to venture capital providers. The entrepreneur should attempt
to prepare a document which will attract the interest of the venture
capital provider	 the intermediary if one is used. If this third
party is an accountant or management consultant, he may even be
involved in the formulation of the plan, offering assistance with
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layout, financial projections and other such details. This
professional help should be kept to a minimum in order to "... capture
the spontaneity and enthusiasm of management which in many cases will
be critical to the success of the proposal," (Arthur Anderson, 1987,
p6). This means that a considerable amount of management time will be
taken up in writing a plan or revising an existing document. However,
its use can extend beyond the initial aim of attracting investment
finance, becoming a valuable reference document for planning and
monitoring the long term business performance of the company (Timmons,
1981). For the purposes of this study, the focus will be on the
ability of the plan to attract investment backing.
8.1.2 Business plan components
Typically, the venture capital organisation will reject 85 per cent of
the investment opportunities at an early stage, 15 per cent will
receive serious consideration, and only 5 per cent will result in
negotiations between the potential investor and investee (Arthur
Anderson, 1987). These figures were confirmed by a representative of
Baillie Gifford and Company in Edinburgh; "we get 100 plans a year.
About twelve are looked at seriously, two or three get finance"
(interview evidence). Venture capital organisations undertake a
process of 'due diligence' once they have decided to consider further
promising business proposals (Pratt, 1983c). This primarily entails
substantiating three vital elements of the business plan, namely the
experience of the management team, the market potential and the
technical aspects of the product(s). These components are elaborated
upon below.
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MANAGEMENT
The management team element is often cited as the most critical
factor in the appraisal process (Waite, 1983). Frequently, venture
capital providers maintain that they "... invest in people not
projects," (Gopalan, 1986, p17). The strength of commitment to
funding ventures with competent management is obvious from the
following statements: "... investors would rather back an 'A' team in
a 'B' market than the reverse," (Bruno et p 1., 1985, p13); and, "we're
more inclined to back excellent management in a less exciting area"
(interview evidence with a representative of Baillie Gifford and
Company). Kryzanowski and Giraldeau (1977) and Bruno et p 1. (1985)
have stated that the range in expertise of the management team may
reduce the risk associated with the investment. This might explain
why MacMillan et p 1. (1985) discovered that failure to obtain venture
capital funds was often due to the inexperience of the entrepreneur.
However, technically qualified people applying for venture capital
finance in the United Kingdom tend to lack commercial market expertise
(Stevens, 1981) and this must have a bearing on the success of their
application.
MARKET
Notwithstanding the above comments, the proposed market for the
product is another important consideration. Venture capital
organisations look for the identification of current and future market
requirements in the business plan, together with an assessment of how
the company intends to address these in order to grow (Pratt, 1983c).
Independent validation for market predictions and prospects is also
considered important by the financiers (Watkins, 1978). A fundamental
problem with many business plans is that they do not take sufficient
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account of market potential, and this neglect is seen to indicate a
lack of preparation for competition (Cohen and Fans, 1983). Such
omissions are of added significance to technology-based proposals
formulated, in most instances, by engineers lacking wider business
expertise (Batchelor, 1988c). Competition is likely to be intense in
high technology sectors, since existing potential competitor firms
respond quickly to the introduction of new products as a consequence
of the rapidly changing environment in which they operate (Cohen and
Fans, 1983).
PRODUCT
Technical entrepreneurs are often accused of being blinded by the
innovative nature of their products, whilst ignoring the critically
important factor of profitability (Dolch, 1983). This has been
advanced as one reason why high technology ventures in particular
experience difficulty in attracting investment finance from external
sources (Moseley, 1985). Although venture capital providers are
looking for a product with unique or proprietary technological aspects
(Patricof, 1983), it must to be able to achieve saleability according
to the existing benefits and costs to the consumer (Pennington, 1982).
In other words, the product should have some quality which no
competitor can currentl y rival and, ideally, there should be
demonstration of existing demand in the marketplace at an appropriate
price to the consumer. A representative of Hambros Advanced
Technology Trust in London indicated that he was looking for
"companies with existing products which can be marketed" (interview
evidence).
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8.1.3 Problems associated with the appraisal process
The decision to invest in a particular venture is extremely
judgemental and, as such, the process of appraisal is considered to be
more of an art than a science (NEDC, 1986). Certain objective
analysis techniques can be applied when assessing financial data.
However, the quality of the business plan elements of management,
market and product are mostly assessed on a subjective basis
(Batchelor, 1988d). Venture capital funds place most emphasis on the
experience and competence of the management team. Nonetheless, there
are problems associated with this criterion; namely entrepreneurs
starting out in business may not have had time to acquire management
experience, and small established firms may not have developed a
management team due to their size. Another issue concerns negative
management experience. In the British case, if an entrepreneur has
failed in a previous business venture, then he may find it
particularly difficult to convince the financier of his competence.
According to one prominent venture capital provider, "we would take
previous business failure as proof that this is a man to avoid,"
(Batchelor, 1990c, p17). "There is a huge stigma attached to failure
- everyone remembers it," (interview evidence with a representative of
the Scottish Development Agency). This contradicts the view commonly
held in the United States that "an entrepreneur's second venture
profits from lessons learned from the first ... ," (Larsen and Rogers,
1984, p5Le).
Management expertise might be of reduced significance in high
technology ventures where entrepreneurs are initially protected from
competition by the development of unique products or processes
(Batchelor, 1988e). According to Bruno et p 1. (1985) a product used
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to launch a new firm should be without equal, and yet "venture
capitalists often shy away from investing in research or the
development of altogether new technologies ... ," preferring instead
"... to invest in the application of existing technology to a new
problem," (p13). Generally, venture capital organisations are more
interested in high profile products (Johnston, 1983) in market sectors
with which they are familiar (Bruno et p 1., 1985). The Cambridge-
based venture capital organisation, Cambridge Capital Management Ltd,
"... always go for companies with an established technology in an
innovative application, then you only have to overcome management
risk". However, the representative from Cambridge Capital Management
acknowledged that "within high technology business, product generation
is the lucrative end, not the use of it itself, (interview evidence).
Another problem associated with high technology entrepreneurs is that
they do not always present their companies in an effective manner to
the financiers (Hosking, 1988). Realising this, some entrepreneurs
would welcome the opportunity to revise their business plans in the
light of criticisms put forward by the venture capital organisations
(Foss, 1985). However, it is likely that merging the aims of
entrepreneurs and venture capital providers within business plans will
prove difficult. Very often "... the view held by the entrepreneur
(who is the user of venture capital) can differ quite dramatically
from that held by the supplier of venture capital (the venture capital
fund manager)," (Hodgson, 1984, p118).
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8.2 APPLICATION FOR VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS
From the above commentary it is clear that many entrepreneurs are
faced with the prospect of proving that their business is not only
worthy of investment by venture capital organisations, but also offers
the potential for substantial financial returns. Subsequent sections
of this chapter will investigate the survey firms in more detail with
regard to whether they have received venture capital finance.
However, there now follows a consideration of the nature of the
contact with venture capital providers, both in personal terms and
from the point of view of the business plan. This precedes a more
comprehensive discussion in Chapter 10 on the supply and demand
aspects of the venture capital marketplace.
8.2.1 Contacting venture capital providers
A significant majority of firms which had contact with venture capital
organisations also possessed business plans. This is not surprising
since initial investigations by financiers are based around this
document. Table 8.1 shows that 43 firms or 86 per cent with business
plans had interacted with venture capital providers, whereas the
corresponding figure for firms without formal business plans was a
lower 18 companies or 55 per cent (chi-square test significant at the
level of =0.001). However, given that much of the available
literature advocates the formulation of a five year plan as essential
to obtaining venture capital funding, it is interesting that nine of
the 18 firms (50 per cent) felt able to make an application without
such a document. Eight of these nine companies (89 per cent) decided
to use intermediaries to initiate contact with venture capital
providers, and it may be that the requirement to form a business plan
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is bypassed when contact is made by way of a referral. However, only
3 of these companies were successful in obtaining venture capital
funds in this manner.
TabL. 8.1 Contact with vunturs capitaL provid.ra by wh.th.r
fir.. hay. for.aL busin... pLans
Busin...	 No busin.ss
	
TotaL
pLan	 pLan
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Contact with vsnturs
capitaLists
	
43	 (86.0)	 18	 (54.5)	 61	 (73.5)
No contact with
vsnturs capitaLists
	
7	 (14.0)	 15	 (45.5)	 22	 (26.5)
TotaL	 50 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squars (1 d.f.) - 10.097
	
p-0.001
The growth orientation of the firm may have an effect on the mode of
the initial contact with the financier. According to Table 8.2, when
venture capital organisations initiated the contact, they mostly chose
to approach expanding companies directly. Fifteen growing firms (83
per cent) were approached directly by the financiers, whilst there was
no difference between direct and indirect contact with declining or no
growth companies. The opposite trend was evident in cases where the
firm first established the relationship. The majority of declining or
no growth firms (9 or 75 per cent) made use of an intermediary,
whereas this mode of contact was not so evident amongst growing
companies. In other words, direct contact generally was established
by venture capital organisations when survey firms were growing, and
indirect forms of contact were prevalent when stagnant or declining
firms decided to apply for venture capital funds. The direct approach
is understandable when financiers are attempting to alert certain
-169-
TotaL
n	 (%)
TotaL
n	 (%)
attractive firms to the potential of venture capital funding. On the
other hand, less obviously attractive firms perhaps use intermediaries
as sounding boards before establishing contact with venture capital
providers since their businesses may not appear commercially
attractive. Intermediaries may have advised the firms to look for
more money, and offered their assistance in the process.
T.bL. 1.2 Naturs of contact with vsrturs capitaL provid.rs by who Initiatsd
contact and iricid.nc. of growth
Vsnturs capitaList
initi.t.d contact
Positivs	 Nsgativs
growth	 growth
n	 (S)	 n	 (%)
Fir.
initiat.d contact
Positiv.	 N.gativ.
growth	 growth
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Dirsct	 15 (83.3) 2 (50.0) 17 (77.3)
	 10 (50.0) 3 (25.0) 13 (40.6)
Intsr-
asdisry	 3 (16.7) 2 (50.0)	 5 (22.7)	 10 (50.0) 9 (75.0) 19 (59.4)
Totit	 18 (100.0) 4 (100.0) 22 (100.0)
	 20 (100.0) 12 (100.0) 32 (100.0)
The remaining sections of this chapter investigate the factors which
lead to the actual supply of venture capital funds to firms after
initial contact has been made.
8.2.2 Business plans
Table 8.3 illustrates that a significant 26 firms (84 per cent) which
received venture capital funds also possessed business plans (chi-
square test significant at the level of =O.00O6). Similarly, the
majority of firms (17 or 57 per cent) in the 'established contact but
not received venture capital' category (NYC) indicated that they had
formulated a plan, whereas few companies which had not required
venture capital finance (NOC) had such a document (7 firms or 14 per
-170-
cent). This would imply that the business plans of the survey firms
had been devised largely to raise investment capital. Indeed, this
was true for 21 firms or 81 per cent which received venture capital
funds, whilst the majority of firms in both the NVC (11 in number or
65 per cent) and NOC (6 companies or 86 per cent) categories had
formulated business plans as strategic planning tools or as
information documents for their parent company. The majority of firms
which formed their plans in order to raise money were successful in
achieving this objective. Therefore, firms possessing business plans
originally formulated for a purpose other than seeking funds might be
advised to revise them when applying for external investment finance.
T.bL. 8.3 Whither fir.. posse.. business pLans by ventura cspitsL status
Recsiv.d	 Not r.ciivid	 No contact	 TotaL
venturi capitaL venturi capitaL
(RVC)	 (NVC)	 (HOC)
n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Bu.in..s pLan	 26	 (83.9)	 17	 (56.7)	 7	 (14.0)	 50	 (60.2)
No businiss pLan	 5	 (16.1)	 13	 (43.3)	 15	 (68.2)	 33	 (39.8)
TotaL	 31	 (100.0)	 30 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) -
	 14.807	 p - 0.0006
Further analysis was undertaken to discover whether particular types
of firms tended to formulate plans. Specifically, the technological
sophistication of the firms was crosstabulated against whether they
possessed a formal business plan. Thirty two of the higher technology
firms in this survey (74 per cent) had formulated a business plan,
compared with only 18 (45 per cent) of the less technologically
sophisticated companies (Table 8.4). This table proved significant
following a chi-square test at the level of =O.006. Perhaps the
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higher technology firms were committed to generally higher levels of
R&D expenditure and had to plan in order to apply for external funds
to maintain expensive R&D efforts. However, just over half of the
higher technology companies (18 in number or 56 per cent) had formed
their plans in order to seek investment capital, and the same
percentage of firms with business plans in the lower technology
category (10 in number) cited the same reason. Therefore, there is no
obvious difference in motives for formulating business proposals
between the higher and lower technology firms in this survey, but
there may be a difference in terms of the extent to which R&D funds
are required.
T.bL• 8.6 Wh.th.r fir.. poss.. busin.s. pLans by
t.chnoLogicaL sophistication
High	 Low	 TotaL
t.chnotogy	 t.chnetogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 i	 (%)
Busin.ss pLan
	 32	 (74.4)	 18	 (45.0)	 50	 (60.2)
No businsas pLan
	 11	 (25.6)	 22	 (55.0)	 33	 (39.8)
TotaL	 43 (100.0)	 40 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squars (1 d.f.) • 1.488	 p - 0.006
There was a significant tendency for younger rather than older firms
to give the requirement for investment finance as the major incentive
for writing business plans (Table 8.5). At the chi-square test
significance level of =O.O42, 17 firms (71 per cent) founded during
1980 or later formulated plans with the specific intention of seeking
investment funds, compared with a lesser 11 older companies (42 per
cent). This result coincides with the greater tendency for younger
firms to receive venture capital finance as outlined in Chapter 7. In
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addition, there is a strong inclination for firms which were
established with external funds to formulate business plans. A
significant 15 firms or 79 per cent founded with external capital as a
main source possessed a formal business plan, whereas 28 firms (a
lesser 53 per cent) using internal start-up capital had written such a
document (Table 8.6). This table is significant at the level of
=O.O46 following a chi-square test. It is likely that firms
established with external funds were obliged to write business plans
in return for start-up funding.
TabLe 8.5 Purpose of th. business plan by year of
format ion
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
To rais. .on.y	 11	 (42.3)	 17	 (70.8)	 28	 (56.0)
Oth.r	 15	 (57.7)	 7	 (29.2)	 22	 (44.0)
TotaL	 26 (100.0)	 24 (100.0)	 50 (100.0)
Chi-squ.r. (1 d.f.) = 4.121	 p - 0.042
TabL. 8.6 Whether firms possess business plans by main
sourc. of start-up finance
InternaL	 ExternaL	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Business pLan	 28	 (52.8)	 15	 (78.9)	 43	 (59.7)
No business pLan
	 25	 (47.2)	 4	 (21.1)	 29	 (40.3)
Total	 53 (100.0)	 19 (100.0)	 72	 (100.0)
ChI-square (1 d.f.) - 3.966
	 p- 0.046
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This observation raised the question of whether business plans had
been fundamentally redrafted at any stage. Interestingly, the
majority of plans belonging to firms receiving venture capital funds
had been altered in some way (16 firms or 62 per cent), whilst plans
belonging to firms which had not received venture capital finance
mostly remained unchanged. The respondents which had redrafted their
plans were asked whether these alterations were made due to the
failure of the original plan to attract venture capital funds. In
only nine out of 24 cases (38 per cent) where business plans had been
modified did the changes take place before approaching the next
venture capital organisation. Significantly, more firms founded in
the last decade were involved in the revision of their business plans
(see Table 8.7). Fifteen firms (63 per cent) established from 1980
onwards changed their plans in some fundamental way, compared with
only 9 companies (35 per cent) established prior to 1980 (chi-square
test significant at the level of .=O.O49). This could be a result
of younger firms still being in their formative years and, as such,
they have not settled on any particular long term strategy on which
it might be possible to rely.
TbL. 8.7 Whether the pLan was fundamentaLLy redraft.d by
year of formation
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 CS)
R.draft.d	 9	 (34.6)	 15	 (62.5)	 24	 (48.0)
Not r.draft.d	 17	 (65.4)	 9	 (37.5)	 26	 (52.0)
TotaL	 26 (100.0)	 24	 (100.0)	 50	 (100.0)
Chi . square (1 d.f.) - 3.888
	 p • 0.049
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The respondents were also asked to indicate whether they had sought
any professional help with the initial formulation of the plan or a
subsequent redraft. Twenty five firms in both the received and not
received venture capital finance categories (almost 58 per cent) had
received professional help and advice with their plan in its initial
stages. The type of professional help enlisted by the survey firms
differed in that accountants were mostly employed by firms in the not
received category (6 firms, 55 per cent incidence) and other
professionals like management consultants and financiers were utilised
by firms in receipt of venture capital funds (11 firms or 79 per cent).
Linking this result to the motivation behind the business plan,
accountants are useful when writing a strategic planning document,
whilst advice from banks, venture capital organisations, consultants
and government agents is effective when formulating plans in order to
obtain venture capital funds.
A considerable amount of management time is taken up in preparing the
business plan and the respondents were asked whether they believed
that the document was of value. Overall, forty firms (80 per cent)
found either the plan itself, or the exercise of writing the plan,
useful to their business. There was a higher incidence of perceived
usefulness amongst firms established prior to 1980. Twenty four older
firms (92 per cent) found the plan valuable compared with 16 younger
companies (67 per cent) and this might be a reflection of ability to
achieve business plan objectives. For example, older companies may
have settled into some form of strategy from which they are able to
plan ahead on a stable basis, and they may be more able to achieve
business plan targets due to consistent performance and greater
experience. On the other hand, younger less experienced firms might
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have to settle for a process of formulating and re-formulating plans
in the light of ambitious targets and variable market conditions and
results.
8.3 MAIN INGREDIENTS OF BUSINESS PLANS
There now follows an evaluation of the three business plan components
highlighted by venture capital organisations as being of particular
interest. Firstly, the qualifications and experience of the founders
and management teams of the survey firms will be analysed to ascertain
the degree to which this affects ability to attract venture capital
funds. An investigation of the nature of the markets together with
the attributes of the products will follow, and may help to explain
any patterns with regard to the supply of venture capital funds.
8.3.1 Management
In order to determine whether academic achievement had any effect on
the acquisition of venture capital, the respondents were asked to
indicate whether the founders held any higher education qualifications
of HND/HNC level or above when establishing the company. Twenty six
companies (45 per cent) with qualified founders had received venture
capital finance (see Table 8.8) and almost three quarters were in
possession of an ordinary degree or higher qualification. This
compares with only 4 founders (18 per cent) receiving venture capital
funds when not in possession of higher education qualifications.
However, a substantial minority of the qualified entrepreneurs (20 in
number or 35 per cent) had not received venture capital funding and
the majority of these held an ordinary degree or higher qualification
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as above. The academic status of the founder appeared to have only a
marginal effect on the distribution of venture capital funds. Indeed,
it might be postulated that the qualifications of the founders are
considered to be supplanted by the expertise they gain in business
after leaving an academic environment.
T.bL. 8.8 Incid.nci of venture capitaL funding by whether .in found.r had
for.at .cad..ic quaLifications at ti.. of for.ation
Quatifi.d	 Not quaLified	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
R.c.Iv.d vsnturs capitaL (RVC)
	 26	 (64.8)	 4	 (13.2)	 30	 (37.5)
Not r.c,Iv,d ventur, capitaL (NYC)
	 20	 (34.5)	 10	 (45.5)	 30	 (37.5)
No contact with venturi 	 12	 (20.7)	 8	 (36.4)	 20	 (25.0)
capitaLists (NOC)
TotaL	 58 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 80 (100.0)
The respondents were asked whether any members of the management team
had management experience with other firms in the same industry prior
to forming the current firm. Surprisingly, 13 management teams or 46
per cent with no prior management experience in a similar business had
received venture capital finance (see Table 8.9). Eight companies (36
per cent) with one experienced manager and 10 firms (30 per cent) with
two or more experienced personnel also received venture capital
funding. However, 14 management teams (42 per cent) consisting of two
or more managers with relevant industrial experience had not received
finance after contact with venture capital providers. It is also
interesting to note from Table 8.10 that a significant 10 firms (53
per cent) with no prior industrial management experience used external
funds to establish the business (chi-square test significance level of
= 0.033). This compares with 16 companies with no prior management
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experience (30 per cent) established with internal capital. In the
majority of cases banks emerged as the main external source of start-
up funds.
T.bL. 8.9 Incid.ncs of v•nturs capitaL funding by nb.r of •anag.ra on
.anags..nt t.am with prior •an.g.m.nt •xp.ri.nc . in th. industry
0	 1	 2+	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 rt	 (%)
R.c.iv.d vsntur.
capitaL (RYC)
Not r.c.ivsd
vsnturs capitaL (NVC)
No contact with v.nturs
capitaLists (NOC)
TotaL
	
13 (46.4)	 8 (36.4)	 10 (30.3)	 31	 (37.3)
	
9 (32.1)	 7 (31.8)	 14 (42.4)	 30 (36.1)
	
6 (21.4)	 7 (31.8)	 9 (27.3)	 22 (26.5)
	
28 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
TabLu 8.10 Nb.r of •anag.rs on •anag...nt tasm
with prior uanag...nt •xpsri.nc. in th.
industry by •aln sourc. of start-up
f I nancs
Int.rnaL	 ExtsrnaL	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
0	 16	 (30.2)	 10	 (52.6)	 26	 (36.1)
1	 14	 (26.4)	 7	 (36.8)	 21	 (29.2)
2+	 23	 (43.4)	 2	 (10.5)	 25	 (36.7)
TotaL	 53 (100.0)	 19 (100.0)	 72 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) • 6.824	 p.0.033
The lack of prior management experience does not appear to inhibit the
ability of the firm to attract venture capital and other forms of
external finance. However, it is not evident from this survey whether
the people lacking management experience were academic in origin, as
information on academic qualifications was sought only for the main
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founder of the company. It is also not clear whether experienced
founders and managers found themselves involved in the current
business as a result of the failure of a previous venture. It might
be the case that no previous business experience in the industry is
preferable to having failed in the running of a similar company when
seeking external investment finance.
8.3.2 Market
Only 18 of the survey firms (22 per cent) were involved in selling a
percentage of their output to the final consumer market, the main
emphasis being on industrial and government markets. Forty one firms
(almost 50 per cent of the sample) sold their products to customers
who were predominantly located abroad (see Table 8.11) and a strong
export orientation was associated with receipt of venture capital
funds. Twenty companies (49 per cent) selling mostly outwith the
United Kingdom had obtained such finance, compared with only 11 firms
(26 per cent) selling to United Kingdom customers. It is not clear
whether firms with a strong current export orientation exported before
receiving venture capital funding, or whether this money helped to
establish an overseas customer base. However, the money was used to
finance the marketing efforts of export oriented companies in only two
instances from a total of 44 separate venture capital investments. It
seems reasonable to postulate that venture capital organisations are
interested in investment opportunities involving companies with a
strong emphasis on exporting, since this means that the survey firms
are not dependent upon the fortunes of one market, and demand abroad
is a reflection of the strength of the product technology.
-179-
Tabts 811 Ventura capitaL status by predominant customer Location
	
United	 Abroad	 TotaL
Kingdom
	
n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)
R.c.iv.d Ventura capitaL (RVC)
	 11	 (26.2)	 20	 (48.8)	 31	 (37.3)
Not rac.iv.d ventura capitaL
(NVC)	 16	 (38.1)	 14	 (34.1)	 30	 (36.1)
No contact with venturi
capitaLists (NOC)	 15	 (35.7)	 7	 (17.1)	 22	 (26.5)
TotaL	 62 (100.0)	 41 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
The propensity to export depends upon the nature of the main product
of the survey firm; that is, whether it is a direct imitation or
improvement of a product already available on the market, or whether
it is a totally new product. Table 8.12 indicates that a significant
9 firms or 90 per cent with imitation type products were mainly
involved in exporting, compared with 11 companies (44 per cent)
trading improved products and 21 firms (44 per cent) with a totally
new product strategy (chi-square test significant at the level of
0.024). These results may be partially explained by Table 8.13
which compares the main product attribute with the age of the company.
Twenty two younger firms (67 per cent) were concerned with the
manufacture of totally new products, compared with 26 firms (a lesser
52 per cent) founded prior to 1980. This table proved to be
significant after a chi-square test at the level of =0.038. It is
likely that older firms will have developed clear marketing and
product strategies for the domestic marketplace, enabling them to
build on this and become established in export markets. On the other
hand, younger firms dealing in totally new products may be
tentatively 'piloting' them on the home market and gaining experience
before progressing to the export stage. This would limit exposure to
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risk in the short term. However, this strategy could alert
competitors following imitation- or improvement-based product
strategies to the existence of the new product, allowing them to
develop copycat versions rapidly to sell to buyers in established
export markets.
TabLe 8.12 Pr.domlnant customer Location by nature of •ain product
	
Imitation	 Improvement	 TotaLLy new	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
United KIn9do.	 1	 (10.0)	 14	 (56.0)	 27	 (56.3)	 42	 (50.6)
Abroad	 9	 (90.0)	 11	 (44.0)	 21	 (43.8)	 41	 (49.4)
TotaL	 10 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 48 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
	
Chi-square (2 d.f.) - 7.499
	 pO.O26
TabLe 8.13 Natur. of main product by year of
format Ion
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Imitation	 6	 (8.0)	 6	 (18.2)	 10	 (12.0)
Improvement	 20	 (60.0)	 5	 (15.2)	 25	 (30.1)
TotaLLy flaw	 26	 (52.0)	 22	 (66.7)	 48	 (57.8)
TotaL	 50 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) • 6.525	 p. 0.038
8.3.3 Product
In keeping with the above commentary, 5 firms (50 per cent) with
imitation-based products had received venture capital finance (see
Table 8.14) and perhaps these funds were required to finance copycat
development work and/or marketing efforts. Twenty companies (42 per
cent) manufacturing totally new products also obtained venture capital
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funds, and these could have been used to finance R&D work since
innovative companies tend to be dependent upon their own expensive R&D
efforts as opposed to technology licensing agreements. According to
Table 8.15, a significant majority of firms which used only their own
R&D facilities (40 in number or 56 per cent) developed more
technologically complex products (chi-square test significant at the
level of =O.O45). This compares with only 3 companies (25 per cent)
producing high technology goods and utilising external sources of R&D.
This would seem to echo the above findings that companies with new
products are more inclined to spend investment funds on R&D efforts.
Further justification for this conclusion is provided by Table 8.16,
which is significant at the .=O.033 level following a chi-square test.
The respondents were asked to indicate whether they had ever
terminated significant R&D projects at a critical stage. Firms which
either manufactured improvement type or totally new products
registered a higher incidence of abandoned noteworthy product
innovations (16 firms, 67 per cent and 40 firms, 85 per cent
respectively) than producers of imitation goods (5 firms or 50 per
cent). A number of these projects may not have lived up to the
expectations of the firm if they had been carried through to
completion, but they are a useful indication of the level of R&D and
subsequent risk taking place in the more technically sophisticated
firms.
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TabL. S.i4 Incid.nc. of vsntur. capital funding by nature of main product
I.itation	 Improvement TotalLy new	 Total
n	 CS)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
Received venturi
capital (RVC)
Not r.c.ivsd
venture capital (NYC)
No contact with venturi
capitaList. (NOC)
Total
	
5 (50.0)	 6 (26.0)	 20 (41.7)	 31	 (37.3)
	
3 (30.0)	 9 (36.0)	 18 (37.5)	 30 (36.1)
	
2 (20.0)	 10 (40.0)	 10 (20.8)	 22 (26.5)
	
10 (100.0)	 25 (100.0)	 48 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
TabL. 8.15 TechnoLogical sophistication by main source of
R&D
	
Totally self-	 External!	 Total
	
sufficient	 combination
	
n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
High technology	 40	 (56.3)	 3	 (25.0)	 43	 (51.8)
Low technoLogy	 31	 (43.7)	 9	 (75.0)	 40	 (48.2)
Total	 71	 (100.0)	 12 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) - 4.038 	 p • 0.045
T.bL. 8.16 Incidenc, of abandoned innovation proj.cts by nature of main
product
Imitation	 I.prov.msnt TotalLy new	 Total
n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
Abandoned project	 5 (50.0)	 16 (66.7)	 40 (85.1)	 61 (75.3)
Not abandoned project
	 5 (50.0)	 8 (33.3)	 7 (14.9)	 20 (24.7)
Total	 10 (100.0)	 24 (100.0)	 47 (100.0)	 81 (100.0)
Chi-square (2 d.f.) = 6.835
	
p • 0.033
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Thus, firms which are mainly concerned with the research and
development of totally
 new products not only have to find the money to
finance this process, but also have to be prepared to see funds
absorbed by projects which may not come to fruition. The firm may end
up without a viable product after months or years of expensive R&D. A
similar situation confronts traditional venture capital providers when
deciding whether to invest in firms whose manufacturing strategy
consists of developing totally new products. The venture capital
organisation may invest in an idea which fails to become a marketable
product. The issue of risk management by the investor is important to
the supply and demand relationship, and this will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 10.
8.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The majority of firms in contact with venture capital organisations
had formulated business plans, although a number had decided to
approach these financiers without such formal documents. These
companies mostly established contact via intermediaries, and third
parties proved useful when potential investee firms were not obviously
attractive investment propositions. Generally, firms receiving
venture capital funds conceived their business plans in order to raise
investment finance. Other companies considered them an integral part
of strategic planning. It emerged that young high technology firms
had the greater propensity to write business plans, along with
companies which had accessed external capital as a main start-up
source. The qualifications and experience of the management team did
not seem to have a bearing on ability to attract venture capital
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funding. However, recipients exhibited a strong exporting orientation
and a number of these companies tended to manufacture imitation-based
products. These firms required investment capital for reasons other
than R&D, in contrast to firms developing totally new products.
A number of declining or no growth firms requiring investment funds
chose to approach venture capital providers by means of an
intermediary. This enabled the firm to 'get a foot in the door' of
the venture capital organisation where simply sending a business plan
might have resulted in immediate and outright rejection. That is not
to say, however, that the business plan is not an essential document
when seeking venture capital funds. The plan should be formulated
specifically to attract the interest of the venture capital
organisation in order to have the best chance of success. However, an
inordinate amount of management time can be taken up in this process.
Although the plan acts as a useful screening device for the venture
capital organisation, a firm is likely to become disenchanted by the
application procedure if the plan is rejected 'at the first hurdle'
after substantial work has been expended.
Analysis of the principal components of the business plan revealed
that management with no previous experience in the industry are just
as likely to receive venture capital funds as firms with experienced
management teams. This contradicts a stated aim of many venture
capital organisations to target firms with relevant management
expertise. It also raises the question as to whether the firm is
likely to obtain venture capital funds if members of the management
team have been involved in prior business opportunities which have
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failed. Venture capital organisations in the United States
acknowledge that as much valuable business experience will be gained
from failed ventures as from successful enterprises.
Again, contrary to the United States convention, some venture capital
providers in this country appear to be looking for investment
opportunities with immediately achievable objectives. Firms exporting
imitation-based products do not offer necessarily the same opportunity
to achieve phenomenal returns as some United States investments. On
the other hand, companies requiring capital for new product R&D work
have to convince venture capital providers that the investment will
lead to the development of viable commercial products within a
reasonable time span. An original and perhaps more profitable
approach for venture capital providers in the United Kingdom would be
to seek out investment opportunities involving a higher degree of
uncertainty, and be prepared to invest over the long term in the
future success of both the investee firm and the venture capital
organisation. Possible factors inhibiting this mode of operation will
be discussed in detail in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 9
ISSUES CONCERNING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SURVEY FIRMS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Personal ambitions of entrepreneurs have a pervasive influence on the
strategic, and hence financial, objectives pursued by firms. More
often than not, these personal goals are expressed in terms of the
company remaining independent whilst creating a profitable and
successful growth-oriented enterprise (Grieve Smith and Fleck, 1989).
Business founders may fear that the adoption of venture capital
finance, coupled with the resulting partial loss of equity, could
precipitate the eventual takeover of the firm. Grieve Smith and Fleck
(1987) point out that:
"It is ... not so much the availability of outside
finance that appears to limit expansion, but the
implications of accepting it. From the
entrepreneur's point of view the ideal supplier of
capital will provide additional capital as required
(preferably in a combination of non-voting equity and
debt) take a long view, not pressing for speedy
returns, and not interfere with the running of the
company. The ability of venture capital
organizations to convince the smaller firms that they
can approximate to this ideal may be an important
factor in stimulating growth, as major industrial
developments generally require control over
substantial capital resources," (p6.5).
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9.1.1 Ethos of the founder
The classical economic view of entrepreneurs is that they are striving
to maximise profit through the expression of the business venture
(Marris, 1966). This is an all too simplistic assumption as few
owner/managers prioritise the profit objective. According to Simon
(1982) "the entrepreneur may obtain all kinds of 'psychic income' from
the firm, quite apart from monetary rewards," (p296). This 'psychic
income' may manifest itself in terms of personal achievement and job
satisfaction (Parkes, 1988), but more likely emphasis will be placed
upon creation and maintenance of autonomy and independence (Curran and
Stanworth, 1982). Entrepreneurs stressing these particular goals have
been labelled 'dynastically ambitious' by Hodgson (1984). This type
of owner/manager foresees a long-term role for his family in the
running of the company, and is likely to be reluctant to relinquish
part of the ownership of the company, especially to those individuals
or institutions which might interfere with his personal autonomy and
plans for the business (Stanworth and Curran, 1981; CBI, 1981). A
representative of Prelude Technology Investments in Cambridge revealed
that they "... avoid investing in companies where control is an
emotional issue," (evidence from interview). Conversely, the 'non-
dynastically minded' entrepreneur (Hodgson, 1984) takes a short-term
orientation to the creation and growth of a business venture,
attempting to attract external sources of investment finance in order
to rapidly reach the point of "saleability," (Oakey et p 1., 1988).
Research by Storey et p 1. (1988) showed that businesses which were
prepared to accept lower margins to accelerate sales growth created
jobs more quickly than firms whose owners strove for job satisfaction
and a secure life style. The study goes on to illustrate that rapidly
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growing firms tend to be more marketing oriented, involved in the
manufacture of new products, and are interested in developing export
opportunities. Fast-growing firms are likely to require significant
amounts of capital to achieve these objectives and, thus, they will
not be averse to borrowing funds, even where this involves a partial
loss of personal equity.
The growth of an enterprise may be stimulated by the involvement of a
venture capital organisation, acting as a catalyst to change within
the firm. Whilst a firm remains small it is relatively easy for the
entrepreneur to maintain control from a 'hub of the wheel' position.
However, this becomes tenuous as the business grows especially if the
owner/manager is reluctant to delegate the decision-making function.
Batchelor (1990d) maintained that, "the singlemindedness which drove
the business in its early stages may hinder its later expansion when a
more structured approach becomes necessary," (p17). According to
Oakey et p 1. (1988) it is not unusual for venture capital
organisations in the United States to replace the original founder
with a new managing director and management team. This lending
strategy may have significant implications for entrepreneurs who set a
premium on maintaining control (see following subsection). That is
not to say, however, that the entrepreneur is ejected from the firm as
he may stay on in a more technical capacity. Nevertheless, this
"...usually ensures that the small firm's entrepreneurial phase is
ended," (Oakey et p 1., 1988, p32), and the equity owners may no longer
be the active managers in the business (Simon, 1982).
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9.1.2 The control issue
Firms which have adopted venture capital funding consequently may be
in one of several different situations: the original founder may still
have managerial control of the business but have relinquished part
ownership; the previous owner/manager might have surrendered the
position of managing director along with part of the equity; or the
entrepreneur may have left the company completely, having sold all or
the major part of his shareholding. Taylor (1983) and Kramer (1983)
have argued that control and ownership of the orgarxisation are two
separate issues, and the amount of shares held by founders should not
impinge upon effective day-to-day control of the business.
Nevertheless, the implication of diluted equity and the loss of
control is that the enthusiasm and drive to push the organisation by
those entrepreneurs remaining with the firm will be diminished (Simon,
1982).
Interviews with representatives of a number of venture capital
organisations revealed the following with regard to the issue of
control: "even with a substantial shareholding we control things
through agreement, not through shareholding," (interview evidence -
Prelude Technology Investments); "we don't get involved in decision-
making, but in discussion - we never take a controlling interest,"
(interview evidence - Scottish Development Agency); "we never take a
majority position in the ownership of a company," (interview evidence
- 3i); "our equity investment comprises not less than 10 per cent, not
more than 40 per cent (interview evidence - British Technology Group);
"it is not our policy to take a controlling interest. It has
happened, but only through problems. Making the right decisions
requires control," (interview evidence - Cambridge Capital Management
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Ltd). However, some venture capital organisations are specifically
excluded from taking a majority position in an investee company
because they would lose their investment trust status, which enables
them to buy and sell shares without incurring capital gains tax
(interview evidence). Only one of the nine venture capital companies
interviewed, Managed Technology Investors of Watford, stated that it
was a matter of policy to take a majority share if a large amount of
capital was invested in a company (evidence from interview).
STRUCTURE OF THE INVESTMENT
Golder (1983) maintained that the structure of the financing ". .. can
have a material effect on the eventual result of an investment and,
therefore, the structure is an important element in setting the
price , N
 (p79). The rule of thumb is that venture capital
organisations take a percentage of the equity of the firm directly in
proportion to the perceived risk of the investment. As such, a higher
share of ownership may be requested when the management team is
inexperienced and/or the product and the market are unproven (Deloitte
Haskins & Sells, 1983). It is in the interests of both founders and
financiers to get the right balance between ownership and control of
the enterprise. It is not uncommon in the United States for venture
capitalists to take a substantial majority equity stake in investee
companies (Colder, 1983). One way to compensate for the apparent loss
of control this entails is to structure the investment in such a way
that if stipulated targets are met by the investee firm, then they are
able to recover an increasing share of equity (Colder, 1983). This is
an 'earn-out' arrangement and is commonly used in the United States
(Lorenz, 1985). This investment technique is less common in the
United Kingdom and it tends to be limited to management buy-out
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investments (Lorenz, 1985). United Kingdom venture capital
organisations have also adapted the 'earn-out' mechanism so that it
operates in reverse; that is, the management team start out with a
maximum shareholding which the financier dilutes by converting
preferred shares to ordinary voting shares if the desired performance
is not achieved (Lorenz, 1985).
According to a number of representatives of venture capital
organisations in the United Kingdom 'earn-outs,' or 'ratchets' as they
are more commonly known, "... put investors and management on opposite
sides of the fence," (interview evidence, Baillie Gifford and
Company). Hambros Advanced Technology Trust are anti-ratchet at the
moment because investors and management rarely agree on the value of
the company, which is used to set the targets for the ratchet. "If
you follow this course and people don't achieve these targets, then
nasty feelings result. The tendency is to our [the venture
capitalist] advantage, not theirs [the management] , because they
always overestimate what they'll achieve," (interview evidence,
Hambros Advanced Technology Trust).
The financiers may also structure the investment deal by using a
combination of different types of shares, thus limiting the number of
ordinary voting or controlling shares in their hands. Nevertheless,
convertible preference shares and/or convertible loans involve the
imposition of dividend or interest payments, and the investee firm
will be required to pay money back almost immediately to the venture
capital firm, creating the appearance of giving with one hand and
taking away with the other (Golder, 1983). Moreover, by making the
current investment convertible, whereby preference shares can be
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converted into voting ordinary shares, venture capital organisations
are able to benefit from interest payments in the short term with the
means to take control of the organisation if the need arises.
According to a representative of 3i Ventures, they utilise ".
redeemable convertible preference shares to get a dividend [then] if
they [investee companies] don't do well we can convert them into
ordinary shares," (evidence from interview). The representative of
Baillie Gifford and Company maintained that this was "... equity with
protection" (interview evidence). Each of these financial instruments
will have a different effect on the balance sheet of the firm. For
example, interest accruing to a loan is a pre-tax expense, whereas
preference share dividends are a post-tax cost, and a high debt to
equity ratio as a result of a venture capital loan may affect ability
to raise additional loan capital (Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1983).
Nevertheless, two of the venture capital organisations interviewed
stated that they always invested in the form of pure equity, rather
than loans or preference shares since they did not require a regular
income from their investments (interview evidence, Managed Technology
Investors Ltd and Hambros Advanced Technology Trust).
FINANCIAL RETURN SOUGHT AND MEANS OF REALISATION
A venture capital firm will look for the deal which will yield the
best possible financial gain for its clients (Kramer, 1983) and the
return must be greater than that achievable with relatively less risky
investments (Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1983). The time period of the
investment is also important, since investors will not wish to tie up
funds for long periods unless the potential return offers suitable
compensation (Lorenz, 1985). The United States publication "Guide to
Venture Capital Sources" illustrates typical return targets set by
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venture capital organisations (Table 9.1). Such rates of return may
be achieved when successful investee firms are floated on the Stock
Exchange, or the Unlisted Securities Market in the case of smaller
companies (Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 1983). Alternatively, the
investor and investee firm may agree to a trade sale or share re-
purchase and, in extreme cases, voluntary liquidation or receivership
(Lorenz, 1985). The latter two events are likely where the investment
has failed to live up to initial expectations. Nonetheless, the ratio
of flotations to takeovers has been estimated to be in the range of
1:4 with successful investments (Fleck and Garnsey, 1987) and,
according to a representative of the British Technology Group,
"flotations are the exception rather than the rule," (interview
evidence). Again, this raises the question of control of the
enterprise and whether adoption of venture capital finance is the
first step towards eventual sale of the business. Glassmeyer (1983)
maintained that in the United States "many investors are counting on
the sale of the entire company when they make their initial
investment," and since "the sale of a minority position in a private
company is extremely difficult, ... the venture capitalist will often
seek [to] . .. deliver 'control' or 50% or more of the business" in the
event of a sale (p77). Even if assurances are given that the
investment will not result in a trade sale, "the need of venture
capitalists to realise their investments puts a growing firm under
pressure to demonstrate short term profitability [for the purposes of
flotation] which may be at the expense of long term development,"
(Fleck and Garnsey, 1987, p22).
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TabLe 9.1 Profit targets of venture capitaL organisations
Compounded AnnuaL
Rat.. of Return (pre-tax)
TripL. their money In thr.. ysars	 44%
TripLe thur mon.y in five years	 25%
Four tim.. their money in four y..rs 	 41%
Fl y. ti... their .on.y in thr.. years 	 71%
Five ti... their money in five years 	 38%
Ssven times their mon.y in thr.e years 	 91%
Sev.n times th.ir .on.y in five y.ars 	 48%
Ten times their money in three years 	 115%
Ten times their money in five years 	 58%
Source: SoLder (1983)
MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION
The traditional venture capital investor takes an active role in the
running of the investee firm in order to advance the company to a
position where the investment will be realised (Taylor, 1983). As
noted above, in the United States this may mean that the financiers
get involved in the day-to-day operations of the company. However,
United Kingdom venture capital organisations are more likely just to
monitor the investment and offer advice by means of the appointment of
a director to the board of management (Lorenz, 1985). Baillie Gifford
and Company simply reserve the right to a seat on the board of
management, and "... usually take it up when things start going
wrong, TM (interview evidence). This 'hands-off' strategy enables
venture capital organisations in the United Kingdom to be party to
discussions involving strategic planning, business policy, finance,
senior personnel and similar matters (Adler, 1983). The investor will
be involved in the critical decision making process whilst the
entrepreneur maintains overall day-to-day control.
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9.2 REASONS FOR ThE ATTITUDES OF FOUNDERS TOWARDS OWNERSHIP
9.2.1 Previous employment situation
It is likely that the attitudes of founders towards their current
business ventures will be coloured by their experiences in previous
employment situations. The following tables attempt to take account
of some of the multiplicity of historical factors influencing
entreprenuers in this study when they first established their current
business. Amongst these factors is the degree of commitment to a
"fast growth" strategy. The respondents were asked to state what
their main business goals were at the time of founding the company.
Their answers were dichotomised into aggressive and passive
categories; aggressive consisting of the pursuit of market share,
profit and growth, and passive comprising the aims of using the
business to make a secure, comfortable living and/or simply wishing to
manufacture and sell products.
Table 9.2 illustrates that 27 founders (almost one third of the
personal interview sample) established their companies to pursue the
more aggressive goals of market share, profit and/or growth. A
slightly higher proportion of founders who had been employees
immediately prior to formation of the current firm displayed passive
goals (38 in number or 64 per cent) when compared with the previously
self-employed (8 founders or 57 per cent). In addition, Table 9.3
indicates that previously self-employed entrepreneurs had a higher
tendency to establish firms manufacturing high technology products (12
firms, 75 per cent), than founders who were employees beforehand (28
firms, 44 per cent). No correlation was found to exist between the
academic qualifications of the main founder and the type of business
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established. Further investigation revealed that, of those twelve
previously self-employed entrepreneurs establishing high technology
firms (Table 9.3) seven (58 per cent) had not been involved in that
type of business before. This implies that five entrepreneurs
establishing similar businesses had either sold their shareholding in
a surviving company, failed with the previous business venture or
maintained an interest in the former company whilst creating the new
enterprise. Interestingly, only three of the 60 entrepreneurs (5 per
cent) stating their long term intentions aimed to sell the current
business, and all three had been employees in their previous
occupation. The remaining 57 entrepreneurs wished to stay with their
present businesses. However, it emerged that 13 founders (23 per
cent) who had initially intended to stay with the company had sold
all of their shareholding at the time of the survey.
TabL. 9.2 MaIn business goaLs at formation by prior •mpLoyment status of
main found.r
Employ..	 S.Lf-.apLoy.d	 UnempLoyed	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
Passlv. goaLs
	 38	 (64.4)	 8	 (57.1)	 1 (100.0)	 47	 (63.5)
Aggressiv, goaLs
	 21	 (35.6)	 6	 (42.9)	 0	 (0.0)	 27	 (36.5)
TotaL	 59 (100.0)	 14 (100.0)	 1	 (100.0)	 74 (100.0)
TabL. 9.3 TechnoLogicaL sophistication by prior empLoyment status of main
founder
Employ..	 SeLf-employed	 Un.mptoyed	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
High technology	 28	 (44.4)	 12	 (75.0)	 1	 (100.0)	 41	 (51.3)
Low technology	 35	 (55.6)	 4	 (25.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 39	 (48.8)
Total	 63	 (100.0)	 16	 (100.0)	 1	 (100.0)	 80	 (100.0)
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9.2.2 Percentage ownership held by the founder
A good indication of the extent of long term commitment to businesses
by founding entrepreneurs is the percentage ownership taken by them at
the time of establishment. It might be expected that 'dynastically
ambitious' entrepreneurs would seek to hold the majority, if not all,
of the shareholding of the company. Only 10 entrepreneurs (18 per
cent) intending to stay with the company had taken an initial 100 per
cent shareholding, although none of the founders who proposed to
sell out ultimately had taken up full ownership. Of course, the 'ow
incidence of initial 100 per cent shareholdings may be due to raising
start-up finance from sources which required an ownership stake, or
multiple founders being involved in the formation of the company.
Table 9.4 confirms that the greater the number of founders, the
smaller the initial ownership level of the main founder.
Significantly, 31 firms (53 per cent) which had two or more founders
were established with the principal entrepreneur holding less than 50
per cent of the equity. There were only four firms (21 per cent) with
one founder who took an ownership level of between one and fifty per
cent (significant after a chi-square test at the =0.0l5 level). This
trend is understandable, since the people who are taking the risks of
setting up in business and providing the start-up finance would also
want the opportunity to share in the rewards in terms of the ownership
of the company.
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TabLe 9.4 Perc.ntae ownership of principal
•ntr.preneur by number of found.ra at
tim. of estabLishment
On.	 Two or mor.	 Total
found.r	 found.ra
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1-50%	 4	 (21.1)	 31	 (52.5)	 35	 (44.9)
51-99%	 8	 (42.1)	 21	 (35.6)	 29	 (37.2)
100%	 7	 (36.8)	 7	 (11.9)	 14	 (17.9)
TotaL	 19 (100.0)	 59 (100.0)	 78 (100.0)
ChI-aquar. (2 d.f.) • 9.606 	 p.0.015
It might be anticipated that a number of firms with founders
possessing less than 50 per cent of the initial ownership would have
had contact with venture capital firms. However, according to Table
9.5, the level of recorded contacts showed no significant difference
when compared with the percentage of equity held. A possible
explanation lies in the fact that this table is concerned with level
of ownership when the comvanv was first established, and it has
already been shown that venture capital providers in the United
Kingdom do not tend to invest in start-up ventures, at least with
regard to firms in this study (see Chapter 6, Subsection 6.2.1).
Table 9.5 Whether firm has had contact with venture capital
organisations by LeveL of initiaL ownership of main
founder
S of equity heLd by founder initiaLly
	
1-50%	 51-99%	 100%	 TotaL
n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
Contact	 25	 (69.4)	 23	 (79.3)	 11	 (78.6)	 59	 (74.7)
No contact	 11	 (30.6)	 6	 (20.7)	 3	 (21.4)	 20	 (25.3)
TotaL	 36 (100.0)	 29 (100.0)	 14 (100.0)	 79 (100.0)
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It is also interesting to consider the stated business goals with
respect to the share of ownership taken by the entrepreneur at the
time of founding the company. Table 9.6 indicates that a highly
significant nineteen founders (70 per cent) maintained a less than
fifty per cent shareholding when pursuing the more aggressive goals of
market share, profit and/or growth (chi-square test significant at the
=O.008 level). This compares with 16 founders (a lesser 33 per cent)
holding the same minority ownership when interested in the passive
aims of securing a comfortable living and/or simply manufacturing and
selling their products. Ten companies (21 per cent) with passive
objectives and only two firms (7 per cent) in the aggressive goals
category maintained total control of the enterprise at the time of
founding. Generally speaking, it appears that the less the percentage
of equity taken by the founder, the more aggressive the business
goals. Perhaps, in order to grow quickly, these companies require
substantial injections of external capital. Such funds might only be
obtained in return for a share of equity if the company has already
borrowed loan capital to the limit of its collateral. As will be
demonstrated in Chapter 10, there is no significant correlation
between the initial objectives set by the entrepreneurs and the
subsequent performance of the firm measured in terms of growth in
turnover per employee. This is an important point since it was
expected that 'non-dynastically ambitious' entrepreneurs would strive
for more rapid growth in order to take the company to a saleable
position.
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TaM. 9.6 Psrc.nta9. own.rship of principaL
•ntrspr.n.ur at formation by busin.as
oaL$ at formation
Agr.ssiv.	 Passiv.	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1-50%	 19	 (70.4)	 16	 (33.3)	 35	 (66.7)
51-99%	 6	 (22.2)	 22	 (45.8)	 28	 (37.3)
100%	 2	 (7.4)	 10	 (20.8)	 12	 (16.0)
TotaL	 27 (100.0)	 48 (100.0)	 75 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) • 9.606 	 p.0.008
9.2.3 Venture capital organisation involvement
The question arises as to whether founders formulate presumptions on
the involvement of the venture capitalist organisations as a result of
experiences with these financiers, or whether entrepreneurs are aware
initially that the adoption of venture capital finance traditionally
involves more than the injection of funds; for example, the
appointment of a non-executive director. Table 9.7 illustrates that
19 firms (70 per cent) which realised that venture capital finance
involved more than just the injection of funds, became recipients. In
contrast, only 11 firms (39 per cent) had obtained the finance when
believing that it would solel y involve the injection of money (chi-
square test significanct at the
	 O.O2l level). This result is
extremely interesting as it indicates that entrepreneurs demonstrating
awareness of the role venture capital organisations play, over and
above the provision of capital, may be more likely to obtain the
required finance. Conversely, it could be that awareness of these
other conditions incidentally came about as a result of involvement
with the venture capital organisation. However, some of the
entrepreneurs interviewed had sought venture capital finance precisely
because of the perceived added advantages of managerial input and
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other benefits. Overall, ten of the 61 respondent companies in
contact with venture capital organisations (16 per cent) expected to
receive management assistance in tandem with the the required finance.
TbL. 9.7 Y•nturs capitaL status by b.Li.fs of found.rs on invoLv...nt of
v.nturs capitaL provid.ra
$oLsty .on.y	 I4on.y pLus	 TotaL
n	 CS)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
R.c.iv.d vsntur. capitaL (RVC)
	 11	 (39.3)	 19	 (70.4)	 30	 (54.5)
Not r.c.iv.d vsnturs capitaL (NYC)
	 17	 (60.7)	 8	 (29.6)	 25	 (45.5)
TotaL	 28	 (100.0)	 27 (100.0)	 55 (100.0)
ChI-squar. (1 d.f.) - 5.357 	 p=O.021
In order to provide a holistic picture, the expectations of
entrepreneurs who did not obtain venture capital finance were also
taken into account. Therefore, turning to the beliefs of the seven
firms which had been refused finance, five (71 per cent) were only
seeking money, whilst the remaining two (29 per cent) expected more
than simply financial input. As regards the 23 firms which had
decided not to pursue the opportunity of venture capital financing
after initial inquiries, twelve (52 per cent) were only interested in
money and six (26 per cent) expected other additional services. The
remaining 5 companies (22 per cent) did not provide an answer to the
question on expectations. Respondents who had no contact with
venture capital organisations were not asked to state what they
expected to result from the involvement of such a financier, since
this would have been a purely hypothetical question. Table 9.8
summarises the beliefs of different categories of survey firms with
regard to venture capital status. The evidence from the expectations
held by those who have applied for and not received venture capital
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funds (NVC1) partially confirms the correlation between successfully
obtaining funds and awareness that the involvement of the venture
capital provider entails more than the simple provision of finance.
However, the direction of this relationship is not clear from the
survey data.
TabLe 9.1 Venture capital statu. of jj fir.. by b.Li.fs of found.ra on
involve.ent of v.ntur. capital provid.ra
SoL.Ly .on.y	 Honey plus	 Other	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 r	 (S)	 n	 (S)
Received venture
capitaL (RVC)
	 11	 (39.3)	 19	 (70.4)	 1	 (16.7)	 31	 (50.8)
Refused v.ntur.
capitaL (NVC1)
	 5	 (17.9)	 2	 (7.4)	 0	 (0.0)	 7	 (11.5)
Not wanting venture
capitaL (NVC2)
	 12	 (42.9)	 6	 (22.2)	 5	 (83.3)	 23	 (37.7)
No contact vsnture
capitalist. (NOC)
	 0	 (0.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 0	 (0.0)
TotaL	 28 (100.0)	 27 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 61	 (100.0)
CONSIDERATION OF THE USE OF VENTURE CAPITAL
This section is concerned with firms which have had contact with
venture capital organisations and not received finance, either because
they have been refused funds (NVC1) or because they decided not to
pursue the financing opportunity (NVC2). Obviously, all seven
companies that had been refused venture capital funds (NVC1) had
intended using the finance for a particular project. However, of the
23 firms which had not pursued the venture capital financing
opportunity after initial enquiries (NVC2), 6 companies or 26 per cent
had reconsidered either because the money was available from a parent
company or there was enough internal capital. In only 2 cases (9 per
cent) was the use of venture capital avoided due to an expressed
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concern over the future independence of the enterprise. However, four
of these 23 companies (17 per cent) believed that the financiers
required too much equity and six (26 per cent) reconsidered the
intended course of action for which they had sought the extra capital.
Respondents who had no contact with venture capital organisations were
also asked whether they had considered making use of venture capital
finance at any stage. Only two of the 21 respondents (10 per cent)
had contemplated attempting to obtain venture capital funds and they
had decided that they were not quite ready to take this step. The
other nineteen firms did not consider this line of financing at all,
either because they believed that the independence and hence control
of the enterprise would be threatened (9 firms, 47 per cent) or the
required money was available from a parent company (2 firms, 11 per
cent) or another source (8 companies, 42 per cent). Table 9.9
summarises responses to the question of whether survey firms have ever
considered using venture capital funds.
TabL. 9.9 Vsntur. capitaL status by wh.th.r fir. consid.r.d
making use of venture capitaL financ.
	
Considered	 Not consid.r.d	 TotaL
	
using venturi	 using v.nture
capitaL	 capitaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Rec.ivsd v.nture
capitaL (RVC)
	 31	 (58.5)	 0	 (0.0)	 31	 (37.8)
Refus.d venturs
capitaL (NVC1)
	 7	 (13.2)	 0	 (0.0)	 7	 (8.5)
Not wanting venture
capital. (NVC2)
	 13	 (24.5)	 10	 (34.5)	 23	 (28.0)
No contact venture
capitaLists (NOC)
	 2	 (3.8)	 19	 (65.5)	 21	 (25.6)
TotaL	 53 (100.0)	 29 (100.0)	 82 (100.0)
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9.3 ATTITUDES OF FOUNDERS TOWARDS CONTROL
9.3.1 Independent status
Having established that the desire for independence was important to a
number of entrepreneurs when they first established their businesses,
this section considers whether founders had remained resolute in this
aim. Firstly, respondents were asked whether the firm had been
acquired or whether it had remained totally independent since
formation. For the purposes of this survey, independence was defined
as the board of directors holding effective control on site. Table
9.10 illustrates that 12 firms (over 40 per cent) had been acquired
despite the desire to remain independent. This compares with only 7
companies (14 per cent) which had been taken over when the main reason
for establishment was not independence. This table is significant
following a chi-square test at the level of	 O.005. Nevertheless,
the majority of all the companies in this survey remained independent
(61 in number or 76 per cent). Table 9.11 expands on the information
contained in Table 9.10, but also reveals some interesting anomalies.
The current largest shareholder of 16 of the companies (55 per cent)
which originally wished to remain independent was external to the
business (Table 9.11).
TabL. 9.10 Ind.p.nd.nt status of firus by tri.r for
format ion
Ind.p.ndsncs	 Anothar
	
TotaL
goat	 goat
n	 (%)	 n	 (X)	 n	 (%)
Ind.p.nd.nt	 17	 (58.6)	 44	 (86.3)	 61	 (76.3)
Acquired	 12	 (41.4)	 7	 (13.7)	 19	 (23.8)
TotaL	 29 (100.0)	 51	 (100.0)	 80	 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) • 7.807	 p- 0.005
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TbL. 9.11 Wh.thsr Larg.st sh.r.hotd.r is int.rnat or
•xtsrnat by trlggsr for formation
Indspsndsncs	 Anoth.r	 TotaL
goat	 goaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Intsrnat	 13	 (44.8)	 29	 (56.9)	 42	 (52.5)
Ext.rnat	 16	 (55.2)	 22	 (43.1)	 38	 (47.5)
TotaL	 29 (100.0)	 51 (100.0)	 80 (100.0)
Taking Tables 9.10 and 9.11 together, it emerges that four firms
established with the objective of continuing independence maintained
they were independent despite having an external shareholder with the
largest share of ownership. Likewise, where firms were established
for some reason other than independence, 15 companies claimed to be
independent when they did not have an internally held largest
shareholding. Table 9.12 displays these nineteen respondents who
operated independent enterprises even though the largest single
shareholding was held externally. Although the result in Table 9.12
is highly significant at the	 0.0O001 level following a chi-square
test, caution is urged because it contains a structural zero in that
acquired firms would not have an internal largest shareholder. It
should also be noted that the survey companies may still hold a
majority internal shareholding even though the largest shareholding is
in external hands.
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TthL. 9.12 Ind.pendent statu, by whither Largest
shareholder is internaL or •xt.rnal
InternaL	 ExternaL	 TotaL
r	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (S)
Independent	 42 (100.0)	 19	 (46.3)	 61	 (73.5)
Acquired	 0	 (0.0)	 22	 (53.7)	 22	 (26.5)
TotaL	 42 (100.0)	 41 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) - 30.665	 p - 0.00001
9.3.2 Largest shareholder and number of shares held
Obviously the number of shares held by an external owner will have a
bearing on attitudes of the firm to the control issue. As might be
expected, Table 9.13 shows that all survey firms which have been
acquired had a largest shareholder, with a 51 per cent share or more,
who was external to the business. Interestingly, enterprises
classifying themselves as independent had single largest shareholders
with ownership stakes across the range of 1-100 per cent. Twenty
three or 100 per cent of the companies with 1-50 per cent of the
equity owned by the largest shareholder were independent, as were 35
firms (90 per cent) with the largest shareholder possessing 51-99 per
cent and 3 companies (14 per cent) which were 100 per cent owned.
This result could be due to a requirement to obtain additional capital
entailing the exchange of equity in the process, or to the number of
people involved in the foundation of the enterprise as suggested
earlier in this chapter.
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TabLe 9.13 Independent status by percentage of •quity heLd by
Largest shar.hoLd.r
S of equity heLd by Largest sharehoLder
	
1-50%	 51-99%	 100%	 TotaL
n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
Independent	 23 (100.0)	 35	 (89.7)	 3	 (14.3)	 61	 (73.5)
Acquired	 0	 (0.0)	 4	 (10.3)	 18	 (85.7)	 22	 (26.5)
TotaL	 23 (100.0)	 39 (100.0)	 21 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) - 51.372 	 p-O.0000I
With respect to the nineteen firms identified in the previous
subsection with the largest single shareholding in external hands,
Table 9.14 illustrates that eight of these companies (42 per cent)
stated they were independent even though the external owner controlled
more than 50 per cent of the equity of the firm. Further
investigation revealed that six of these eight companies had received
venture capital funds, and this reinforces the aforementioned view
that control is concerned with the management of the day-to-day
operations of the enterprise and not the level of shareholding. It is
likely that this result is characteristic of the United Kingdom, since
venture capitalists in the United States often manage their
investments in a 'hands-on' manner and exercise a greater degree of
control over their investee companies. The eleven firms which had an
external largest shareholder in the 150 per cent ownership category
could claim to be independent on the basis that no 	 individual or
organisation had a majority, and hence controlling interest in the
company. Both Table 9.13 and 9.14 are significant at the	 0.00001
level following a chi-square test, but contain structural zeros in
the bottom left hand corner cells which necessitates caution when
interpreting the results.
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TabLe 9.14 Ind.p.nd.nt status by psrcsnt.gs of squity heLd by Largest
ahar.hoLd.r when Largest shar.hotd.r is •xt.rnaL
S of equity heLd by Largest shar.hotd.r (externaL)
1-50%	 51-99%	 100%	 TotaL
n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
Ind.p.nd.nt	 11 (100.0)	 5	 (66.7)	 0	 (0.0)	 19	 (46.3)
Acquired	 0	 (0.0)	 4	 (33.3)	 18 (100.0)	 22	 (53.7)
TotaL	 11	 (100.0)	 12 (100.0)	 18 (100.0)	 41 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) - 30.276	 p- 0.00001
It is also interesting to note from Table 9.15 that 14 companies (over
40 per cent) founded over the last decade had an external largest
shareholder in the less than 50 per cent equity range, compared with 9
companies (a lesser 18 per cent) established prior to 1980 (chi-square
test significant at the level of D.=O.O39). There was also a slightly
higher propensity for companies established in the 1980s to have
multiple founders (27 firms or an 82 per cent incidence) than those
established in the pre-1980 period (35 firms, 69 per cent) and this
may have affected the level of equity holdings. The tendency toward
smaller shareholdings in firms founded in the last decade may be due
partly to age since older companies have had time to settle in terms
of ownership. For example, principal founders of older firms may have
bought out their co-founders, or may have moved on after selling out
to other individuals or companies.
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TabLe 9.15 Psrc.nta9. of •quity held by Largest
sharehold.r by y.ar of for.ation
Year founded
	
Prior to 1980	 1980 onwards	 Total
	
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1-50%	 9	 (18.0)	 14	 (42.4)	 23	 (27.7)
51-99%	 28	 (56.0)	 11	 (33.3)	 39	 (47.0)
100%	 13	 (26.0)	 8	 (24.2)	 21	 (25.3)
TotaL	 50	 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squ.r. (2 d.f.) = 6.478	 p= 0.039
9.3.3 The current employment position of the founder
Table 9.16 helps to clarify whether the main founder was still
employed by the company against the shareholder with the largest
interest in the company. As might be expected, in 34 cases (nearly 90
per cent) where the largest shareholder was the managing director or
chairman of the company the founder was still with the firm (Table
9.16). Only 8 of the original founders (38 per cent) were employed in
the firm when the main shareholder was a parent company (chi-square
test significant at the level of =O.00O4). The 'other' category in
Table 9.16 comprises shareholders other than managing directors,
chairmen or parent companies, and they may be internal or external to
the company. Therefore, Table 9.17 aggregates the data contained in
Table 9.16 in order to look at the internal/external status of the
largest shareholder against whether the original founder was still
employed in the company, and confirms the result in Table 9.16 with a
stronger significance level of =0.0001 following a chi-square test.
Basically, the founder of the business is more likely to remain with
the firm when the single largest shareholding is held personally or by
some other internal member of the company. Perhaps when external
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owners become involved the original founder is either forced out of
the company or leaves voluntarily. There is also the possibility that
the original founder takes his equity stake with him when he leaves,
thus maintaining an external shareholding in the business. Although
data are not available to confirm these presumptions, Table 9.18 does
offer some evidence of cases where the main founder has remained with
the firm. In 29 cases (85 per cent) where the founder held. the
position of managing director or chairman at the time of the personal
interview survey, the largest shareholder was also the managing
director or chairman of the company. It is also interesting to note
that where the largest shareholder was a parent company, seven
original founders (88 per cent) maintained the position of managing
director or chairman within the firm.
TabL. 9.16 Whsth.r found.r stiLl. ..ploy.d by hoLder of largest percentage of
•qulty
ND/Chairman	 Parent coupany	 Other	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 CX)	 n	 CX)
Founder employsd	 34	 (87.2)	 8	 (38.1)	 15	 (65.2)	 57	 (68.7)
Founder not •.ptoy.d	 5	 (12.8)	 13	 (61.9)	 8	 (34.8)	 26	 (31.3)
TotaL	 39 (100.0)	 21	 (100.0)	 23 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squars (2 d.f.) - 15.464	 p - 0.0004
TabLa 9.17 Wh.th.r founder still empLoyed by internaL/external
status of largest shareholder
Internal	 External	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 CX)	 n	 %)
Founder empLoyed	 37	 (88.1)	 20	 (48.8)	 57	 (68.7)
Founder not •mploy.d
	 5	 (11.9)	 21	 (51.2)	 26	 (31.3)
TotaL	 42 (100.0)	 41	 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-square (1 d.f.) = 14.906	 p = 0.0001
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Tabt. 9.18 E.ploym.nt position of main found.r by hoLd.r of Larg.st
p.rc.nta. of •quity
	
MD/Ch.ir.ari	 Parsnt company	 Oth.r	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)
MD/ChaIrman	 29	 (85.3)	 7	 (87.5)	 10	 (66.7)	 46	 (80.7)
Oth.r dirsctorship	 5	 (14.7)	 1	 (12.5)	 5	 (33.3)	 11	 (19.3)
TotaL	 34 (100.0)	 8 (100.0)	 15 (100.0)	 57 (100.0)
Table 9.19 comprises firms with an external largest shareholder, and
demonstrates that 9 companies (82 per cent) with an external
stakeholder owning between one and fifty per cent of the business
still employed the original founder. However, in only 5 cases (a
lesser 28 per cent) were founders still with the company when the
external shareholder controlled jj.
 of the equity (significant at the
O.O18 level after a chi-square test). In other words, when the
external largest shareholding is low the original founder is mostly
still employed in the business. The reverse appears to be the case
when the external shareholder owns all of the shareholding. This
finding is confirmed by Table 9.20, where 14 firms (64 per cent) which
had been acquired and 12 of the independent companies (only 20 per
cent) no longer employed the original founder. This table is also
highly significant following a chi-square test at the level of
=O.00Ol. Obviously, the age of the firm will have an influence on
whether the original founder is still employed in the company.
Nineteen of the 26 firms (73 per cent) which no longer employed the
original owner had been founded prior to 1980, and 14 of these had an
external shareholder with the largest proportion of equity whilst nine
had been totally acquired. Unfortunately, data were not obtained to
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Found.r •.pLoy.d
Found.r not •mptoy.d
TotaL
indicate whether any of the original founders had been forced out of
the company by the new external owner exercising control, other than
when venture capital investors were involved (see the following
subsection).
TabL. 919 Wh.th.r found.r stiLt •mptoy.d by targ.st shar.hoLd.r wh.n L.rg.st
shar.hotd.r is .xt.rn.L
% of .quity h.Ld by L.rg.st .har.hotd.r (sxt.rnat)
	
1-50%	 51-99%	 100%
	
TotaL
	
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Found.r ..ptoy.d	 9	 (81.8)	 6	 (50.0)	 5	 (27.8)
	
20	 (48.8)
Found.r not •mptoy.d	 2	 (18.2)	 6	 (50.0)	 13	 (72.2)
	
21	 (53.7)
TotaL	 11	 (100.0)	 12 (100.0)	 18 (100.0)
	
41	 (100.0)
	
Chi-squsr. (2 d.f.) • 7.99	 p	 0.018
TabL. 9.20 Wh.th.r found.r stiLL •.ptoy.d by ind.psndsnt
status
Ind.p.nd.nt	 Acquirsd	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
49	 (80.3)	 8	 (36.4)	 57	 (68.7)
12	 (19.7)	 14	 (63.6)	 26	 (31.3)
61	 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 83 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) • 14.527	 p • 0.0001
9.3.4 Requirements set by venture capital organisations
The following is a brief overview of the terms and conditions attached
to investments by the venture capital organisations for the 31 firms
in receipt of this form of finance.
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PERCENTAGE OF EQUITY TAKEN
Table 9.21 illustrates that only 11 or 36 per cent of those firms
where the managing director or chairman held the largest stake in the
business had received venture capital funds (RVC) . This compares
with 17 companies (57 per cent) not receiving the finance after
initial enquiries (NyC), and 11 firms (50 per cent) which had no
interaction with these financiers (NOC), when the managing director or
chairman held the largest stake. This table is significant at the
level of =O.O28 following a chi-square test, and might indicate that
firms have to be prepared to relinquish the largest share of equity in
order to obtain venture capital funds. Table 9.22 indicates that in
19 cases (63 per cent) the venture capital organisation took less than
50 per cent of the equity of the survey firm. However, nine companies
(30 per cent) were required to concede majority ownership to the
venture capital organisation or syndicate. In one instance, the
venture capital provider made the investment in the form of a loan
with an option to convert it to equity should the necessity arise;
that is, if the financier believed there was a requirement to exercise
control. No trends emerged in terms of the subsequent independent
status of the firm, or employment position of the main founder.
Indeed, only two of the nine companies (22 per cent) conceding the
major equity shareholding to venture capital organisations had been
acquired, and in one instance the main founder was still employed with
the firm.
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TabL. 9.21 HoLd.r of targ.st psrc.ntags of squity by vsnturs capitaL status
Rsc.iv.d	 Not r.c.iv.d	 No contact	 TotaL
vsntur. capitaL vsnturs capitaL
(RYC)	 (NVC)	 (NOC)
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
14D/Chair..ri	 11	 (35.5)	 17	 (56.7)	 11	 (50.0)	 39	 (47.0)
Parsnt co.pany	 5	 (16.1)	 9	 (30.0)	 7	 (31.8)	 21	 (25.3)
Oth.r	 15	 (48.4)	 4	 (13.3)	 4	 (18.2)	 23	 (27.7)
TotaL	 31 (100.0)	 30 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 57 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (4 d.f.) - 10.917	 p- 0.028
TabI. 9.22 Psrcentag. of squity tak.n by ths vsnturs capitaL
organisation (or syndicat.) by hoLd.r of Largast p.rc.ntag. of
squity
I	 50%
51 - 99%
D.bt/.qui ty
conv.rs ion
Total
140/
Chai r.an
r	 (%)
9	 (90.0)
0	 (0.0)
1	 (10.0)
10 (100.0)
Pa rant
coupany
n	 (%)
4	 (80.0)
1	 (20.0)
0	 (0.0)
5 (100.0)
Oth.r
n	 (%)
6	 (40.0)
8	 (53.3)
1	 (6.7)
15 (100.0)
TotaL
n	 (%)
19	 (63.3)
9	 (30.0)
2	 (6.7)
30 (100.0)
EXPECTED RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Fourteen firms (45 per cent) receiving venture capital funds had been
informed of the expected return on the investment required by the
financier. Of course, this depended upon the nature of the particular
investment. For example, when the investment was made in the form of
a loan, the financier was typically looking for interest repayments in
the range of 11-20 per cent; and an investment of only preference
shares called for a dividend in the range of 7.5 to 15 per cent per
annum. In only two instances was the expected return on the
investment expressed in terms of an internal rate of return.
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According to Harrap's Dictionary of Business & Finance (1988) this is
the ••• hypothetical interest rate, equivalent to the marginal
efficiency of capital, which is used to assess the investor's [future]
yield ...," (p183). In both cases the expected internal rate of
return was in the 30-40 per cent range and, according to Table 9.1,
the financiers were hoping to make approximately five times their
original investment in five years. The repayment period was delayed
for only two of these fourteen firms. Two venture capital
organisations were prepared to wait until their formal exit from the
investment to realise their return, rather than expecting a regular
interest or dividend payment.
NATURE OF THE 'OUT'
In nineteen cases (61 per cent) the venture capitalist organisation
had discussed how it would realise its investment. Surprisingly, only
three firms were aiming for a definite market listing. A further
three companies had the specific opportunity to buy their own shares
back from the financier. However, two firms had been informed that
the involvement of the venture capital organisation would result in
the firm being sold to another company. A further nine respondents
indicated that the discussion on the nature of realisation was general
in terms, and a number of the above options were a possibility
depending upon performance.
SEAT ON THE BOARD
Nineteen firms (61 per cent) had venture capital input not only in the
form of finance, but also through representation on the board of
management. A further two venture capital organisations had the right
to appoint a director but had not exercised it as yet. The
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respondents were also asked to state what role the venture capital
organisation played in the general running of the firm. As might be
expected, those firms with an appointed director tended to interact
more with the investor companies. Eight such firms indicated that the
venture capital firm played an active role, and the remaining 13 with
an appointed or appointee director indicated that the financier either
played no role in the running of the company or intervened only in
times of trouble.
The general controls imposed by venture capital organisations and,
where appropriate, their nominees, included financial expenditure
controls (12 firms gave this response), consultation and reporting
requirements (10 companies), restrictions on share transfers (4
firms), and staff recruitment controls (3 companies gave this answer).
Interestingly, over a quarter of the firms receiving venture capital
funds (8 companies) stated that there were no conditions attached to
the investment, although three of these firms had a venture capitalist
representative appointed as a company director.
CHANGE INDUCED BY VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANISATIONS
This subsection is concerned with whether venture capital providers
have acted as catalysts for change, in terms of either operational
strategy of the firm or leadership of the company. The percentage of
equity taken by the venture capital organisation obviously affects its
ability to influence the strategic direction of the company. Twelve
respondents (39 per cent) stated that there had been a change in the
strategic direction of the company whilst the venture capital
organisation was involved with their operations. According to Table
9.23, when the financier controlled 50 per cent or less of the equity
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of the investee firm 5 companies or 26 per cent revised their
strategic operations. This compares with 5 companies, or a greater 56
per cent, changing strategic direction when the venture capital
organisation held the majority shareholding. Looking into this
information in a little more detail revealed that the change was
prompted by the financier in only six cases. Five companies were
advised to revise either the direction of their marketing efforts or
their programme for growth, and one firm was required to become less
R&D oriented in order to satisfy the requirements of the venture
capital organisation.
T.bL. 9.23 Wh.th.r fir. chang.d str.t.91c dir.ction by
p.rc.ntag. of squity b.Ld by v.nturs capitaL
providar
Psrcsntag. of •quity
I - 50%	 51 - 100%	 TotaL
n	 CS)	 n	 (5)	 n	 (5)
No ch.ng. in stratsgy 	 14	 (73.7)	 4	 (44.4)	 18	 (.3)
Chan9. In str.t.gy	 5	 (26.3)	 5	 (55.6)	 10	 (35.7)
TotaL	 19 (100.0)	 9 (100.0)	 28 (100.0)
Perhaps more important from the control point of view, respondents
were asked if there was a change in either leadership or management of
the firm during the period of the investment. Twelve firms overall
(39 per cent) had altered the composition of their management teams.
Table 9.24 illustrates the level of venture capital shareholding
against the management status of the investee firm. When the
financier held a 51 per cent or greater equity stake, 6 of the study
firms (67 per cent) altered the management team in some way. This
compares with 6 firms (a lesser 32 per cent) doing so when the venture
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capital organisation did not have a majority shareholding. Further
investigation revealed that the venture capital organisation had
induced this change in nine cases. The changes mainly comprised
existing senior directors leaving and new people being brought into
the organisation. In two instances, the existing managing director
was replaced by someone introduced into the firm by the venture
capital organisation. In five of the nine cases the change in
management was initiated by a venture capital organisation controlling
50 per cent or less of the shareholding of the investee firm. It is
impossible to discern from the data whether the changes were made on
an amicable basis.
TabI. 9.24 Wh.th.r firm chag.d l.ad.r.hip/.ana9...nt by
p.rcsnta9s of •quity h.ld by vsntur. capital provid.r
P.rc.ntag. of squity
	
- 50%	 51 - 100%	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
No chang. in manag.m.nt	 13	 (68.4)	 3	 (33.3)	 16	 (57.1)
Chang. in •anag.msnt	 6	 (31.6)	 6	 (66.7)	 12	 (42.9)
Total	 19 (100.0)	 9 (100.0)	 28 (100.0)
9.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Most entrepreneurs had a vision of staying with the firms they founded
in the long term, and maintaining the independence of these
enterprises. This was made difficult by the fact that there was a low
incidence of initial 100 per cent ownership stakes. Founders pursuing
aggressive business goals tended to have less than 50 per cent
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ownership at the time of founding. There was no link between the
initial ownership stake and receipt of venture capital funds. Firms
which were aware that venture capital funding involved more than just
the injection of finance had received such an investment. However,
the direction of the cause and effect in this relationship was not
clear. Some firms did not make use of venture capital funds because
of a concern about control of the enterprise, and either obtained the
investment finance from other sources or reconsidered their need for
capital. Many survey firms were able to maintain independent status
where the largest and, in some cases, majority equity shareholding was
in external hands. Six independent companies had handed over the
major part of their shares to venture capital organisations. No
association was apparent between receipt of venture capital funds and
the independent status of the firm or employment of the main founder.
Venture capital providers did not always make arrangements explicit
with regard to realising their investment, although many appointed, or
reserved the right to appoint, a director to the board of management
of the client firm. To some extent there was evidence that these
directors were able to effect strategic and managerial changes within
the investee firm.
The need to maintain independence was important when the entrepreneur
had a taste of independence in a previous venture. A limited number
of founders who had been prior employees set up their firms with the
specific intention of selling out at a later stage. A 100 per cent
shareholding would facilitate the selling out process, however, few
entrepreneurs were able to maintain full ownership of their companies
at start-up. Nonetheless, the tendency towards smaller initial
shareholdings has its advantages. The greater number of founders
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means that the firm has access to a larger amount of start-up capital;
and the risks of starting up in business are spread across a number of
individuals. In addition, entrepreneurs with more aggressive business
ambitions and lower shareholdings perhaps realised that a fast growth
strategy required not only a greater capital investment, but also
broader management skills to handle the proposed rapid expansion.
Most of the independent enterprises maintained this status due to the
fact that no one individual or organisation controlled greater than 50
per cent of the ownership. However, control could be exercised by
pooling voting rights with other stakeholders to arrive at an
aggregate 51 per cent or greater shareholding. The fact that the
equity of six independent companies comprised more than 50 per cent
venture capital funds confirms that venture capital organisations do
not necessarily wish to take over the running of the investee firm.
They do not get involved in the day-to-day decision making in the
organisation, even where they hold a majority shareholding, but they
may exercise some control over major strategic decisions and who takes
these decisions. It is likely that the institutionalised nature of
venture capital provision in the United Kingdom has resulted in the
situation where there are too many investments to be monitored by too
few people. Thus, venture capital organisations cannot afford to get
too involved in the running of an investee company.
Independence was of concern to companies not receiving venture capital
finance. To a large extent the criticism for not allaying fears about
this issue of investor control lies with the venture capital
organisations, despite extensive efforts to reassure would be investee
firms through their company literature. Discussions with survey firms
-221-
which received venture capital finance revealed that, generally
speaking, investors avoided making their ultimate intentions explicit
with regard to the nature of the 'out' . Therefore, there may be an
ever-present fear or threat that the business will be sold in order
for the venture capital organisation to realise its investment. This
fear may be heightened amongst firms conceding the major share of
equity to the provider of venture capital funds. The nature of the
exit mechanism will depend upon the ultimate performance of the firm,
but the possibility of the organisation being sold is likely to be
resisted when independence is at issue. In terms of the management of
investee companies, venture capital providers sometimes encourage the
enlargement or restructuring of the board of management, perhaps
entailing the original founder stepping sideways into a more technical
and less administrative position.
A number of firms saw fit not to adopt venture capital funding, not
because of a stated concern over the future independence of the
enterprise, but because they found the required investment finance
from other sources. In two instances, the 'other source' proved to be
a parent company, in which circumstances the control of the enterprise
is not an issue since the parent already possesses control. However,
eight companies adopted external finance other than venture capital,
and this would imply that these 'other sources' are more attractive in
terms and/or conditions. One problem relates to the fact that the
typical venture capital financing package does not involve equity in
the form of ordinary voting shares. United Kingdom venture capital
organisations tend to invest in the form of loans and preference
shares which involve the immediate commencement of interest payments,
thus differing very little from bank finance. Indeed, convertible
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preference shares may be unattractive to potential investees since
they allow venture capital organisations to benefit from regular
interest payments as well as the potential to exercise control over
the company. A clause in the investment agreement allowing preference
shares to be converted into ordinary voting shares means that venture
capital organisations will be able to exert pressure on the strategic
direction or management of the company if the need arises. Although
there is little evidence of this occurring, even where the venture
capital firm holds a majority shareholding, the potential threat of
loss of management control may have a disquieting effect on the
investee firm.
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Chapter 10
THE DELIVERY OF VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH
IT IS CRITICAL TO SURVIVAL AND GROWTH
10.1 INTRODUCTION
10.1.1 Market forces
The emergence of high technology industries in the Silicon Valley area
of California in the United States has been due, in part, to the
availability of venture capital funding (Hambrecht, 1984; Larsen and
Rogers, 1984). According to Siegel and Markoff (1985) "... venture
capitalism appears to be an excellent mechanism for stimulating the
development of new technologies," (plS8). The original risk-embracing
venture capital firms in the United States often provided
entrepreneurs with finance before a product had been proven in the
marketplace and, in some cases, before it had even been fully
developed (Young, 1985).
However, the tendency in the United Kingdom is towards the provision
of later stage development or management buy-out capital as, in both
cases, the product, market and management team have been tried and
tested (Dean, 1984). This interest in later stage deals implies that
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the 'equity gap,' identified in The Wilson Report (1980) and discussed
in Chapter 4, still exists. That is, small high technology
manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom experience difficulty in
raising finance for establishment and growth. Indeed, according to
Anthony Costley-White, co-founder of the venture capital firm Oxford
Ventures,	 .. many start-ups which a few years ago could have raised
venture finance would be unable to do so now," (Batchelor, 1990b,
p15). This observation can be attributed to the change in the
investment orientation from early to later stage deals by United
Kingdom venture capital organisations, as exhibited by Murray
Johnstone, the Glasgow-based venture capital company (see Chapter 7).
However, it is important to note that not all developments in the
venture capital industry have been negative. A network of venture
capital sources has emerged in the regions outside London and the
South East which has, in turn, been joined by a number of regional
funds established by venture capital firms with their headquarters in
London (Hamilton Fazey, 1987; 1988b). In conjunction, regional
venture capital firms tended to focus their investment strategies on
specific investment stages, for example start-up or development
capital (BVCA, 1987a) and/or particular industrial sectors, for
example technology-based funds (Chapman, 1986). These developments
may be the result of attempts by venture capitalist organisations to
respond to latent demand for investment finance in the regions, since
a report by the UK Venture Capital Journal (1986) attributed the
concentration of technological investments in the South East by the
venture capital industry to the demand for venture capital, as opposed
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to the supply. Alternatively, the emergence of regionally-based
venture capital organisations may have stimulated demand for such
finance in the regions.
10.1.2 Added value
It is useful to consider why an entrepreneur might contemplate making
use of venture capital funds as opposed to any other form of finance.
To quote one entrepreneur from the United States, Nit is far more
important whose money you get than how much you get or how much you
pay for it,w (Timmons, 1983, p71). Traditionally, venture capital
companies nurture their investments by providing 'hands-on' assistance
to the investee firm beyond the initial provision of finance. This is
commonly known as 'adding value' to the investment and involves a
number of important areas of contribution by the financier. Firstly,
the venture capital organisation may appoint a non-executive director
to the board of management of the investee firm, whose duties are
similar to any other non-executive director but incorporate an
additional monitoring and feedback role for the financial institution
(Shoebridge, 1986). As a result, this non-executive director is able
to contribute to long-term strategic planning (Lorenz, 1985;
Shoebridge, 1986) perhaps getting involved in management restructuring
and recruiting key people to fill gaps in the management team
(Timmons, 1983; Lorenz, 1985). In addition, the financier can act as
a useful sounding board for the ideas and plans of the firm, giving
reasonably objective advice as an 'outsider' (Timmons, 1983;
Shoebridge, 1986). The director may also assist the investee company
by facilitating a networking process between companies financed by the
investor, where information on the industry, markets and technology
can be exchanged (Marshall, 1983; Timmons, 1983). Finally, the
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financier can be an important source of contacts leading to
introductions to other venture capital organisations, bankers,
lawyers, advertising agencies, public relations outfits, new customers
and/or suppliers amongst others (Marshall, 1983; Timmons, 1983; Larsen
and Rogers, 1984; Lorenz 1985; Davison, 1986). Thus, investee firms
are able to build quickly a network of useful contacts based on the
business connections of the venture capital provider. Another
important aspect of 'adding value' is the provision of subsequent
rounds of additional financing since the investee firm may need more
capital, either as a result of unforeseen events or to meet
requirements as the firm grows (Timmons, 1983; Shoebridge, 1986;
Davison, 1987).
All of the above functions would typify the work of a 'hands-on'
venture capitalist (see Figure 10.1) since, in effect, the financier
becomes a part-time consultant to the investee firm as well as a
source of finance (Davison, 1986). 'Hands-on' investment is much more
common in the United States where venture capitalists often take a
controlling equity stake and actively participate in the management of
the investee firm (Oakey et al., 1988). However, venture capital
funds in the United Kingdom have been criticised for the low level of
assistance offered to firms in their portfolios, despite claims that
they maintain an active involvement (Batchelor, l990b). This 'hands-
off' investment style is characterised by venture capital firms taking
a minority equity share (Oakey et p 1., 1990) and reserving the right
to appoint non-executive directors to the board of investee companies,
but not necessarily taking up this right. The financier maintains a
passive style of investment, getting involved in the operations of the
business infrequently and then sometimes only at the request of the
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investee firm (Lorenz, 1985). In choosing to adopt the 'hands-off'
investment technique, United Kingdom venture capital organisations
tend to resemble a banking style of investment unlike their
counterparts in the United States (Batchelor, 1990b). This investment
strategy means that venture capital organisations do not have to "...
take responsibility for the management and the appreciation of their
stake in the business," (Oakey et p 1., 1990, p147). However, Lorenz
(1985) has indicated that "high tech investment is not for those
venture capital funds that prefer a more passive or reactive 'hands-
off' post-investment stance," (p33) since the inherent higher risks of
the investment require careful nurturing on the part of the venture
capitalist.
Figur. 10.1 Ths Work of a Hands-on V.nturs CapitaList on
th. Board of a Company R.csiving V.ntur. CapitaL
Source: Sho.bridg. (1986)
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10.1.3 Suitability for innovation funding
"The role of the venture capitalist in high technology business is
more relevant as such businesses need a higher content of equity
financing than loan capital," (Flavin, 1982, p21). This view was
supported by McMurtry (1986) who maintained that venture capital
finance was a form of 'permanent capital.' That is, long term equity
where investors receive returns in the form of dividend payments if
the company is doing well and producing a profit (Brett, 1989). Under
such conditions firms are not subjected to pressures to demonstrate
early returns on the investment by venture capital organisations.
This would mean that a high technology firm could pursue R&D
prograes without having to be concerned with immediate payback
since, typically, returns from innovation projects take a number of
years to materialise, if at all. Venture capital finance has been
promoted as an ideal source of funds for innovation, since the capital
can also be advanced quickly at a stage when time is of the essence to
the high technology firm; that is, when further development capital is
required quickly in order to maintain technological advantage over
competitors (Flavin, 1982). Cumming (1983) has identified that "the
real gap in the market for equity capital is for finance for R&D"
(p101) and banks should not be expected to fill this breach because
this is an inherently high risk area (Bogaardt, 1982). There appears
to be scope for venture capital funding to fulfil this highly
important financial market niche since "without risk capital, there
cannot be innovation on an adequate scale," (Andriessen, 1981, p11).
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10.1.4 Issue of risk
Flavin (1982) has observed that:
"There have been pressures on the venture capital
companies to avoid taking high risks. The principal
among these was the need to win the confidence of the
investment community in the returns achievable in
venture capital investment and the need for the
venture capitalist to avoid a failure image in the
eyes of the business community and more particularly
potential entrepreneurs," (p19).
This strategy is perhaps understandable when the venture capital
industry is still in a fledgeling state of development. However,
questions are still being asked about whether venture capital
organisations in the United Kingdom are risk takers eight years after
the above observation. Bennet (1987) identified that only two per
cent of the electronics companies which approached venture capital
funds actually received help from them. Evidence such as this
prompted Batchelor (1987) to write that, "... venture capital funds
are not going where they are most needed: to provide equity backing
for the young, innovative companies which will be needed to create
wealth and jobs in the l990s," (p20). Even in 1990, the same author
noted that technology-related businesses in the United States appeared
much more able to attract venture capital finance than similar firms
in the United Kingdom (Batchelor, 1990b).
This continuing trend may be the result of experiences of pioneering
venture capital companies in the United Kingdom in the early 1980s.
These funds were operated by banks and other established City
institutions and, initially, they targeted investment funds towards
newly established high risk firms. However, a number of these
companies failed, and the venture capital industry became nervous and
more risk averse as a result (Batchelor, 1987). This still appears to
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be the case, since many venture capital funds concentrate on the less
risky, later stage financial deals. Fast (1983) puts the problem in a
nutshell, "the real risk here is that we get a snowball effect; some
initial failures, the withdrawal of the institutions financing the
industry, and the problem then feeds on itself," (p8°). The
'withdrawal of institutions financing the industry' is quite crucial
since "the vast majority of financial institutions [including pension
funds] have to safeguard shareholders funds. Many aren't allowed to
invest in loss-making companies" (interview evidence with a
representative of 3i Ventures).
The following subsection details the operations of the venture capital
market in relation to the survey sample, and considers whether demand
or supply factors drive the relationship between investees and
investors.
10.2 MARKET FOR VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE
The 61 firms which had previous dealings with venture capital
organisations were asked whether the investor or the investee
established the relationship. Table 10.1 illustrates that, at the
chi-square significance level of	 O.00O7, more firms which initiated
the contact tended to receive venture capital funds (20 firms or 67
per cent) than those that were approached. A much reduced 2 firms (12
per cent) accessed venture capital finance when the financiers
established the relationship. A third category was included for firms
which could not specifically determine who had first made contact, and
9 of these firms or 64 per cent received venture capital funds. These
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results initially appear surprising, since it might be expected that
venture capital providers would be selective about prospective
investment opportunities. However, some firms which have been
approached by venture capital organisations may not have wanted
investment finance on the terms offered, and this might explain the
low adoption rate when financiers took the initiative. Similarly, it
might be assumed that venture capital funds receive so many
applications for finance that they have to turn down a substantial
number. Nevertheless, the high adoption rate when firms initiated the
contact might be explained by careful and thorough presentations by
the potential investees, at the appropriate stage in their investment
cycle, resulting in convincing cases for receiving investment finance.
This outcome confirms that venture capital firms are largely reactive
in terms of the delivery of funds.
TabL. 10.1 Wh.th.r r.c.lv.d vsntura capitaL by natur• of contact with
vsnture capital provid.ra
Who lnitlat.d ths contact
Fir.	 V.nturs	 Coabinatlon	 TotaL
capitaL lit
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Rsc.lv.d vsnturs
capitaL (PVC)	 20	 (66.7)	 2	 (11.8)	 9	 (64.3)	 31	 (50.8)
Not r.c.jv.d vsnturs
capitaL (NVC)	 10	 (33.3)	 15	 (88.2)	 5	 (35.7)	 30	 (49.2)
TotaL	 30 (100.0)	 17 (100.0)	 14 (100.0)	 61	 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) - 14.405	 p • 0.0007
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Generally, venture capital providers appeared more interested in
initiating contact with firms which had been operating for more than
ten years. When the firm was less than 10 years old, the firm itself
tended to apply for venture capital funds. According to Table 10.2,
sixteen firms (53 per cent) founded in the 1980s initiated contact
compared with 3 instances (18 per cent) where the financiers
established coniunication. A third category is included in this table
for instances where respondents were unsure about who initiated
contact. This table proved to be significant at the .=0.048 level
following a chi-square test. In addition, Table 10.3 indicates that
the majority of firms (7 in number or 64 per cent) contacted by the
financier prior to 1984 received funds, compared with only 4 companies
(20 per cent) contacted in the 1984-1989 period (chi-square test
significant at the =O.015 level). These results must reflect
partly the emergence of venture capital in the 1980s as a source of
funding, and never firms learning of the existence of venture capital
when seeking start-up finance. By implication, older firms would be
more familiar with traditional sources of finance, and venture capital
firms may themselves have had to create a general awareness amongst
such companies. It would also appear from Table 10.4 that it is
advantageous to approach, or be approached by, venture capital
organisations with a specific interest in technological investments.
Seventeen firms (74 per cent) in this sample received the required
finance from just such a source. This compares with only 13 firms (38
per cent) receiving funds from general venture capital funds with no
specific technological focus (chi-square test significant at the level
of =0.008).
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Tabl. 10.2 Ysar of for.ation by nature of contact with venturi capitaL
providers
Who initiated th. contact
Fir.	 Venture	 Co.bination	 Total
capitalist
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
Prior to 1980	 14	 (46.7)	 14	 (82.4)	 7	 (50.0)	 35	 (57.4)
1980 onwards	 16	 (53.3)	 3	 (17.6)	 7	 (50.0)	 26	 (42.6)
Total	 30 (100.0)	 17 (100.0)	 14 (100.0)	 61 (100.0)
Chi-square (2 d.f.) • 6.055	 p.0.048
TabLe 10.3 Wheth.r received ventur, capital by year venture
capital provider .ad. contact
1978-1983	 1984-1989	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Received venturi
capital	 7	 (63.6)	 4	 (20.0)	 11	 (35.5)
Not received
venture capital
	 4	 (36.4)	 16	 (80.0)	 20	 (64.5)
Total	 11	 (100.0)	 20 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)
Chi-square (1 d.f.) - 5.903 	 p - 0.015
TabLe 10.4 Whither received venturi capital by type of
venturi capital organisation
General	 Technology	 Total
apeci aLisation
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Received venture
capitaL	 13	 (38.2)	 17	 (73.9)	 30	 (52.6)
Not received
venturi capital
	 21	 (61.8)	 6	 (26.1)	 27	 (47.4)
Total	 34 (100.0)	 23 (100.0)	 57 (100.0)
Chi-square (1 d.f.) • 7.005
	 p • 0.008
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10.2.1 Awareness of venture capital opportunities
The entrepreneur may be stimulated to request venture capital finance
in order to support a specific technological development. Venture
capital funds are ideally suited to this purpose since long term
funding can compensate for delayed returns associated with product
development work. On the other hand, venture capital funds may be
required to support a strategy of accelerated growth by the
entrepreneur.
Interestingly, Table 10.5 demonstrates that firms with the passive
objectives of securing a comfortable living and simply wishing to
manufacture and sell products received venture capital funding in 21
cases (44 per cent). This compares with only eight entrepreneurs (30
per cent) who obtained venture capital finance whilst pursuing the
more aggressive aims of market share, profit and growth. However,
firms pursuing aggressive objectives did not appear to be
disadvantaged by the lack of venture capital funds. A large
percentage of firms pursuing aggressive business goals but which had
not received venture capital funds (NyC) achieved a 51 per cent or
greater growth rate in turnover (6 firms or 60 per cent) and employee
nwnbers (5 firms or 50 per cent). In terms of passive firms receiving
venture capital funds (RVC), 9 companies (64 per cent) achieved a 51
per cent or greater increase in turnover, and 8 firms (50 per cent)
achieved a similar employee growth level. Given that the percentage
results are not too dissimilar, the presence of venture capital might
enable passive firms to achieve comparable growth levels to aggressive
growth oriented firms. On the other hand, perhaps firms with passive
goals at the time of founding have, subsequently, become more
aggressive and growth oriented as a result of receiving the venture
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capital input. It should be noted that percentage growth in turnover
and employee levels can only be calculated for firms founded prior to
1984 because growth is measured over the period 1984 to 1989. This
explains any anomalies between Table 10.5 and the above figures.
TaM. 10.5 Incid.nc. of vsntur. capitaL fundin9 by busin.is goaLs at
formation
Aggrsssiv.	 Psssivs	 TotaL
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Rac.iv.d v.nturs capitaL (RVC)
	 8	 (29.6)	 21	 (43.8)	 29	 (38.7)
Hot r.c.iv.d vsnturs capital. (HVC)
	 12	 (44.4)	 15	 (31.3)	 27	 (36.0)
Ho contact with v.nturs 	 7	 (25.9)	 12	 (25.0)	 19	 (25.3)
capitaLists (HOC)
TotaL	 27 (100.0)	 48 (100.0)	 75 (100.0)
Respondents were also asked whether they could have achieved a higher
level of growth, but for the presence of some inhibiting factor. Both
aggressive and passive firms cited lack of orders as the major
impediment to expansion (10 firms, 42 per cent and 17 firms, 36 per
cent respectively) followed by lack of finance (5 firms, 21 per cent
and 15 firms, 32 per cent respectively). A number of the lower
technology firms, in particular, believed they were financially
constrained (13 companies, 35 per cent) whereas 18 of the higher
technology firms (43 per cent) felt restricted mostly by the lack of
orders. The majority of firms had overcome the main constraint they
faced in 1984 only to be faced by a different constraining factor in
1989 (Table 10.6). However, of those companies facing the same
constraining factors, thirteen or 39 per cent were lower technology
firms and only six or 16 per cent belonged to the higher technology
category (chi-square test significant at the level of =O.025). The
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financial restriction appeared to be a constant problem for a number
of the lower technology firms over the period 1984 to 1989. Chapter 7
established that many of the lover technology firms in this sample
generally have been unable to attract venture capital funds, despite
pursuing more aggressive growth strategies than their higher
technology counterparts (Chapter 9).
TabL. 10.6 1984 and 1989 constraInts by t.chnoLoicaL
sophistication
Hi9h	 Low	 TotaL
tschnoLo9y	 t.chnotogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Constraints th. sam• 	 6	 (15.8)	 13	 (39.4)	 19	 (26.8)
Constraints diff.r.nt 	 32	 (84.2)	 20	 (60.6)	 52	 (73.2)
TotaL	 38 (100.0)	 33 (100.0)	 71	 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) - 5.021	 p- 0.025
A greater percentage of the higher technology firms approached more
than one source of venture capital funds when compared with the lower
technology companies, and applicants who were not put off after one
unsuccessful attempt were more likely to receive the required finance
(Table 10.7). The lower technology firms might be time constrained by
the limited market opportunities offered by their
imitation/improvement product strategies, since it is important to
obtain market share as quickly as possible, and they may have decided
not to pursue the possibility of venture capital funding beyond a
single approach. In addition, because of the existing market for the
imitation/improvement product and a perceived smaller risk, these
firms might be able to attract alternative forms of finance, for
example bank funding. However, more technologically sophisticated
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firms might have encountered difficulty in raising investment finance
for product development strategies, and so are forced to explore
multiple lending sources until the required funds have been obtained.
Table 10.8 also indicates that the age of the firm has a significant
bearing on the number of venture capital organisations approached.
Newer companies appear more likely to make a sustained effort to
attract this form of finance by approaching more than one venture
capital provider. Twenty one companies (91 per cent) founded in 1980
or later approached two or more venture capital organisations,
compared with only 11 firms (55 per cent) founded prior to 1980 (chi-
square test significant at the	 O.007 level). This is likely to be a
cause of the previously noted observation that younger firms tend to
receive venture capital funds.
TabL. 10.7 Nu.b.r of v.nturs capitaL provld.rs approachsd by t.chnotogicat
sophistication and incld.nc. of vsntur. capitaL funding
TschnoLogicaL sophistication	 V.ntur. capitaL status
	
High	 Low	 TotaL	 R.c.iv.d Not r.c.iv.d	 TotaL
funds	 funds
r	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1	 3 (11.5)	 8 (47.1) 11	 (25.6)	 3 (10.7)	 8 (53.3) 11	 (25.6)
2+	 23 (88.5)	 9 (52.9) 32 (74.4)	 25 (89.3)	 7 (46.7) 32 (74.4)
TotaL 26 (100.0) 17 (100.0) 43 (100.0) 	 28 (100.0) 15 (100.0) 43 (100.0)
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T.bL. u.S Nu.b.r of vsnture capitaL provid.rs
spproach.d by y.sr of for.ation
Ysir fir. was found.d
Prior to
	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
i	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1	 9	 (45.0)	 2	 (8.7)	 11	 (25.6)
2+	 11	 (55.0)	 21	 (91.3)	 32	 (74.6)
TotaL	 20 (100.0)	 23 (100.0)	 43 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) .7.406	 p.0.007
10.2.2 Awareness of investment opportunities
Evidence cited earlier in this chapter indicated that venture capital
organisations are not particularly active in selling their services.
If the responsibility lies mainly with the entrepreneur to establish
contact, this means that suitable investment opportunities could be
missed due to lack of awareness on the part of both the venture
capital provider and the entrepreneur. It is encouraging that only
one of the 83 respondents in this survey had not heard of the concept
of venture capital financing. However, 22 firms had not had any form
of contact with venture capital organisations at any time.
An attempt was made to investigate whether venture capital providers
have missed investment opportunities, both in terms of firms with
which they have had no contact and companies which may have been
refused investment finance at some stage. To this end, all the
respondents were asked whether they had abandoned a significant
product innovation after initial development work. The answer to this
question was cross-tabulated with the main product strategy of the
firm; that is, whether the company manufactured imitation-based
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products, improved products to those already available in the
marketplace, or totally new products to the market. Table 10.9
illustrates that 40 firms (nearly half of the total sample of 83
companies) manufacturing totally new products had abandoned one or
more innovation projects (chi-square test significant at the =0.O33
level). Thirteen of these 40 respondents (33 per cent) indicated that
a lack of resources, including time, manpower and investment capital,
had been a constraint. Other restrictions on innovation programmes
included market/competition problems (17 companies, 43 per cent) and
the development work required to bring the product to market at a
reasonable cost (10 firms, 25 per cent). Therefore, the lack of
finance was a problem affecting the innovation process for only a
notable minority of companies.
TabI. 10.9 Main product innovation typ. by incid.nc. of
•bandon.d innovation proj.cts
	
Not •bandon.d Ab.ndon.d
	
TotaL
innovation	 innovation
n	 (S)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (%)
Imitation	 5	 (25.0)	 5	 (8.2)	 10	 (12.3)
lmprov.m.nt	 8	 (40.0)	 16	 (26.2)	 24	 (29.6)
TotalLy n.y
	7	 (35.0)	 40	 (65.6)	 47	 (58.0)
TotaL	 20 (100.0)	 61 (100.0)	 81	 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (2 d.f.) - 6.835	 p.0.033
It is useful to consider these innovation constraints in relation to
the level of growth achieved by the survey firms. The lack of
resources, including capital, emerged as the major problem for 8 firms
or 57 per cent in the no growth or decline category, whilst 13 growing
firms (42 per cent) experienced market problems. Interestingly, in
only one out of twelve cases did a venture capital provider approach a
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firm undergoing a period of decline. These two results suggest that
the innovation programmes of some declining or no growth firms may be
constrained by a general lack of resources including finance, despite
many having explored the possibility of venture capital funding.
Further investigation revealed that declining or no growth firms were
not specifically burdened by high R&D costs when compared with growing
companies. Indeed, declining or no growth firms generally exhibited a
lower R&D spend, although this could be an effect of the financial
resource constraint.
10.3 ThE DELIVERY OF VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE
10.3.1 Promotional efforts
Venture capital organisations must have created awareness of the
venture capital funding option in the financial marketplace in order
to encourage companies to establish contact. A simple means of
creating this consciousness is to send out company literature to
prospective clients and their contacts, for example accountants and
solicitors. Table 10.10 illustrates that promotional efforts of
venture capital organisations were most useful for survey firms
established prior to 1980. Six firms (33 per cent) founded prior to
1980 were alerted to the possibility of venture financing by
literature produced by venture capital companies, compared with only
two youngers firms (9 per cent). This substantiates the observation
that older firms tend not to seek venture capital actively on their
own initiative. However, venture capital firms initiated direct
contact in only a minority of cases. According to Table 10.10,
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personal contacts mostly performed the intermediary function of
informing survey firms about venture capital funding (a 50 per cent
or greater incidence for firms regardless of foundation date).
T.bLs 10.10 How firma discov.rsd v.nturs capitaL
organiaationa by ysar of for.ation
Prior to	 1980
	
TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (5)	 n	 (5)	 n	 CS)
Int.r..di ary
	
9	 (50.0)	 13	 (59.1)	 22	 (55.0)
PromotionaL
mat.ri at
	
6	 (33.3)	 2	 (9.1)	 8	 (20.0)
Oth.r
	
3	 (16.7)	 7	 (31.8)	 10	 (25.0)
TotaL
	
18 (100.0)	 22 (100.0)	 40 (100.0)
Promotional efforts of venture capital organisations generally
attracted firms which had been established with mostly internal
capital. This is perhaps understandable, since externally funded
start-ups would have established a number of financial contacts during
their start-up phase, including venture capital firms and contacts of
venture capital providers.
10.3.2 Turnaround of venture capital deals
Before considering the speed with which survey firms received venture
capital finance, it is useful to gain a general idea of when companies
actually received the investment. Table 10.11 demonstrates that ten
firms (77 per cent) founded prior to 1980 received their most recent,
or only, injection of venture capital finance before 1985. This
compares with only 5 companies (28 per cent) established within the
last decade which received the finance prior to 1985 (chi-square test
significant at the =0.007 level). This result is understandable
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given that only a limited number of younger firms in the sample would
have been established in the years 1980 to 1984, and also given the
aforementioned evidence that venture capital organisations do not tend
to invest in start-up situations. Interestingly, the reduction in
older firms receiving venture capital finance over the last ten years
may be a result of recently reduced marketing efforts by venture
capital organisations, due to increasing general awareness of venture
capital as a source of finance.
TabL. 10.11 Data of most rscsnt inj.ction of vsnturs
capitaL financ. by y.ar of formation
Y.ar of format ion
Prior to	 1980
	
TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
R.c.ivsd financ.
pr..1 985
	
10	 (76.9)	 5	 (27.8)	 15	 (48.4)
R.c.iv.d financ.
1985 onwards
	
3	 (23.1)	 13	 (72.2)	 16	 (51.6)
TotaL	 13 (100.0)	 18 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)
Chi-squar. (1 d.f.) • 7.300	 p - 0.007
As might be expected, no trend emerged when examining how quickly
survey firms received their most recent injection of venture capital
funds against when they were founded. However, Table 10.12 indicates
that firms exhibiting no growth, or in a period of decline, mostly
were required to wait longer than six months from the date of
application before receiving investment finance. Four companies (67
per cent) in the no growth or decline category, compared with 2 firms
(13 per cent) exhibiting growth, received the venture capital finance
after more than six months of waiting. Typically, expanding firms
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experienced a two to six month delay between application and receipt
(10 companies or 67 per cent). One possible explanation for this
observed time difference between effectively declining and growing
firms is the longer vetting period associated with the former category
of companies. Because more than 20 per cent of the cells in Table
10.12 have an expected frequency of less than five, it is not possible
to estimate the significance level resulting from the correlation of
growth and delay in receiving venture capital funds. This is due to
the relatively small number of relevant cases included in the analysis
at this level of disaggregation.
TabL. 10.12 How quickLy firms r.c.iv.d vsnturs capitaL
financ. by incid.nc. of growth
Positiv.	 N.gativs	 TotaL
growth	 growth
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1-4 w..k,	 3	 (20.0)	 1	 (16.7)	 6	 (19.0)
2-6 •onths	 10	 (66.7)	 1	 (16.7)	 11	 (52.4)
7 months +
	 2	 (13.3)	 4	 (66.7)	 6	 (28.6)
TotaL	 15 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 21	 (100.0)
It is also interesting to note from Table 10.12 that a number of firms
received the required finance within a month of application. This
indicates that venture capital funds	 be advanced quickly.
Therefore, venture capital may be an ideal source of finance for firms
requiring R&D funds to stay ahead of competitors with a particular
technological development. However, Table 10.13 indicates that none
of the firms which received venture capital funds within a month of
application required the capital for product development purposes.
Three firms required working capital and four used the finance for
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marketing or other purposes. Included in the 'marketing and other'
category are three firms which required capital for a management buy-
out, and only one received the funds in four weeks or less. Business
Expansion Scheme (BES) funds and 3i were relatively quick to
turnaround venture capital deals. Nine companies (50 per cent) which
had to wait up to six months mostly received venture capital funds
from direct captive subsidiaries of other financial institutions.
Perhaps this supports the accusation that venture capital firms behave
more like banks. If financial institutions effectively own and manage
venture capital units, then lending procedures and general bureaucracy
are likely to be similar. Mention should be made here of the venture
capital company 3i; although the shareholders are financial
institutions, 3i is operated effectively as an independent enterprise
as opposed to being directly associated with one particular bank.
However, 3i includes a high loan content in its investment packages,
either in terms of direct loans or quasi-loans such as preference
shares, which is not too dissimilar to the lending procedures of the
banks.
T.bL. 1013 How quickLy firms received venture capitaL financ. by use
of funds
Working	 Product	 Hark.ting	 TotaL
capitaL	 d.v.Lop..nt	 L other
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
1-4 w,.ks	 3	 (30.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 4	 (26.7)	 7	 (22.6)
2-6 months	 5	 (50.0)	 4	 (66.7)	 9	 (60.0)	 18	 (58.1)
7 months +	 2	 (20.0)	 2	 (33.3)	 2	 (13.3)	 6	 (19.4)
Total.	 10	 (100.0)	 6 (100.0)	 15 (100.0)	 31	 (52.4)
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10.4 ADDED VALUE ASPECT OF THE INVESTMENT
10.4.1 Assistance
In order to ascertain whether venture capital organisations attempted
to 'add value' to their investments in any way, survey firms were
asked if they had received any assistance beyond the provision of
finance. Table 10.14 lists assistance which survey firms received
from their respective venture capital investors, and respondents were
able to provide more than one answer to this question. As a result,
the chi-square statistic could not be used on this table and those
following, and this also explains the inclusion of two column totals;
the first total is concerned with the number of responses, and the
second total indicates how many firms gave these answers. In eight
cases (over 60 per cent) where firms were established prior to 1980 no
assistance was received beyond the provision of capital (Table 10.14).
However, amongst those companies founded within the last decade there
were 6 instances (35 per cent) where firms received general management
advice from venture capital providers, and four cases (24 per cent)
where respondents believed that they had benefited from the experience
of the financiers. Perhaps younger firms were more able to benefit
from the experience and advice of venture capital organisations since
most of the understanding of the traditional venture capitalist has
been built around companies in their formative stages. Support for
this statement is provided by Table 10.15, which illustrates that in
ten cases where companies were at a later stage in their development
these companies received no assistance whatsoever from the venture
capital institution. However, some later-stage companies acknowledged
that management advice was useful (three cases) , in five instances
companies had help with accounting procedures and liaising with the
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bank manager, and in three cases senior executives were recruited with
the assistance of their respective investors. On the other hand, of
those firms receiving venture capital input in their early development
stages, there were three instances where firms received management
advice from the financiers, and three respondents acknowledged that
the greater experience of the venture capital provider was helpful.
Finally, in two cases firms believed that their financiers were good
sources of contacts when they were just starting out in business. The
term networking covers situations where venture capital providers put
investee firms in contact with other businesses. This process was
investigated further by means of separate and distinct questions in
the interview questionnaire, the results of which are set out below.
TabI. 10.14 Assistanc. r.c.iv.d from vsnturs capitaL
organhsatlons by ysar of formation
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (S)	 n	 (S)
No assjstanc.	 8	 (61.5)	 4	 (23.5)	 12	 (40.0)
Manag...nt advic.
	 0	 (0.0)	 6	 (35.3)	 6	 (20.0)
Accounting/bank
asslstanc.	 2	 (15.4)	 3	 (17.6)	 5	 (16.7)
Vsntur. capitaL
firm •xp.rienc.	 1	 (7.7)	 4	 (23.5)	 5	 (16.7)
R.cruit..nt h.Lp
	 1	 (7.7)	 2	 (11.8)	 3	 (10.0)
Nitwork contacts	 0	 (0.0)	 2	 (11.8)	 2	 (6.7)
L.gaL assistanc.	 1	 (7.7)	 0	 (0.0)	 1	 (3.3)
Othsr	 2	 (15.4)	 2	 (11.8)	 4	 (13.3)
Total rssponsss	 15	 23	 38
TotaL firms
	 13	 17	 30
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TabLe 10.15 Assistanc, received fro. venture capitaL
organisations by stage of growth of survey firms
Just after	 At a Later	 TotaL
start-up	 stag.
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
No assistance	 1	 (20.0)	 10	 (41.6)	 11	 (37.9)
Nanagement advice
	 3	 (60.0)	 3	 (12.5)	 6	 (20.7)
Accounting/bank
assistance	 0	 (0.0)	 5	 (20.8)	 5	 (17.2)
Venture capitaL
firm exp.ri.nce	 3	 (60.0)	 2	 (8.3)	 5	 (17.2)
Recruitment heLp
	 0	 (0.0)	 3	 (12.5)	 3	 (10.3)
Network contacts	 2	 (40.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 2	 (6.9)
L,sI. sssstanc.	 0	 (0.0)	 1	 (4.2)	 1	 (3.4)
Otñ.r	 0	 (0.0)	 4	 (16.7)	 4	 (13.8)
TotaL responses	 9	 28	 37
TotaL firms	 5	 24	 29
10.4.2 Networking
Table 10.16 illustrates that companies both at an early and later
development stage received introductions to third parties by venture
capital institutions. Three survey firms which had just started out
in business, and four which were at a later stage of development,
acknowledged that they had been introduced to other investee companies
of a synergistic nature; that is, companies which were complementary
in terms of technology, products or markets. The financiers believed
these companies would be able to share common knowledge and
experiences. Other contacts made as a direct result of the
involvement of the venture capital organisation were with potential
customers and suppliers. Also noteworthy are introductions to other
possible sources of finance amongst those firms at a later stage of
development (4 firms). It is possible that some of these other
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financiers could comprise venture capital organisations, since the
survey revealed some evidence of investment deals being syndicated
amongst a number of venture capital financiers.
TabL. 10.16 IntroductIons by vsnturs capitaL organisations by
stag. of growth
Just aft.r	 At a Lat.r
	
TotaL
start-up	 Stags
n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Syn.rgistic
coaparii as
Oth.r financisrs
Pot.nti.L suppLi.rs
Pot.nti.t cuitc.srs
ConsuL tints
TotaL rssponsss
TotaL
3	 (75.0)	 4	 (66.7)	 7	 (53.8)
1	 (25.0)	 4	 (66.7)	 5	 (38.5)
2	 (50.0)	 3	 (50.0)	 5	 (38.5)
2	 (50.0)	 2	 (33.3)	 4	 (30.8)
0	 (0.0)	 2	 (33.3)	 2	 (15.4)
8	 15	 23
4	 6	 10
Previous subsections noted the tendency for venture capital
institutions to interact more with survey firms established over the
last ten years and, it would appear, younger firms have also been
inclined to receive introductions to other parties. Table 10.17
illustrates that these contacts consisted of synergistic companies (5
1irms tthr nanci i tititiois (4 companies) potential customers
(4 companies) and/or suppliers (4 firms). However, these results only
indicate whether introductions to third parties resulted from venture
capital involvement. They do not reveal whether survey firms believed
that any benefit had emerged as a result. Overall, of the 13 firms
which had been introduced to potential business contacts, only 5 firms
(38 per cent) believed that there had been useful results. Two
companies received additional finance from contacts of their
respective venture capital organisations, another two firms acquired
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new customers/suppliers, and one company was pursuing a new market
opportunity as a result. The venture capital organisations have
attempted to 'add value' to the investment in these five cases by
augmenting the current operations of the investee firm. However,
eight companies (a large 62 percent) believed that nothing had emerged
from discussions with contacts of their respective financiers, and
this applied to firms regardless of their age. However, a
representative of Baillie Cifford and Company pointed out that they
were "... very often frustrated with companies because they didn't
follow up on introductions and recommendations," (interview evidence).
Perhaps this is because the process is time consuming for small firms,
especially when only "one in ten contacts might come to something,"
(interview evidence from a representative of Hambros Advanced
Technology Trust).
TbL. 10.17 Introductions by vsntur. capitaL organisations by
ylar of foruatior,
Prior to
	 1980
	
TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
Synsrgistic
co.pani S.
Oth.r fin.nci.rs
Pot.ntiaL suppLi.rs
Pot.ntiat custo..rs
ConsuLtants
TotaL r.spons.s
TotaL firms
2	 (40.0)	 5	 (62.5)	 7	 (53.8)
1	 (20.0)	 4	 (50.0)	 5	 (38.5)
1	 (20.0)	 4	 (50.0)	 5	 (38.5)
0	 (0.0)	 4	 (50.0)	 4	 (30.8)
2	 (40.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 2	 (15.4)
6	 17	 23
5	 8	 13
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10.4.3 Benefit of venture capital finance
The respondents were asked whether they perceived any specific
advantages or disadvantages in utilising venture capital funds.
Twenty four of the 31 firms receiving venture capital finance (77 per
cent) stated that there were advantages associated with this type of
investment capital. Twelve companies (50 per cent) simply stated that
receiving the money was the main advantage, although seven firms
acknowledged that their survival depended upon it. Five firms (21 per
cent) specifically stated that they would not have survived without
the injection of venture capital funds, whilst a further seven
companies (29 per cent) indicated that the expertise of the financier
was the major benefit. Conversely, 19 of the 31 respondents (61 per
cent) perceived some form of disadvantage with venture capital
finance. Nine firms (47 per cent) believed that the venture capital
institution imposed restraints under which they found it difficult to
operate, five companies (26 per cent) maintained that the financier
took too much equity in return for the capital, a further three firms
(16 per cent) complained of the lack of peripheral services beyond the
initial provision of finance, and two interviewees (11 per cent)
believed that the venture capital organisation was unprofessional in
the way it structured the deal. Nevertheless, 29 of the 31 firms
which had received venture capital finance (94 per cent) stated that
they were currently in a better business position than they would have
been without the funds.
The next subsection investigates this result further by attempting to
discover whether, and to what extent, the injection of venture capital
finance was critical to the future survival of the survey firm. In
most cases the results which follow are based on the 31 firms which
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received venture capital funding. The small number of cases involved
means that statistically significant results are often difficult to
obtain using the chi-square statistic. Nevertheless, the results may
shed some light on the nature of the value of venture capital finance.
10.5 VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS - LENDERS OF LAST RESORT?
10.5.1 Source of critical finance
Venture capital may be 'crowding out' other possible sources of funds,
or it may be a unique source of finance for companies unable to obtain
capital from any other source. Table 10.18 illustrates that 25
companies (a substantial 81 per cent) receiving venture capital funds
believed that the injection of finance was critical, and this belief
was more pronounced for firms founded over the last decade. Sixteen
companies (90 per cent) established in the post-1979 period maintained
that the injection of venture capital funds was critical, compared
with nine firms (a lesser 69 per cent) founded prior to 1980. This
tendency could be a result of younger firms still experiencing growing
pains associated with the start-up process. This assumption is
supported by Table 10.19. Sixteen firms (67 per cent) indicated that
they would no longer be in business save for the injection of venture
capital funds, and thirteen of these companies (81 per cent) had been
founded during the last decade. This table fails to be significant
because more than 20 per cent of the cells have an expected frequency
of less than five (25 per cent in this instance). Further analysis of
these 'surviving as a result of venture capital funding' firms
revealed no difference in terms of either location or high/low
technology variation. The size of the company in terms of the number
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of emloyees, however, did appear to play a major part. Table 10.20
demonstrates that 11 companies (92 per cent) employing 25 employees or
less maintained they would not exist without the critical injection of
venture capital finance. This contrasts with only 5 of the larger
companies (42 per cent) which would no longer be in existence without
venture capital funding. These results serve to illustrate the
fragile nature of the start-up process for small businesses, and also
the need for crucial supplementary injections of investment finance
after establishment. The most important result to emerge from Tables
10.19 and 10.20 is that sixteen survey firms attributed their current
existence to venture capital providers.
TabL. 10.15 Whither ventur, capitaL funds wsrs criticaL
by ysar of formation
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
CriticaL	 9	 (69.2)	 16	 (88.9)	 25	 (80.6)
Not criticaL	 4	 (30.8)	 2	 (11.1)	 6	 (19.4)
TotaL	 13 (100.0)	 18 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)
TabLe 10.19 Why venturi capital funds wire criticaL by y.ar
of formation
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
The company wouLd
not exist	 3	 (37.5)	 13	 (81.3)	 16	 (66.7)
Other	 5	 (62.5)	 3	 (18.8)	 8	 (33.3)
TotaL	 8 (100.0)	 16 (100.0)	 24 (100.0)
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T.bL. 10.20 Why v.ntur. c.plt.L funds w.r. criticaL by siz.
of fir. in ..pLoy..nt t.rms
Ni.b.r of •.ptoys.s
I - 25	 26+	 TotaL
n	 (S)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Th. co.pany wouLd
not •xist	 11	 (91.7)	 5	 (41.7)	 16	 (66.7)
Oth.r	 1	 (8.3)	 7	 (58.3)	 8	 (33.3)
TotaL	 12 (100.0)	 12 (100.0)	 24 (100.0)
10.5.2 Additionality
in order to ascertain whether tfhe venture capital provider was the
only opportunity for investment finance for survey firms, respondents
were asked whether they had approached this financier before seeking
funds from any other source. Interestingly, eight firms (80 per cent)
which claimed they would not be operating without venture capital
funds, approached the venture capital institution before applying to
any other source (Table 10.21). This indicates that the venture
capital organisation was not a lender of the last resort for such
firms, since other means of financing had not been explored.
Nevertheless, sixteen respondents believed that they would not be
operating currently without the risk capital supplied by venture
capital firms. Further investigation of these firms revealed a slight
regional variation. Nine companies (75 per cent) located in the South
East of England maintained that the injection of venture capital
finance was crucial, compared with seven firms (a lesser 58 per cent)
operating in Scotland (Table 10.22). This difference should not be
overemphasised since it may be a reflection of the availability of
regional government assistance to firms located in Scotland. If this
is the case, then venture capital organisations effectively may be
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taking the place of government aid in the South East. It should also
be noted that, although respondents stated that they would not exist
without venture capital funds, some may have continued to exist in a
different form; perhaps as subsidiaries of other companies, or having
been sold at a loss. At the time of interview thirteen of the sixteen
firms (81 per cent) were still independent, which may be due to
investment finance received from venture capital providers.
TabE. 10.21 Why venture capitaL funds were criticaL by when fir.s
approached vsnturs capitaL providers
Before oth.r	 With other	 After other	 TotaL
	
sources	 sourcss	 sources
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 i	 (%)
The co.pany wouLd
not exist
	
8	 (80.0)	 5	 (50.0)	 2	 (66.7)	 15	 (65.2)
Other
	
2	 (20.0)	 5	 (50.0)	 1	 (33.3)	 8	 (34.8)
TotaL
	
10 (100.0)	 10 (100.0)	 3 (100.0)	 23	 (66.7)
TabLe 10.22 Why Venture capitaL funds were criticaL by fir.
Location
South East	 ScotLand	 Total
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
The coupany wouLd
not exist	 9	 (75.0)	 7	 (58.3)	 16	 (66.7)
Other	 3	 (25.0)	 5	 (41.7)	 8	 (33.3)
TotaL	 12 (100.0)	 12 (100.0)	 24 (100.0)
The current performance of the above sixteen companies also indicates
that their critical need for finance has been overcome, since fourteen
respondents (88 per cent) perceived their firms to be in an
expansionary phase of development. Only two respondents believed that
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their business was in a static or declining state, and this was
confirmed by the calculation of percentage growth in turnover per
employee for the period 1984 to 1989. Therefore, the majority of
firms which were struggling enterprises at an earlier stage, had
managed to turn their fortunes around following an injection of
venture capital finance by the time of the survey. That is not to
say, however, that venture capital organisations should expect to sit
back and reap the rewards of a successful investment. Only five of
the sixteen companies surviving as a result of venture capital funds
(31 per cent) were currently making a profit. The venture capital
provider should play a nurturing role, offering additional financial
support if necessary to take the company to a self-financing position.
Thus, venture capital providers should be prepared to be sources of
long term risk capital in order to have the best possible offering for
public flotation or trade sale when exiting investee companies.
10.5.3 Risk capital
It would appear from the above evidence that some venture capital
organisations in the United Kingdom have put their funds at risk.
According to Table 10.23, eighteen of the 24 companies which believed
the financiers had taken a risk with their capital actually
manufactured high technology products, as defined in Chapter 7 (see
also Appendix 10). This may result from the fact that research and
development processes associated with high technology production are
intrinsically more risk-bearing than with low technology goods. Table
10.24 gives some indication of the degree of risk associated with the
venture capital investment as perceived by the respondents. Eight
companies (50 per cent) estimating the degree of risk believed that
the venture capital company could suffer a loss as a result of the
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investment. As might be expected, marginally more higher technology
firms maintained that the financier could incur a loss (six or 55 per
cent of the higher technology firms compared with two or 40 per cent
of the lower technology companies). The remaining eight companies
responding to the question on the nature of the risk, considered that
the venture capital firm had taken a calculated risk when making the
investment; that is, the likelihood of success was considered greater
than the possibility of failure.
TabL. 10.23 Wh.th.r v.nturs capitaL organisations took a
risk by t.chnoLoicaL sophistication
High	 Low	 TotaL
t.chnoto9y	 technoLogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
Took a risk	 18	 (90.0)	 6	 (54.5)	 24	 (77.4)
Ho risk invoLved	 2	 (10.0)	 5	 (45.5)	 7	 (22.6)
TotaL	 20 (100.0)	 11	 (100.0)	 31	 (100.0)
TabLe 10.24 Degre, of investment risk by technoLogicaL
sophistication
High	 Low	 TotaL
technoLogy	 technoLogy
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (%)
CaLcuLated risk	 5	 (45.5)	 3	 (60.0)	 8	 (50.0)
PossibLe Loss	 6	 (54.5)	 2	 (40.0)	 8	 (50.0)
TotaL	 11	 (100.0)	 5 (100.0)	 16 (100.0)
The willingness of venture capital organisations to address risk can
also be investigated by considering whether survey firms received
injections of venture capital funds at other critical stages in their
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business operations. Table 10.25 demonstrates that thirteen firms
overall received a further important tranche of investment capital,
and twelve of these believed that the finance was received at a
critical time. When asked to define in what sense the investment was
critical, nine companies (75 per cent) again maintained that they
would not be operating in their present form without venture capital
funds. Therefore, in their own estimation a number of companies had
been saved twice from bankruptcy, liquidation or takeover by the
timely investment of venture capital finance.
TabL. 10.25 Wh.th.r •ost important injection of venture
capital funds was criticaL by y.ar of
format ion
Prior to	 1980	 TotaL
1980	 onwards
n	 (%)	 n	 (%)	 n	 (S)
CriticaL	 4	 (80.0)	 8 (100.0)	 12	 (92.3)
Not critical	 1	 (20.0)	 0	 (0.0)	 1	 (7.7)
TotaL	 5 (100.0)	 8 (100.0)	 13 (100.0)
10.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Recipients of venture capital funds tended to initiate contact, via an
intermediary, with venture capital organisations. Very often firms
had to apply to more than one provider of venture capital finance
before they were successful. Further characteristics of recipients
included being less than ten years old., pursuing passive business
objectives and generally manufacturing higher technology products.
Older companies were more inclined to be approached by purveyors of
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venture capital funds, but were less likely to become recipients.
Producers of lower technology goods felt cash-constrained, perhaps as
a result of pursuing aggressive marketing strategies. There was
little evidence that venture capital funds could be advanced quickly,
especially when firms were not growing or were in a period of decline.
There were also few perceived benefits in the attempts by venture
capital organisations to 'add value' to their investments, but a
number of younger companies received assistance immediately after
start-up. Many small young firms believed that the receipt of venture
capital finance was critical to their survival, and that the
financiers were prepared to put their capital at risk.
It would appear that the onus has been on the potential recipient to
actively and tenaciously seek venture capital funding ever since
venture capital emerged as a notable source of investment funds in the
early 1980s. This would seem logical given that the firm itself,
rather than the venture capital organisation, would know when
investment funds were required. However, venture capital is not a
short term form of finance and cannot be compared with a typical
application for a loan or overdraft from a bank. The venture capital
provider should be investing in the future prosperity of the firm, as
distinct from banks which are concerned with current performance.
Effectively, venture capital organisations fulfil a shareholding role
and, like any other investor, they should carefully research and
select company shares with a view to seeing the investment grow.
Therefore, it seems natural that the financier would get involved in
some form of search process in order to target the firms most likely
to grow. This type of activity could lead to accusations of the
venture capital provider 'skimming the cream' of current investment
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opportunities, rather than being concerned with more marginal
investments. However, the firm does not have to be growing prior to
the venture capital input, merely exhibiting the potential for growth.
The nature of venture capital is such that the investor not only
provides finance, but also takes a 'hands on' role in the running of
the company in order to 'add value' to the investment. The survey
evidence indicates that this is not the approach of the United Kingdom
venture capital industry. Venture capital organisations have tended -
to approach older firms currently exhibiting positive growth levels.
Perhaps the financiers were simply alerting older companies to the
opportunity of venture capital funding and, coincidentally, these
firms were performing well. If this were the case and venture capital
organisations were actively marketing their services, then it might be
expected that the vast majority of firms in the sample should have had
some form of contact with such financiers. Nevertheless, over a
quarter of the entrepreneurs in the sample indicated that they had
neither approached or been approached by venture capital companies at
any stage in the development of the firm.
It has been postulated that the 'hands on' investment style is
required for high technology venture capital investments in
particular. However, evidence indicates that United Kingdom venture
capital organisations generally take a 'hands-off' stance and,
therefore, it is not possible to differentiate them from other
financiers on this point. The tendency towards a 'hands-off' style of
investment may be due to the evolutionary nature of the United Kingdom
venture capital industry. Unlike pioneering individuals in the United
States, venture capitalists in the United Kingdom mostly operate in
captive subsidiaries of existing financial institutions. These
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organisations cannot afford to place an individual industrial
specialist in each investee firm, neither in terms of the time
available nor the cost of managing the investment. A
very small number of respondents in high technology companies
acknowledged that they benefited from the experience of the venture
capital organisation during the phase immediately after start-up.
Again, this could be a result of lessons learned by venture
capitalists from early investment mistakes during the emergence of the
industry. In an attempt to ensure that subsequent investment ventures
did not suffer the same fate as earlier failures, some financiers may
have become more involved with the investee firm during its early
development stages. Nevertheless, a substantial number of venture
capital organisations have chosen the different and, perhaps, easier
option of investing in situations which did not require much
involvement beyond the initial provision of funds. This is also
evident in the level of equity required by financiers as a result of
their investment. Mostly they obtained minority shareholdings, which
meant that they were not required, or did not seek, to participate
actively in the running of the company. This investment strategy
would suit those founders reluctant to relinquish the major share of
their enterprise.
Essentially, United Kingdom venture capital organisations appear to be
looking for rapid, risk-free returns which exceed what they could earn
with more traditional investment instruments. As a result, they
target only 'sure fire' winners and comprehensively 'vet' applications
for funds. However, the waiting period whilst applications are
processed may be critical, a situation that can only become worse if
the required finance is not then forthcoming. Thus, the venture
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capital industry can be criticised for becoming too
'insititutionalised' in relation to the United States example, and too
similar in nature to other available sources of finance. However,
some survey firms considered that venture capital companies had taken
a risk when making their investment, and a number believed they would
no longer be operating without the injection of venture capital funds.
It might be difficult to claim that the venture capital organisations
are fulfilling an 'additional' financial role, since a number of these
firms had not approached other financial sources at this critical
survival stage. This statement notwithstanding, maybe these firms
believed that they would be unable to raise investment capital from
traditional financiers without further collateral. Perhaps the
distinguishing aspect of venture capital funding in the United Kingdom
is that it is investment without collateral. This is a different
lending strategy from that pursued by other financial institutions
which, in general, seek assurance that investment capital will be
repaid in full with interest within a defined time period, even if the
firm collapses.
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Chapter 11
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction to this thesis specified that the principal purpose
of this research was the investigation of the nature of venture
capital provision in the United Kingdom when compared with the United
States example. This approach has resulted in the formulation of a
model of typical United Kingdom venture capital organisation
behaviour. This model, supported by empirical evidence from preceding
chapters, will be presented later in this chapter, followed by a
consideration of the future implications for venture capital practice
and the formulation of policy. Areas for possible future research are
also considered.
It should be noted in interpreting the results of this thesis that
social science research takes place in a dynamic environment and,
consequently, the following conclusions and recommendations are based
upon a discussion of empirical results and theoretical issues within
the framework of economic and political circumstances current at the
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time of completion of this thesis (December 1991). There now follows
a brief overview of the major findings of this study in order to act
as a contextual basis for subsequent sections of this chapter.
11.2 MAJOR FINDINGS
This section contains the major findings of the five preceding
empirical chapters.
11.2.1 Investigation on the main source of start-up capital revealed
that:
The main source of start-up capital for the majority
of survey firms was internal
• The use of external start-up capital has become more
prevalent in recent years
• Externally funded start-ups generally gained access
to larger amounts of finance than internally funded
s tart - ups
• Survey firms did not appear to associate their
particular financial need with a particular type of
capital
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DISCUSSION
Chapter 6 demonstrated that, although the main source of start-up
capital for the majority of survey firms proved to be of internal
origin, an increasing percentage of firms founded since 1960 have
adopted external capital as their main start-up source. One advantage
of externally-sourced finance is the larger amounts of capital that
may be made available to the founder when compared with internal
sources. However, survey firms utilising external capital may be
subjected to unnecessary financial strain because they tend to adopt
unsuitable forms of finance for their requirements; for example, using
overdraft facilities to finance the purchase of fixed assets, and term
loan finance to fund working capital needs (see Chapter 6). There was
little evidence that, having identified the need for external capital,
survey firms made a considered decision on the particular type of
capital required.
11.2.2 Consideration of the process of application for, or offer of,
venture capital funds indicated that:
• Recipients of venture capital funds tended to be
younger survey firms (founded since 1980) which
actively sought investment finance from venture
capital providers
' Older survey firms were more inclined to be
approached by purveyors of venture capital funds, but
were less likely to become recipients
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• It was common for eventual recipients of venture
capital funds initially to be refused this type of
finance from more than one source of venture capital
funds
DISCUSSION
Chapter 10 investigated the market mechanism for the delivery of
venture capital finance to the survey firms; that is, whether venture
capital organisations actively sought investment opportunities, or
whether survey firms initiated contact with the financiers.
Interestingly, age played an important part in the application for, or
offer of, venture capital funds. Older survey firms tended to be
approached by venture capital organisations with a view to becoming
potential recipients. However, these older survey firms were not
inclined to take up the offer of venture capital finance. On the
other hand, many younger survey firms became recipients of venture
capital funds after having sought the finance from several venture
capital sources. In addition, these firms were not put off by initial
refusals to their applications for venture capital funding.
11.2.3 Investigation of the factors involved in attracting venture
capital funds revealed that:
• Firms without formal business plans initially tended
to contact venture capital organisations via an
intermediary, and were largely successful in
obtaining venture capital funds
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• The qualifications and experience of the management
team did not seem to have any bearing on ability to
attract venture capital funding
• Recipients of venture capital funds generally pursued
passive business objectives, displayed a greater
propensity to be 'higher technology' as measured by
R&D inputs, exhibited a higher rate of turnover and
employee growth and displayed a stronger exporting
orientation than their older non-adopting
counterparts
• Firms which were aware that the venture capital
investment involved more than just the injection of
capital tended to be in receipt of venture capital
funds
DISCUSSION
The role the business plan played in attracting venture capital funds
was investigated in Chapter 8 which revealed that this document was
not essential to the receipt of venture capital funds. Intermediaries
played an important role by recommending to venture capital providers
survey firms without business plans as possible investment
opportunities. In addition, Chapter 8 demonstrated that the
experience of the management team did not appear to be the prime
investment criterion applied by venture capital organisations. This
is despite the fact that venture capital organisations state that
management is the most important factor in the investment equation.
Chapter 7 detailed the characteristics of firms in receipt of venture
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capital finance, and these included a strong orientation towards
exporting. This implies that the market criterion might be a more
important factor when venture capitalists are deciding which projects
to finance. Other factors involved in attracting venture capital
organisation interest were identified in Chapter 10. These included
the fact that survey firms demonstrating an awareness of the non-
financial aspects of the venture capital investment, like the
appointment of a non-executive director, tended to be in receipt of
venture capital funds. However, the direction of the cause and effect
in this relationship remained unclear.
11.2.4 An exploration of the adoption of venture capital funds and
its relationship to control of the enterpise revealed that:
• Some companies did not make use of venture capital
funds because they believed this would lead to a
loss of control of their enterprise
• Many survey companies were able to maintain their
independent status where the largest and, in some
cases, majority shareholding was in the hands of
venture capital organisations
• No association was found between receipt of venture
capital funds and whether the main founder was still
employed in the company
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• Venture capital organisations did not always make
their intentions explicit with regard to how the
investment would be realised
DISCUSSION
Chapter 9 considered what effect the perception of ownership and
control of the survey firm would have on the propensity of
entrepreneurs to adopt venture capital funding. Generally,
entrepreneurs who were concerned about ownership and/or control chose
not to adopt venture capital finance. However, this concern appears
unfounded given the evidence that a number of survey firms maintained
their independence even where venture capital organisations owned the
majority shareholding. A potential reason for concern over ownership
and/or control is that venture capital organisations in the United
Kingdom tend to place the emphasis on trade sales rather than
flotations when realising their investments.
11.2.5 A consideration of 'hands-on' management of venture capital
investments suggested that:
• Many venture capital organisations appointed, or
reserved the right to appoint, a director to the
board of management of the investee firm
• These directors intitiated a limited number of
strategic and managerial changes in investee firms
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• There were few perceived benefits by survey firms in
the attempts by venture capital organisations to 'add
value' to their investments
• A number of Scottish survey firms had received
venture capital funds from financiers based in the
South East of England
DISCUSSION
Chapters 9 and 10 investigated the extent of the 'hands-on' contact
between recipient firms and venture capital organisations. Generally,
venture capital organisations believed that non-executive directors
would be able to fulfil the 'hands-on' management role. However,
where these directors were appointed, few survey firms reported that
strategic or management changes resulted from the relationship. Most
survey firms in receipt of venture capital funds stated that the
finance itself was the only advantage of venture capital involvement.
They did not believe that the venture capital organisation, or its
appointed director, brought 'added value' to the investment. The one
advantage of this 'hands-off' role is that venture capital
organisations are able to invest on a remote basis. Indeed, as
Chapter 7 illustrated, a number of venture capital organisations
located in the South East of England had made investments in Scottish-
based firms.
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11.2.6 Investigation of the significance of venture capital funding
led to the observation that:
• Many small young firms believed that the receipt of
venture capital funds was critical to their survival,
and that some venture capital organisations would, as
a result, lose the capital they had invested
DISCUSSION
Despite the evidence that venture capital organisations invest little
more than money and, thus, appear similar to other financial
institutions, Chapter 10 ascertained that they adopt a high risk
profile by investing without taking collaterol. A number of investee
firms believed that the venture capital organisation would make a loss
by investing in them, and that no other financial institution would
have provided investment funds in these circumstances. However, it is
debatable whether venture capital organisations would risk losing
their investments quite so much if they chose to adopted a 'hands-on'
management role.
11.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
In order to discuss the implications of this research for theory, it
is necessary to construct a 'classical' model of venture capital
behaviour. Chapter 4 has already hinted at the form this model should
take based on the example of past venture capital providers in the
United States. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that
modern-day venture capital providers in the United Kingdom and, to a
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certain extent, the United States (see Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.2),
are attempting to reproduce the results of a 'classical' venture
capital model whilst adopting a fundamentally different approach.
This conclusion will seek to argue that such an expectation is
unrealistic, with significant implications for theory, practice and
policy.
11.3.1 The 'classical' model of venture capital behaviour
A typical example of the 'classical' venture capitalist form would be
a successful ex-entrepreneur who invests his own capital in a new
venture which is seeking to exploit the application of a particular
technology. This new company is often founded by an entrepreneur
spinning-off from another company. The venture capitalist invests
capital in return for equity for an indeterminate period of time. The
venture capitalist then becomes actively involved in helping the
business to grow, utilising his own entrepreneurial experience and
business contacts to assist management in the first instance, and
possibly taking full control in the medium term. The investment is
long-term with the venture capitalist only realising a return when the
business becomes a viable prospect for public flotation or trade sale.
The return on investment can be substantial because of the early
involvement of the venture capitalist. The key catalysts for growth
are participation, long-termism, risk and business development. The
venture capitalist is prepared to invest at the risk of not regaining
his original investment. This risk is reduced by the financier
becoming actively involved in the investee company through good times
and bad. There is the possibility that two venture capitalists will
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emerge from the relationship; the original venture capitalist, and the
newly successful entrepreneur who wishes to become involved in future
new technology-related ventures.
11.3.2 The United Kingdom experience of venture capital provision
based on empirical evidence
Venture capital personnel in the United Kingdom and, to a growing
extent, in the United States are financial experts managing mainly
institutional funds. These financial experts typically invest in
existing companies at a later stage in their development when compared
with the lclassicall venture capitalist. The investment takes the
form of part equity, part loan over a fixed period of time. These
fund managers do not become actively involved in the operations of
the investee company, although they may recruit an additional member
to the management team of the company if they feel a particular area
of expertise is lacking. Generally, they appoint a representative to
the board of management, or reserve this right for the future. The
venture capital investor provides the investee firm with a list of
potential business contacts, and the onus is on the investee firm to
pursue the contacts on this list. This form of investment tends to be
short-term for two main reasons; first, the venture capital investor
receives a regular return on the investment in the form of interest
payments on loans or dividends on preference shares; second, these
later-stage investments realise a return more quickly than early-stage
investments. The emphasis for realising the investment is on trade
sales rather than flotations, however, management buy-outs tend to
involve a share buy-back agreement. In this United Kingdom example
the key issues are lack of participation and short-termism, whilst
incurring as little risk as possible in managing the investment fund.
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Such criteria are achieved by investing in later-stage ventures where
there is an experienced management team requiring little management
input by the venture capital organisation, but where the potential for
a substantial return on investment is reduced. Moreover, in the
United Kingdom case, there is little or no possibility of any new
venture capital investor emerging from the relationship.
11.3.3 Critical coimnent on the model adopted by United Kingdom
venture capital organisations
It is clear from the above evidence that the model the United Kingdom
venture capital industry has adopted is diametrically opposed to the
'classical' venture capital model. Table 11.1 itemises certain
components of venture capital investment behaviour in order to
illustrate the critical differences between the 'classical' model and
the United Kingdom reality.
TabL. 11.1 Comparison of the CLassicaL Hod.L of Venturi CapitaL B.haviour and
th. United Kingdom ReaLity
Investor expertis.
Stag. of invoLv.m.nt
Typ. of financ.
Length of investment
Typ. of management
LeveL of risk
Venture capitaList
spin-off
CLassicaL Hod.L
Technical and financiaL
EarLy
Equity
Long term
Hands-on
High
Spawns flaw venture
capitalists
United Kingdom R.atity
FinanciaL
Later-stag.
Combined equity/Loan
Short term
Hands-off
Low
No spin-off venture
capitaLists
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It is not surprising, given the evidence of Table 11.1, that United
Kingdom venture capital organisations have been unable to replicate
the spectacular early investment successes of Digital Equipment
Corporation, Apple Computer, Compaq and so on. In order to produce
the same investment success 'effects' it is necessary to implement the
same basic causal mechanisms such as long term, high risk,
participative investment. Whilst it must be acknowledged that a very
small number of United Kingdom venture capital organisations follow
the 'classical' model of investment behaviour, these 'classical' style
venture capital operations are the 'exception rather than the rule.'
Most United Kingdom venture capital organisations follow the 'United
Kingdom reality' form of Table 11.1. However, there are functional
problems in calling the two phenomena listed in Table 11.1 by a common
name. The implications for policy section of this chapter discusses
these problems and proposes a solution.
One reason for the popular use of the term 'venture capital' might be
an attempt to associate the United Kingdom industry with the
spectacular investment successes of the United States in the 1970s and
early 1980s. However, United Kingdom venture capital organisations
have taken proven 'ingredients' and substituted others for economic
reasons, principally, to satisfy the short-term returns required by
the financial institutions supplying the investment funds to the
industry. These 'ingredients' have also been changed for political
reasons, with a number of high street banks establishing venture
capital subsidiaries in order to address the problem of the 'equity
gap' identified by the Wilson Report. The banks sought to fill this
gap in a structural sense by making small amounts of finance available
to small businesses. Inevitably, however, these captive venture
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capital organisations adopted many of the lending characteristics of
their parent banks, principally, financial experts seeking to minimise
both risk and involvement in investee companies. Therefore, the banks
failed to fill the equity gap in a physical sense. It is paradoxical
that many of the providers of finance to the United Kingdom venture
capital community have become disenchanted recently with the poor
performance of venture capital investments, when these investments
cannot be termed venture capital in the 'classical' sense.
11.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
The following implications for practice specifically focus on the
above empirical model of venture capital behaviour and a number of
research findings directly relevant to the hypotheses posed in Chapter
5 of this thesis. The purpose of this section is to recommend
possible actions to encourage venture capital investors and small high
technology manufacturing firms to establish a productive and mutually
beneficial investment relationship.
The evidence of this thesis is that entrepreneurs frequently do not
access the most appropriate type of capital for their particular need.
This implies that organisations are making use of other, perhaps
short-term, forms of finance when longer-term equity-based venture
capital funds might be more appropriate. Entrepreneurs wishing to
maintain small businesses, or grow within internally-generated means,
should not seek funds from venture capital organisations whose main
objective is to accelerate the growth of investee companies.
Businesses seeking moderate or fast-growth should be more willing to
-276-
concede equity to outside investors since this research has shown that
United Kingdom venture capital providers generally require the largest
or, in some instances, major share of equity. Concern about control
of the enterprise was expressed by a number of company founders in the
United Kingdom, but even where venture capital organisations possessed
the majority shareholding most entrepreneurs maintained that they
operated independent businesses.
The concentration on consumer product/service industries and later-
stage investments means that organisations operating in the United
Kingdom venture capital industry are little differentiated. Later-
stage investments are considered prudent by the venture capital
community which is attempting to safeguard existing capital committed
by their investors, primarily pension funds, and attract additional
investment funds in future. However, the venture capital organisation
seeking phenomenal returns should be looking to invest at an early
stage in the development of a company and, as a result, obtain
investment capital not from institutional investors but from
individuals who are willing to put their own money at risk. Some
early-stage investment successes might encourage more venture capital
organisations to differentiate their services. Currently, there is
some evidence that venture capital providers are attempting to
differentiate their services by targeting quoted companies (Batchelor,
1990e). This investment strategy will further limit the amount of
capital available for small unquoted early-stage ventures. Although
the venture capital industry should be commended for actively seeking
new investment opportunities, questions should be asked as to whether
firms following the quoted company, and the later-stage, investment
option can be termed true venture capital organisations.
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One of the most surprising findings of this thesis is the extent of
venture capital funding in Scottish electronics companies sourced from
financiers in the South East of England. However, this investment on
a remote rather than local basis has been facilitated by the fact that
United Kingdom venture capital organisations tend to pursue a 'hands-
off' investment strategy, which means that frequent contact with the
investee company is not necessary. This is in direct contrast to the
'classical' United States example where 'hands-on' contact is
maintained due to the concentration of venture capitalists around
'hives' of entrepreneurial activity, and the highly integrated
networking process between individual venture capital investors.
Thus, a local venture capitalist can act as lead investor in a
syndicate of more distant investors. Although there is evidence in
this study of networking between United Kingdom venture capital
organisations, it has not evolved to the same extent as the United
States example. Whilst this may be a reflection of the relative youth
of the United Kingdom industry, it seems more reasonable to assume
that the 'hands-off' investment stance releases United Kingdom venture
capital investors from the need to collaborate, thus negating the
opportunity to 'add value' to their investments.
Venture capital providers can argue that a 'hands-off' investment
strategy gives them the opportunity to invest in a larger proportion
of the industrial population. Investing across a number of different
industrial sectors spreads the risk, but it could lead venture capital
personnel to become 'jack of all trades, master of none' so that they
do not have the specialist knowledge to 'add value' to their
investments. Of course, venture capital organisations have an
obligation to their shareholders or parent companies to perform as
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well as they are able, which is the justification for pursuing short-
term returns with multiple investments in popular industrial sectors.
However, until the United Kingdom venture capital industry as a whole
attempts nurturing and 'adding value' to its investments, there is
still the question of whether a smaller number of long term focused
investments will yield a higher overall return. One problem with the
change to a more nurturing investment strategy is the effect this
would have on the perception of control by founding entrepreneurs;
that is, a 'hands-on' role might be considered interfering and a
threat to their control of the enterprise.
Interestingly, this research found that an impediment to the adoption
of venture capital funds by entrepreneurs which had no contact with
venture capital providers was not the issue of control, but rather the
fact that firms preferred to make use of capital from a range of other
financial sources. This implies that the terms and conditions
associated with venture capital funding compare unfavourably with
other financial instruments, and firms which are unable to obtain any
other form of finance may be at a disadvantage in adopting venture
capital funding. However, most firms would rather operate under less
favourable conditions than go out of business, and a number of survey
companies stated that they owed their present existence to the
investment of venture capital funds. This indicates that some venture
capital organisations are prepared to put their money 'at risk,' and
this is what distinguishes venture capital funding from bank finance
in the United Kingdom. Even though banks have become more aware of
their small business customers over the last decade and now offer
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information and assistance as part of their investment package, they
are still constrained by the fact that they require loans to be
secured against business or personal assets.
Unlike the United States, there is no tradition in the United Kingdom
of successful venture capital investments in early-stage high
technology ventures. The United Kingdom needs some successful
examples of United States-style early stage investments, with the
emphasis on 'hands-on' management and adding value through good times
and bad, in order to convince the venture capital industry that they
are worthwhile. Given the example of the United States in the 1970s
(see Chapter 4, Subsection 4.2.1), the present recession may force
venture capital organisations to maintain their investments and work
with investee companies until times are better and significant returns
can be achieved. However, there may not be enough venture capital
organisations currently holding on to, and working with, their early-
stage high technology investments in order to have a chance of any
showing significant returns within the next five to ten years.
Perhaps what is required to change this situation is some sort of
paradigm disruption. For example, a sudden upsurge in 'business
angel' activity may encourage a sudden upsurge in 'classical' style
venture capital activity. If the 'business angel' community, either
in the United States or the United Kingdom, demonstrates some initial
investment successes this might encourage United Kingdom venture
capital organisations to invest more actively in early-stage ventures.
This prognosis is not unreasonable, given the fact that United Kingdom
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high street banks became newly interested in small firms, and renewed
their interest in venture capitalism, as a result of competition from
the emerging venture capital industry.
11.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
It would appear that the government is playing a decreasing direct
role in the development of important high technology industrial
sectors. Specifically, the operations of the public sector
organisations and initiatives formed to provide, in effect, venture
capital funds gradually have been reduced in effectiveness over the
last ten years. This strategy would not be out of place if the
private sector and, in particular, the venture capital industry filled
the role of providing risk capital for innovative projects involving
new and growing small high technology companies. However, the fact
remains that the costs
	
risks of providing finance to small firms
are higher than for larger enterprises, regardless of the source of
the capital. The nature of a free market dictates that more marginal
investment projects will be neglected in favour of opportunities
involving less risk which, in turn, provide a better chance of
achieving a quick return on the capital invested. This has resulted
in the United Kingdom venture capital industry concentrating on later-
stage investments rather than considering the more risk-bearing seed
capital and start-up projects. Moreover, the recent development to
provide venture capital funds to smaller quoted firms whose shares are
traded on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM) or the full stock
market looks like diverting much needed investment capital away from
unquoted companies. This modification is in direct contravention to
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the findings of the Macmillan, Radcliffe, Bolton and Wilson Reports,
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, which recommended the promotion of
sources of equity finance for unquoted companies.
The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) has called for the
government to play an increasing role in the funding of company start-
ups, since these investments are not particularly favoured by the
venture capital community:
"The BVCA is concerned at the lack of funds available
for start-up early stage companies. It has set up a
committee which, as part of its role, needs to
persuade the Government to rethink its approach to
start-up capitals. Many people now appreciate the
difference between venture capital (start-up or near
start-up situations) and development capital (which
all too often now just means management buy-outs!)
As the BVCA statistics show, less money is being put
into start-up situations and it is this area into
which Government assistance should be channelled,"
(Dodwell, 1989, p6).
Government bodies could interact with the private venture capital
sector, picking up marginal investments which are worthwhile in terms
of future economic development and then passing these projects on at a
later stage when they become of commercial interest to the private
sector. John Laydon of the Scottish Development Agency, or Scottish
Enterprise as it is now known, approached this argument from a
different angle, hinting at the role venture capital providers might
play in bridging the gap between the public and private sectors (see
Figure 11.1). Thus, venture capital organisations should be looking
to invest in opportunities before they become obvious candidates for
more traditional sources of finance, like bank funding or public share
issues.
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Flgur. 11.1 PubLic/privat. sector investment bridg.
The Brdcie	 (Tb. Archi
PUBLIC SECTOR 4	 PRIVATE SECTOR
Vsntur.	 capitaL
SDA	 I	 I	 I	 Banks
ov.rr•nt
	
Oth.r L.nd.rs
Entr.pr.n.urs
Source: Laydon (1988)
However, too much emphasis on short-term 'hands-off' later-stage deals
has led to accusations that there are only about ten to twelve true
venture capital organisations operating in the United Kingdom; that
is, companies which are prepared to invest in the form of pure equity
and participate extensively in high-risk investee companies.
Investments in quoted companies will surely lead to further
allegations that venture capital institutions are losing sight of the
venturing objective. The British Venture Capital Association has been
an active player in convincing members of the benefits of investing on
a more geographical basis, therefore, there may be scope for the
British Venture Capital Association liaising with the government to
ensure that true, or 'classical' style, venture capitalism is not lost
to the operations of the free market. This might entail the
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reorganisation of the United Kingdom venture capital industry to
better distinguish between true venture capitalists and organisations
more concerned with the provision of later-stage development capital.
True venture capital providers are able to play a unique role in
relation to other financial services. Although the terms and
conditions of venture capital finance may not always compare
favourably with these other forms of finance, the investment can be
sold on the basis that it combines unsecured long-term capital with
expertise in the form of an individual who will work with the
entrepreneur to add value to the company for their mutual benefit.
What is required are a larger number of small specialist venture
capital operations run by people with industrial and financial
expertise according to the 'classical' model. This would be
preferable to the current small number of general venture capital
companies operated mainly by financial experts who attempt to spread
their investment attention too thinly and which have become,
essentially, investment houses by another name. In addition, venture
capital organisations should become more involved in marketing their
services and identifying potential recipient firms.
In more general financial terms, there might be scope for extending
the recent government study on bank lending practices and small firms
in order to evaluate the overall financial provision for this
important sector of industry given the recent expansion in numbers of
small businesses. Such an investigation is appropriate at this point
in time, since many companies will have been encouraged to borrow to
their limit during the boom years only to be hit by high interest
rates during the present recession. The increased reliance on private
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sector monies during the enterprise years of the 1980s can only have
served to exacerbate the financial problems of a number of small firms
which, instead, might have received non-repayable government funds in
the past. Therefore, the proposed government study should determine
what current mechanisms are in place in both the public and private
sectors to limit the financial difficulties of small companies which,
perhaps through no fault of their own, find themselves on the brink of
bankruptcy.
11.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A 'snapshot study' of such a fluid topic of interest has its
limitations and so it would be enlightening to conduct a follow-up
survey of the firms involved in this research. Such an investigation
would allow a picture to be formed of the movement of venture capital
funds within the high technology study industry. Non-adopters may
have become recipients in the meantime and existing investments may
have matured or even failed. A follow-up study would also offer the
opportunity to observe how the companies have weathered the recession
and whether their relationship with venture capital providers has been
affected as a result. Of course, the investigation should take
account of the position of venture capital organisations during the
economic downturn.
It would also be useful to study some high technology companies in
greater detail in order to observe their interaction with financiers
in general, and venture capital organisations in particular. It might
be possible to monitor the entire venture capital investment process,
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from the initial application for venture capital funds to the exit at
the end of the investment period. This would involve regular in-depth
qualitative interviews with investee and investor companies over a
protracted period of time, and could add insight to the relationship
between the two parties.
A further area of future research could involve studying business
angel activity in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Given the convergence in investment strategies by the venture capital
industries in both countries, it would be interesting to monitor the
investment activity of business angels in this respect. In addition,
the study could determine whether the business angels of today are the
original venture capitalists of yesterday. It is most likely the case
that these informal investors have always been around, but the
institutionalisation of venture capital activity adulterated the
original concept of venture capitalism. Therefore, the term 'business
angel' was adopted to differentiate traditional venture capital
investments from institutionalised venture capital activity.
Given that this thesis has recommended more emphasis on 'hands-on'
venture capitalism, this could have implications for the growing
number of cross-border venture capital investments; that is,
investments made in one country by a venture capital organisation
located in another country. It would be interesting to investigate
whether cross-border investors actively involve themselves with their
investee companies. The financiers might instal specialists in
several countries and attempt to make this worthwhile by financing a
reasonable number of companies in each, or they could establish a
networking process with a number of like-minded venture capital
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organisations in countries of interest. Research into this area,
however, may find that venture capital organisations involved in
cross-border investments concentrate on 'hands-off' later-stage deals
to limit the need for personal contact and collaboration between
financiers.
Finally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the performance of
different types of venture capital providers in the United Kingdom.
This involves identifying and selecting venture capital institutions
which pursue fundamentally different investment strategies. For
example, venture capital organisations which invest patient money and
expertise in new or almost new ventures; venture capital organisations
which advance capital and little else to more mature companies over
the short term; and venture capital funds which focus their attention
on the quoted investment sector. Thus, it might be possible to
evaluate the relative success of the above three investment strategies
in order to determine which constitutes 'best practice. ' It is
anticipated that the results of such a study would build on the
findings of this thesis, and could have significant implications for
the future development of policies aimed at ensuring an optimum and
effective United Kingdom venture capital industry.
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Appendix 1
COMPARISON OF THE THREE FINANCIAL MARKETS
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COMPARISON OF THE THREE FINANCIAL MARKETS
ISE markets: comparison of levels of entry
Official List	 USM	 Third Market
Minimum	 £700,000 for equities No minimum	 No minimum
market	 (but normally sponsors
capitalisation	 look for companies
over £10 million for
market liquidity and
cost reasons)
Minimum	 3 years	 2 years	 Usually 1 year
trading record
Annual	 No minimum but
	
No minimum but No minimum
turnover of	 sponsors normally	 normally over
company	 look for £10 million	 £500,000
Minimum	 25%	 10%	 No minimum
percentage of
shares which
must be
publicly held
Latest audited Within six months	 Within nine	 Usually within
results in	 months	 nine months
prospectus	 unless a
greenfield
company
Threshold	 15% of the assets	 25% of the	 No threshold
percentage for	 or profit before	 assets or	 but
circulars to
	 taxation or equity	 profit before recommended
shareholders	 being issued	 taxation or	 at 25%
on	 equity being
acquisitions	 issued
and disposals
after
flotation
Publicity	 One formal notice	 One formal	 One formal
requirements:	 in a national daily	 notice in a	 notice in a
introductions	 newspaper and	 daily	 daily
and placings	 circulation of	 newspaper and newspaper and
listing particulars	 circulation of circulation
in the Extel	 prospectus in of prospectus
Statistical Services 	 the Extel	 in the Extel
Statistical	 Statistical
Services	 Services
Publicity	 Listing particulars 	 One formal	 One formal
requirements:	 to be published in
	
notice in a
	 notice in a
offers for sale two national daily	 daily	 daily
newspapers and	 newspaper	 newspaper
circulated in the
Extel Statistical
Services
Lource: ISE (1988/89)	
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Appendix 2
ASSISTED AREAS FROM 1978 ONWARDS
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REGIONAL POLICY
	
0
'Assisted Areas'
1978
A
Special development areas
Development areas
Intermediate areas
Source: Law (1980)
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REGIONAL POLICY
'Assisted Areas'
1982 - 1984
Special development areas
Development areas
Intermediate areas
Source: Townsend (1987)
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dO..
Development areas
Intermediate areas
A
REGIONAL POLICY
	 0
'Assisted Areas'
1984 -
Source: Townsend (1987)
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Appendix 3
THE PERSONAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
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THE I1PACT OF vENTURE CAPITAL ON SHALL
HIGH TECHNOLOGY HANUFACTURING FIRXS
CODE NO.
Name of firm:
Address:
Sort of site:
Telephone no:
Name of contact:
Positionof contact: ____________________________________
Date of interview:
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1 ORIGINS OF TKE FIRM
1 In what year was this firm founded?
2 What was the main trigger for the establishment of this firm?
3 How many people were involved in the founding of this company?
4 Did the main founder have any formal academic qualifications at
the time of founding?
1 - no
2 - yes	 Highest qualification held at founding _____________
5 Does the main founder still work for this firm?
1 - no
2 - yes	 Position currently held _____________________________
6 Before the establishment of this venture, was the principal
founder
1 - employed by someone?
2 - self-employed?
3 - unemployed?
	
GO TO Q.9
4 - a student?
	
GO TO Q.9
7 Prior to beginning this firm, did the main founder work in
the same area of business?
1 - yes
2 - no
-1-
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8 Please give details of the main founder's previous business
and the position held:
9 Was the main previous work experience of the principal founder
in:
1 - business management expertise?
2 - technical expertise?
3 - both of the above?
4 - other?
10 Upon the establishment of this firm, what percentage share of
ownership was held by the main founder?
11 At the time of founding, what were the main business goals of
this firm?
-2-
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2 ACQUIRED OR INDEPENDENT?
12 Since formation, has this firm been acquired by another
company, or does it remain totally independent? (Totally
independent means effective control of this firm is held by
the Board of Directors on this site).
1 - acquired
2 - independent	 GO TO SECTION 3
13 In what year was this firm acquired?
14 Please indicate the main reason for the acquisition. (Please
include main attitudes of both acquiring and acquired firms).
a) ACQUIRED
b) ACQUIRER
15 Please give name and location of parent company:
Name
Location
16 Please give the parent company's percentage share of this
firm's total equity:
EXACT %
1 - 51-74 ______________
2 - 75-99 ______________
3 - 100
17 Where are financial decisions concerning this firm primarily
made?
1 - this firm
2 - parent company
-3-
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3 CKARACTXRISTICS OF THE FIRM
18 Is this company:
1 - expanding rapidly?
2 - expanding steadily?
3 - static?
4 - declining?
19 What functions are the Board members, who are also full-time
employees, responsible for in this firm?
FUNCTIONS
20 Who has the largest shareholding in this firm?
MIOUNT
21 Bow many people are involved in the management team of this
firm?
22 Bow many of the firm's current management team have been
involved in the management of
(A) other firms in the same industry?	 _______
(B) other firms in dissimilar industries?	 ________
23 What is the main product of this firm (ie the product which
contributed most to turnover in the last financial year)?
-4-
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24 Was this product
1 - developed through 'in house' R & D?
2 - obtained from an external source? 	 Form of the
technologytransfer? ________________________
25 Where are your customers predominantly located?
26 Could you estimate the percentage of sales dispatched to
1 - private industry?	 _______
2 - the government sector? 	 _______
3 - the final consumer market? 	 _______
27 Which of the following categories would you say your firm's
main product (as described in Q.23) falls into?
1 - an imitation of a product already
available on the market
2 - an improvement to an existing
product manufactured by this firm
3 - a totally new product previously
unavailable on the market
28 What was the main reason for the development of this type of
product innovation?
-5-
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29 What degree of risk to your firm would you attach to the
following strategies (on a scale of 1 to 5)?
SCALE
1=1,0W to 5=HIGH
1 - an imitation of a product
already available on the market 	 ___________
2 - an improvement to an existing
product produced by this firm	 ___________
3 - a totally new product previously
unavailable on the market	 ___________
Comments:
30 Has the company ever seriously considered a new product
innovation and not proceeded with it?
1-no	 GOTOSECTION4
2 - yes	 Please give details ________________________________
31 What was (were) the main reason(s) for not proceeding with
this product innovation?
32 Has another firm subsequently developed a product innovation
of similar specification (to that mentioned in Q.30) to
perform a similar function?
1 - no
2 - yes Please give details _________________________________
-6-
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4 TEE PERFORMANCE OF TEE FIRM
33 Can you estimate the gross annual turnover of this firm for
the last full financial year and, where applicable, for 1984
(please indicate a loss in brackets):
198 /8
	
EXACT FIGURE
1 - 1-19K ______________
2 - 20-49K _____________
3 - 50-99K _____________
4 - 100-499K _____________
5 - 0.5-iN ___________
6- 1N+
1984	 EXACT FIGURE
1 - 1-19K _____________
2 - 20-49K ______________
3 - 50-99K _____________
4 - 100-499K _____________
5 - 0.5-1X ____________
6- 1N+
34 Can you indicate the firm's declared profit (or loss in brackets)
for the last full financial year and, where applicable, for 1984:
198 /8
	
EXACT FIGURE
1 - 1-19K _____________
2 - 20-49K _____________
3 - 50-99K _____________
4 - 100-499K _____________
5 - 0.5-iN ____________
6- 1N+ _______
1984	 EXACT FIGURE
1 - 1-19K _____________
2 - 20-49K _____________
3 - 50-99K ______________
4 - 100-499K _____________
5 - 0.5-iN ____________
6- 1N+
35 Can you estimate how much the firm spent on research and
development for the last full financial year and, where
applicable, for 1984:
198 /8
	 EXACT FIGURE	 1984	 EXACT FIGURE
1 - nothing _____________
2 - 1-19K _____________
3 - 20-49K _____________
4 - 50-99K _____________
5 - 100-499K _____________
6 - 0.5-iN ____________
•7-	 1N+
1 - nothing ____________
2 - 1-19K _____________
3 - 20-49K _____________
4 - 50-99K _____________
5 - 100-499K _____________
6 - 0.5-iN ____________
7- 1N+
36 How many people were employed in this firm in:
(A) - 198 /8 ?
(B) - 1984 (if applicable)?
37 How many employees were directly involved with research
and development in:
(A) - 198 /8 ?
(B) - 1984 (if applicable)?
-.7-
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38 Row much did the firm export as a percentage of its total
output in:
(A) - 198 /8 ?
(B) - 1984 (if applicable)?
39 What was the firm's debt to equity ratio in:
(A) - 198 /8 ?	 _______________
(B) - 1984 (if applicable)?	 _____________
40 What was the firm's return on investment ratio in:
(A) - 198 /8 ?
(B) - 1984 (if applicable)?
41 What was (were) the main constraint(s) to the firm's growth
in:
(A) 198 /8 ?
(B) 1984 (if applicable)?
-8-
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5 THE BUSINESS PLAN
42 Does the firm have a formal business plan?
1 - yes
2-no	 GOTOSECTION6
43 When was the business plan formulated?
44 For what specific purpose was it formulated?
45 Who in the firm was (were) responsible for its formulation
(positions/functions in the firm)?
46 During the plan's formulation, was any help sought from
professionals outside this firm?
1 - yes
2-no	 GOTOQ.49
47 What type of professionals help did your firm access?
48 Were these professionals asked for their help at the outset of
the business plan's formulation?
1 - yes
2 - no	 Please give details _____________________________
-9-
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49 Was the plan ever redraf ted?
1 - yes
2-no	 GOTOQ.51
50 What prompted the redraft of the business plan?
51 Has the plan been of value to the business?
1 - yes In what way(s)? _________________________________
2-no Whynot? _____________________________
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6 TBE IKPACT OF Vl(TUXE CAPITAL ON THE TARGET SECTOR
52 Bas your firm ever contacted or been contacted by a venture
capitalist?
1 - yes
2 - no	 GO TO SECTION 6(D)
53 On these occasions who made the initial contact?
1 - your firm	 CODE A
2 - the venture capitalist(s)	 CODE B
3 - both of the above	 CODE C
54 BC In what year did the venture capitalist(s) first approach
your firm?
55 BC What stage of growth was the firm at when the venture
capitalist(s) first approached your firm?
eg * concept generation stage
* business recently formed
* business expanding rapidly/steadily
* business declining
56 BC Bow many venture capital organisations have approached your
firm?
57 BC With regard to the most valuable encounter, how did the
venture capitalist find out about your firm?
58 BC How did this venture capitalist first contact your firm?
59 BC Why do you consider this to be the most valuable encounter?
(NB: with the venture capitalist initiating the contact.)
-11-
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60 AC In what year did you first approach the venture
capitalist (s)?
61 AC What stage of growth had you firm reached when you first
approached the venture capitalist(s)?
eg * concept generation stage
* business recently formed
* business expanding rapidly/steadily
* business declining
62 AC With regard to the most valuable encounter, how did your
firm find out about the venture capitalist?
63 AC Row did your firm first contact this venture capitalist?
64 AC Why do you consider this to be the most valuable encounter?
(NB: with the firm initiating the contact.)
65 AC Bow many venture capitalists did the firm approach in
total?
1 - one?	 GO TO Q.68
2 - two or more? ____________
66 AC Why did the firm approach this number of
venture capitalists?
67 AC Was anything done to modify the proposed business
venture/idea between the approach to one venture capitalist
and the next?
1 - no
2 - yes	 Please give details _____________________________
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68 AC Did the firm approach the venture capitalist(s):
2. - before looking for finance from other sources?
2 - whilst looking for finance from other sources?
3 - after looking for finance from other sources?
69 Where was (were) the venture capitalist(s) that had contact
with your firm ( predominantly) located?
70 What type of venture capitalist(s) approached (or were
approached by) the firm (if known)?
eg * private individual
* independent venture capital fund
* Business Expansion Scheme fund
* captive subsidiary of a financial institution
* general/specialist fund
71 What did your firm believe would result from the venture
capitalist's involvement?
72 Is your firm one which:
1 - has received (or is receiving)
venture capital finance?
2 - has been refused venture
capital finance?	 GO TO Q.74
3 - has decided not to make use of
venture capital finance?
73 Has the firm ever been refused venture capital finance?
1 - yes
2 - no	 GO TO END OF SECTION
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74 What uiain reason(s) were given for the refusal of venture
capital finance?
75 What did the firni do about this (these) refusal(s)?
76 Did the fin ever re-approach the venture capitalist(s) who
first refused funds?
1 - no
2 - yes What was the outconie? _____________________________
NB TEE FOLLOWING SECTIONS APPLY TO TEE FOJ.1LOWING FIRMS
6(A) FIRMS RECEivii.G ViNTLJRE CAPITAL FINANCE
6(B) FIRMS RXFUSED VTUKE CAPITAL FINANCE
6(C) FIRMS VEICE RAVE BAD CONTACT WITH VNTUXE
CAPITALISTS AND DECIDED NOT TO USE SUCE FINANCE
6(D) FIRMS WEICE RAVE RAD NO CONTACT WITH VXNTURE
CAPITALISTS
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(6(1) FIRIS RZCEIVING VXtTURE CAPITAL FINANCE
6(A) TERN S OF TB! INVESTMENT
77 Have you received more than one injection of venture capital
finance during the life of this firm?
NUMBER
1 - yes	 ________
2 - no	 GO TO Q.91 (IGNORE UNDERLINED WORDS)
78 Please give the approximate date of the most important
injection of venture capital received by the firm:
79 Why did you consider this to be the most important injection
of venture capital finance?
80 Approximately bow soon after the initial application was this
most important injection of venture capital finance received?
81 Can you indicate how much was received from the venture
capitalist in this most important injection of finance?
EXACT FIGURE
	
EXACT FIGURE
1 -	 1-50K
2 - 51-150K
3 - 151-250K
4 - 251-350K
5 - 351-450K
6 - 451-550K
7 - 551-650K
8 - 651-750K
9 - 751-850K
10 - 851-950K
11 - 950K+
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82 What was the method of investment for this most important
injection of venture capital?
1 - debt only
2 - equity only (Type ____________________________________
3 - mixture of debt and equity
_________% debt
_________% equity (Type _____________________________
4 - other
83 What was the intended use of this most important venture
capital funding?
84 Was this investment critical to your firm's survival?
1 - no
2 - yes	 For what main reason?
85 Was this a syndicated investment by a number of venture
capitalists?
NTJXBER
1 - yes	 ___________
2 - no
86 Where was (were) the venture capitalist(s) that supplied this
most important injection of finance located?
87 What type(s) of venture capitalist(s) supplied this most
important injection of finance (if known)?
eg * private individual
* independent venture capital fund
* Business Expansion Scheme fund
* captive subsidiary of a financial institution
* general/specialist fund
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88 Has this most important finance been provided on a stage by
stage basis?
1 - no
2 - yes	 On what terms? ________________________________
89	 Is there the opportunity to go back to the venture
capitalist(s) for more finance if required?
1. - yes
2 - no
Comments:
90 Was this most important injection of venture capital finance
also the most recent?
1 - yes	 GO TO SECTION 6(A)
2 - no
91 Please give the approximate date of this most recent injection
of venture capital received by the firm:
92 Approximately how soon after the initial application was this
most recent injection of venture capital finance received?
93 Can you indicate how much finance was received during this
most recent transaction with the venture capitalist?
EXACT FIGURE
	
EXACT FIGURE
1 -	 1-50K
2 - 51-150K
3 - 151-250K
4 - 251-350K
5 - 351-450K
6 - 451-550K
______________	 7 - 551-650K ______________
______________	
8 - 651-750K ______________
_____________	 9 - 751-850K _____________
______________	
10 - 851-950K ______________
_____________	
11 - 950K+	 _____________
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94 What was the method of investment for this most recent
injection of venture capital?
1 - debt only
2 - equity only (Type ___________________________________
3 - mixture of debt and equity
_________% debt
_________% equity (Type _______________________________
4 - other
95 What was the intended use of this most recent venture capital
funding?
96 Was this investment critical to your firm's survival?
1 - no
2 - yes For what main reason?
97 Was this a syndicated investment by a number of venture
capitalists?
NU1BER
1 - yes
2 - no
98 Where was (were) the venture capitalist(s) that supplied this
recent injection of finance located?
99 What type(s) of venture capitalist(s) supplied this most
recent injection of finance (if known)?
eg * private individual
* independent venture capital fund
* Business Expansion Scheme fund
* captive subsidiary of a financial institution
* general/specialist fund
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100 Bas this most recent finance been provided on a stage by
stage basis?
1 - no
2 - yes	 On what terms?
101 Is there the opportunity to go back to the venture
capitalist(s) for more finance if required?
1 - yes
2 - no
Comments:
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6(A) cont'd CONTROLS EXERTED BY THE VENTURE CAPITALIST
NB EXPI1ANATION FOR THOSE FIRNS WITH NORE TKA.N ONE INJECTION
OF VM(TUR.E CAPITAL FINANCE:
"The following questions apply to the 'ost important
injection of venture capital finance for the fin"
102 What percentage of equity has been taken by the venture
capitalist (syndicate)?
103 At the time of the initial investment, did the venture
capitalist (syndicate) state the return he (it) was
expecting?
AMOUNT FOR EACH TYPE OF DEBT/EQUITY
1 - yes
2 - no	 GO TO Q.105
104 Has the expected return on investment changed during the
period of the venture capitalist's (syndicate's) involvement?
1 - no
2 - yes	 Please give details ___________________________
105 Has the venture capitalist (syndicate) stated the time period
of this investment?
TIME PERIOD
1 - yes	 ____________
2 - no	 GO TO Q.107
106 Has this the length of this time period changed during the
life of the investment?
1 - no
2 - yes	 Please give details ____________________________
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107 Has the venture capitalist (syndicate) discussed the nature
of the disinvestment?
NATURE OF DISINVESTMENT
1 - yes
2 - no
108 Does the venture capitalist (syndicate) have a seat on the
board?
1 - yes
2 - no
109 What kind of role does the venture capitalist (syndicate)
play in the running of the firm?
1 - active with ongoing contact
2 - responsive with contact only when requested
3 - responsive with contact mostly in times of trouble
3 - passive with very little contact
Comments:
110 What controls have been exerted (or imposed on the firm) by
the venture capitalist (syndicate)?
111 Do you think the venture capitalist (syndicate) took a risk
in investing in your firm?
1 - yes
2 - no
Comments:
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6(1) cont 'd ADDED YALU
112 What general managerial assistance has the venture capitalist
(syndicate) contributed to the firm?
113 Bas there been a change in business orientation/strategy
during the venture capitalist's (syndicate's) involvement
with the firm?
1 - no	 GO TO Q.115
2 - yes	 For what purpose? _________________________________
114 Was this change in business orientation/strategy prompted by
the venture capitalist (syndicate)?
1 - yes
2 - no
115 Eas there been a change in leadership/management during the
venture capitalist's (syndicate's) involvement with the firm?
1-no	 GOTOQ.117
2 - yes	 For what purpose? ________________________________
116 Was this change in leadership/management prompted by the
venture capitalist (syndicate)?
1 - yes
2 - no
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117 Has the venture capitalist (syndicate) ever introduced the
firm to his (its) business contacts?
2. - no	 GO TO Q.119
2 - yes	 Who were these contacts? _________________________
118 What resulted from this (these) introduction(s)?
119 In financial terms, what has been the main advantage of the
firm's involvement with venture capital and venture
capitalists?
120 In financial terms, what has been the main disadvantage of
the firm's involvement with venture capital and venture
capitalists?
121 In non-financial terms, what has been the main advantage of
the firm's involvement with venture capital and venture
capitalists?
122 In non-financial terms, what has been the main disadvantage
of the firm's involvement with venture capital and venture
capitalists?
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123 Do you think that the firn is in a better position now than
it would have been if it had not obtained venture capital
finance?
2. - yes	 In what way(s)? _______________________________
_______________________________ GO TO SECTION 7
2-no	 Whynot? ___________________________
GO TO SECTION 7
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(B) FIRMS REFUSED VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCE ALTOGETHER
6(B) FIRMS REFUSED vrruxE CAPITAL FINANCE
124 Can you indicate how much finance was sought when you 	 t
had contact with the venture capitalist?
EXACT FIGURE
1 - less than £50,000
	 _____________
2 - £50,000 - £100,000
	 ____________
3 - £100,001 - £250,000
	 ____________
4 - £250,001 - £500,000
	 ____________
5 - £500,001 - £750,000
	 ____________
6 - £750,001 - £1,000,000
	 ____________
7 - more than £1,000,000	 ____________
125 Where was this venture capitalist located?
126 From where did the firm get the required finance after the
venture capitalist's last refusal?
127 Do you think that your firm's area of business would be
attractive for venture capital funding?
1 - yes	 In what way(s)? _____________________________
2-no	 Whynot? ___________________________
128 Do you think that the firm would be in a better position than
it is now if it had obtained venture capital finance?
1 - yes	 In what way(s)? ______________________________
2-no	 Whynot?
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129 Do you believe that the venture capitalist(s) would have
been taking a risk in investing in your firm?
- yes
- no
Comments:
GO TO SECTION 7
-26-
-321-
; (C) FIRES WHICH RAVE HAD CONTACT WITH VLKTLJRE
CAPITALISTS AND DECIDKD NOT TO USE vruxE
CAPITAL FINANCE
6(C) FIRNS WHICH DECIDED NOT TO USE VNTU)E CAPITAL FINANCE
130 Has the firm ever considered making use of venture capital
finance?
1 - yes	 What caused the firm to change its mind?
2 - no	 What was (were) the firm's reason(s) for not
wanting venture capital finance?
131 Do you think that your firm's area of business would be
attractive for venture capital funding?
1 - yes	 In what way(s)? ______________________________
2-no	 Whynot? __________________________
132 Do you think that the firm would be in a better position than
it is now if had obtained venture capital finance?
1 - yes	 In what way(s)? ______________________________
2 - no	 Why not?
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5(D) FIRMS WHICH RAVE HAD NO CONTACT WITH vruxE
CAPITALISTS
6(D) FIRMS WHICH HAVE HAD NO CONTACT wiTH VNTUKE CAPITALISTS
133 Has the firm ever heard of venture capital?
1-no	 GOTOSECTION7
2 - yes	 From where? _____________________________________
134 Has the firm ever considered making use of venture capital
finance?
1 - yes	 What caused the firm to change its mind?
2 - no	 What was (were) the firm's reason(s) for not
wanting venture capital finance?
135 Do you think that your firm's area of business would be
attractive for venture capital funding?
1 - yes	 In what way(s)? ______________________________
2-no	 Whynot? ___________________________
136 Do you think that the firm would be in a better position than
it is now if it had obtained venture capital finance?
1 - yes	 In what way(s)? ______________________________
2-no	 Whynot? __________________________
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7 SOURCES OF START-UP AND FURThER FINANCE
137 Can you estimate how much capital was required to start-up
this firm?
EXACT FIGURE
	
EXACT FIGURE
1 - 1-24K
2 - 25-49K
3 - 50-74K
4 - 75-99K
5 - 100-249K
6 - 250-499K
- 500-749K
8 - 750-999K
9-	 1)1+
138 Was the main source of start-up finance obtained from
sources:
1 - internal to the firm? 	 Please give details: __________
GO TO Q.143
2 - external to the firm? 	 Please give details:
139 Did the major source of start-up finance require a business
plan?
1 - yes
2 - no
140 What were the main terms or conditions placed on the
investment by the major source of start-up finance?
141 How did the firm find out about the source which provided the
majority of this start-up finance?
142 How was contact established with the source which provided
the majority of this start-up finance?
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143 Since start-up, has the firm ever applied for substantial
financial support from sources external to the firm
(excluding venture capital, and bank overdrafts and loans of
less than £10,000)?
1-no	 GOTOSECTION8
2 - yes	 Please give details:
144 What mainly triggered the realisation that the firm required
its first injection of post start-up external finance ?
eg * cashf low problems
* need to invest in new machinery
* need to move to new premises
* need for R & D expenditure
145 Can you estimate how much finance was required at this
initial stage of seeking substantial financial support after
start-up (excluding venture capital, and bank overdrafts and
loans of less than £10,000)?
EXACT FIGURE
1 -	 1-24K
2 - 25-49K
3 - 50-74K
4 - 75-99K
5 - 100-249K
EXACT FIGURE
6 - 250-499K
7 - 500-749K
8 - 750-999K
9-	 1}+
146 Did the major source supplying this initial injection of
substantial external finance require a business plan?
1 - yes
2 - no
147 What were the main terms or conditions placed on the
investment by the major source of this initial injection of
substantial external finance?
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148 How did the firm find out about the source which provided the
majority of this initial substantial external finance?
149 How was contact established with the source(s) which provided
the majority of this initial substantial external finance?
150 Was the firm's first substantial injection of external
finance also the larg-est injection of external finance to
date (excluding venture capital, and bank overdrafts and
loans of less than £10,000)?
1 - yes	 GO TO SECTIOR 8
2 - no	 Please give details
151 For this large injection of external finance, what mainly
triggered the realisation that it was required?
eg * cashflow problems?
* need to invest in new machinery?
* need to move to new premises?
* need for R & D expenditure?
152 Can you estimate the amount of external finance required by
the firm to fund the above?
EXACT FIGURE
1 -	 1-24K
2 - 25-49K
3 - 50-74K
4 - 75-99K
5 - 100-249K
EXACT FIGURE
6 - 250-499K
7 - 500-749K
8 - 750-999K
9-	 1x+
153 Did the major source supplying this large injection of
external finance require a business plan?
1 - yes
2 - no
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154 What were the main terms or conditions placed on the
investment by the major source of this large injection of
external finance?
155	 ow did the firm find out about the source which provided the
majority of this lar ge inj ection of finance?
156 Row was contact established with the source which provided
the majority of this large injection of finance?
-32-
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8 CONCLUSION - GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
157 Have you any general comment on the firm's experiences in
raising funds at the various stages of its growth?
158 Have you any general comment on the firm's experiences (or
lack of experience) with the venture capital industry?
159 Do you have any suggestions for improving the availability
of:
(A) bank finance?
(B) govt/quasi-govt finance? _________________________________
(C) venture capital finance? _________________________________
160 What policy measure related to finance might be adopted to
facilitate the growth of firms in the high technology
industrial sector?
NB	 ALLOWED TO SEE A COPY OF THE BUSINESS PLAN:	 YES	 NO
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP
-33-
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Appendix 4
VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANISATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
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VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANISATION INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
What is the main focus of your firm's current investment strategy;
and why?
- attractive industries?
- investment stage?
- size of investment?
- financing package?
- length of investment?
- return on investment?
2 Where do high technology investments fit into this strategy; and
why?
- size of investment?
- particular problems (e.g. high risk)?
- existing versus pioneering technologies?
- comparison with other investments?
- future high technology focus?
3 When deciding whether to invest in a firm, is the location of the
potential investee an important factor; and, if so, why?
- monitoring problems?
- local network of contacts?
- particular local expertise?
- mobilise finance more quickly (time from contact until
investment)?
- cost variations in the provision of finance across regions?
4 What criteria does you company employ when selecting investees
(risk evaluation/reduction); and why these particular criteria?
- nature of initial contact?
- business proposals received; reviewed; received finance?
- analysis of business proposal (product, management team, market
niche)?
- further investigations (other criteria)?
5	 How does your firm monitor its investments (risk management); and
why are these particular methods employed?
- seat on board?
- role played in day-to-day operations?
- consultation requirements?
- reporting requirements?
- ratchet investment mechanisms?
- other controls?
6 What does your organisation offer the investee in terms of added
value; and why?
- venture capital network?
- syndication?
- business contacts?
- staff recruitment?
- managerial assistance?
- post-investment involvement?
- investees aware of added value benefits?
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7	 Does your company ever take a controlling interest in investee
firms; and, if so, why?
- attitude of investees to issue of control?
- penalty for failure to meet pre-set targets?
- replacement of founder/original owner?
- enabling disinvestment?
8	 How does your organisation realise its investments; and why?
- flotation; trade sale; merger; liquidation?
- timing of disinvestment?
- return on investment?
- problems with founders/original owners?
- problems with financial markets?
- post-investment involvement?
9 How do you compare the role of venture capitalists with other
financial institutions; and why?
- equity versus debt finance?
- issue of security?
- equity gap (seed, start-up and early development finance)?
- issue of risk (later-stage and buy-out finance)?
- hands-on involvement?
10 How do you see the future of the venture capital industry; and
why?
- future investments (industry; stage)?
- future of high technology investments?
- government policy measures?
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Appendix 5
RECONCILIATION OF SIC 1980 WITh SIC 1968
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RECONCILIATION OF SIC 1980 WITH SIC 1968
SIC Revised 1980
Activity
Class Group Heading	 Description
34 343 3433 Alarms and
signalling
equipment
34	 343	 3435	 Electrical equip.
for industrial
use not elsewhere
specified
34	 344	 3443	 Radio and
electronic
capital goods
34	 344	 3454/2	 Other electronic
equipment not
elsewhere
specified
37	 371	 3710	 Measuring,
checking and
precision
instruments and
apparatus
37	 373	 3732	 Optical
precis ion
instruments
SIC 1968
MLH	 Description
367/1 Alarms and
signalling
equipment
367/2pt	 Cyclotron,
particle
accelerator
and dielectric
heating equip.
manufacture
only
367/2	 Other radio,
radar and
electronic
capital goods
367pt	 Misc.
unspecified
electronic
equipment
367/2pt Magnetic
compass and
gyroscope
manufacturing
only
367/2pt Laser (excl.
laser system)
manufacturing
only
Source: CSO (1980) Standard Industrial Classification Revised 1980:
Reconciliation With Standard Industrial Classification 1968, London:
Central Statistical Office
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Appendix 6
ThE POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
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HERIOT-WATT UNIVERSITY
Please d
not writ
in this
column
(Please correct any errors in the address and name above)
POSTAL SURVEY OF KIGH TECENOLOGY MANUFACTURING FIRMS
This questionnaire may be answered by the named person, the
managing director or any member of senior management.
Nameand position of respondent ____________________________________
1-4
5
1. in what year was this firm founded?	 I J II
2 Was this firm established as a:
E Wholly independent company?
Subsidiary of another firm? GO TO QUESTION 6
3 Since formation, has this firm been acquired by another company,
or does it remain totally independent?
E Acquired
Independent
4 Was the main previous work experience of the principal founder in:
Business management expertise?
Technical expertise?
Both of the above?
Other? Please state _______________________________________
5 Does the main founder still work for this firm?
Yes
EN0
6 Is this company currently:
Expanding rapidly? 	 Static?
Li Expanding steadily?	 E Declining?
7 How many people are involved in the management team of this firm?
6-9
10
11
12
13
14
15-16
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Please
not wri
in thi
column
17
8 Can you estimate the gross annual turnover of this firm
for the last full financial year?
Less than £50,000
	
£500,000 - £999,999
£50,000 - £99,999	 E £1,000,000 - £5,000,000
£100,000 - £499,999	 jNore than £5,000,000
9 How many people are currently employed full-time in this firm?
10 Is this firm primarily concerned with the:
Manufacture of products?
D Provision of services? GO TO QUESTION 13
11 What is the main product of this firm (ie the product which
contributed most to gross sales in the last financial year)?
18
19
20-21
12 Which of the following categories would you say your
firm's main product falls into?
0 Imitation of a product already on the market
Improvement to an existing product of this firm 	 22
New product previously unavailable on the market
Other? Please state _______________________________________
13 Has your firm ever contacted or been contacted by a
venture capitalist?
Yes
23
No GO TO END
14 Is your firm one which has:
Received (or is receiving) venture capital finance?
Not received venture capital finance?
	
24
END
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
Please return this questionnaire using the enclosed pre-paid envelope
Heather I X Wilson
Department of Business Organisation
Reriot-Watt University
31-35 Grassmarket
Edinburgh EEl 2ET
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Appendix 7
COVERING LETTER FOR THE POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
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EJ
Department of Business
0 rganisation
I-Ieriot-1Natt ljniversity	 31-35 Grassmarket, Edinburgh EH1Telephone 031-225 6465
Professor Leslie W Rodger
Head of Department
Prof essor A Keenari
your ref
our ref
date
The Growth of Hi gh Technology Manufacturin g Firms in the United Kingdom
I an a PhD student in the department of Business Organisation, Heriot-Watt
University, Edinburgh, and I am currently conducting a study on the above
theme. This research is supported by a grant from the Economic and Social
Research Council and aims to establish the extent to which the growth of high
technology manufacturing firms has been influenced by the availability of
venture capital finance (risk capital supplied in return for an equity stake in
the business). I am not only interested in those firms which have accessed
venture capital, but also those firms which have not received such finance. It
is expected that this work will result in policy recommendations for improving
the availability of risk finance on reasonable terms to firms in important high
technology industrial sectors.
The initial stage of this project involves gathering basic information on the
industry's experience (or lack of experience) with venture capitalists, and
also establishing the size and origins of the individual firms. Therefore, I
would be extremely grateful if you could devote a few minutes to completing the
enclosed brief questionnaire in order to provide this information.
Your responses to the questions will remain completely confidential and
individual firms will not be identifiable from the resulting aggregated data
sets. If you require further information on the questionnaire in particular,
or the project in general, please contact either myself (Ext 484) or my
supervisor, Dr Ray Oakey (Ext 481), at the above address and telephone number.
I hope you will feel able to participate in this project and thank you in
anticipation of your support.
Yours sincerely
Heather I N Wilson
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COVERING LETTER FOR THE FOLLOW-UP POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
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Department of Business
Organisation
E-Ieriot\Vatt lJniversity	 31-35 Grassmarket, Edinburgh EH1 2HTTe'ephone 031-225 6465
Professor Leslie W Rodger
Head of Department
Professor A Keenan
your ref
our ref
date
The Growth of Hi gh Technoloy Manufacturing Tiras in the United fingdoi
I as currently conducting a study on the above these and you say recall that I
originally wrote to you on the 8th Noveiber, 1988, concerning a postal
questionnaire survey (see enclosed copy of letter). If, however, you have
responded to sy initial request to take part in this survey, please ignore this
resinder; or if sy original letter did not in fact reach you, please treat the
enclosed copy of that letter as the reason for sy writing to you on this
occasion.
In order to cosplete this stage of sy research (i.e. the gathering of basic
inforsation on the industry's experience, or lack of experience, with venture
capitalists) I as now conducting a follow-up survey. Therefore I have enclosed
the sane brief questionnaire as before, and hope that you will feel able to
participate in the project and return the cospleted questionnaire in the
staaped addressed envelope provided. May I again assure you that your
responses to the questions will resain cospletely confidential (see original
letter).
Thank you in anticipation of your support.
Yours sincerely
Heather I X Wilson
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Appendix 9
LETTER REQUESTING A PERSONAL INTERVIEW (ThREE VERSIONS)
-341
Department of Business
Organ isation
Iieriot-V 7att lJniversity	 31 -35 Grassmarket, Edinburgh EH1 2H1Telephone 031 -225 6465
Professor Leslie W Rodger
Head of Department
Professor A Keenan
your ref
our ref
date
The Growth of Hi gh Technology Manufacturing Firms in the United Kingdom
You may recall that I wrote to you recently concerning the above PhD research
project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. You were kind
enough then to take part in a postal questionnaire survey, which yielded basic
information on the size and structure of your firm, and also the relevance of
venture capital finance to your business.
In order to evaluate the contribution of venture capital funding to the growth
of small, high technology firms, I am focusing this stage of the study on
selected companies which have received (or are receiving) such finance.
However, from an original survey sample of 511 United Kingdom high technology
firms located in Scotland, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire, only
33 comprise the target population. To qualify firms must be totally
independent (or independent when formed), be primarily concerned with
manufacturing, and also have received venture capital finance. As I am sure
you realise, your firm falls within the above category and therefore I ask if
you will, in strictest confidence, take part in a personal interview survey and
devote no more than one hour of your time to answering some general questions
on your firm's evolution and growth. Clearly, the small number of relevant
firms available for interview implies that a high response rate is important
for the survey results to be statistically significant when aggregated.
Consequently, I hope you will agree to this request.
In order to avoid unnecessary effort, please do not reply to this letter as it
will probably be more convenient if I telephone within the next few weeks to
establish whether it is feasible to meet with you and, if so, to make an
appointment that is acceptable to you.
Yours sincerely
Heather I M Vilson
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-	 Department of Business
Organisation
Bleriot\Vatt ljniversity	 31-35 Grassmarket, Edinburgh EH1 2HTTelephone 031-225 6465
Professor Leslie W Rodger
Head of Department
Professor A Keenan
your ref
our ref
date
The Growth of High Technology Manufacturing
 Firms in the United Kingdom
You may recall that I wrote to you recently concerning the above PhD research
project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. You were kind
enough then to take part in a postal questionnaire survey, which yielded basic
information on the size and structure of your firm, and also the relevance of
venture capital finance to your business.
In order to investigate whether the absence of venture capital funding has had
an effect on the growth of small, high technology firms, I am focusing this
stage of the study on selected companies which have had contact with venture
capitalists and have not received such finance.
However, from an original survey sample of 51]. United Kingdom high technology
firms located in Scotland, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire, only
48	 comprise the target population.
	 To qualify firms must be totally
independent (or independent when formed), be primarily concerned with
manufacturing, and also have had contact with venture capitalists and not
received venture capital finance. As I am sure you realise, your firm falls
within the above category and therefore I ask if you will, in strictest
confidence, take part in a personal interview survey and devote no more than
one hour of your time to answering some general questions on your firm's
evolution and growth. Clearly, the small number of relevant firms available
for interview implies that a high response rate is important for the survey
results to be statistically significant when aggregated. Consequently, I hope
you will agree to this request.
In order to avoid unnecessary effort, please do not reply to this letter as it
will probably be more convenient if I telephone within the next few weeks to
establish whether it is feasible to meet with you and, if so, to make an
appointment that is acceptable to you.
Yours sincerely
Heather I H Vilsoza
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Department of Business
Organisation
I-]Ienot-\Vatt TJniversity
	
31-35 Grassmarket, Edinburgh EH1 2HT
Telephone 031 -225 6465
Professor Leslie W Rodger
Head of Department
Professor A Keenan
your ref
our ref
date
The Growth of High Technology Manufacturing Firms in the United Kingdom
You may recall that I wrote to you recently concerning the above PhD research
project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. You were kind
enough then to take part in a postal questionnaire survey, which yielded basic
information on the size and structure of your firm, and also the relevance of
venture capital finance to your business.
In order to investigate whether venture capital funding is an attractive
alternative source of capital for small, high technology firms, I am focusing
this stage of the study on selected companies which have had no contact with
venture capitalists.
However, from an original survey sample of 511 United Kingdom high technology
firms located in Scotland, Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire, only
73	 comprise the target population.
	 To qualify firms must be totally
independent (or independent when formed), be primarily concerned with
manufacturing, and also have had no contact with venture capitalists. As I am
sure you realise, your firm falls within the above category and therefore I ask
if you will, in strictest confidence, take part in a personal interview survey
and devote no more than one hour of your time to answering some general
questions on your firm's evolution and growth. Clearly, the small number of
relevant firms available for interview implies that a high response rate is
important	 for the survey results to be statistically significant when
aggregated. Consequently, I hope you will agree to this request.
In order to avoid unnecessary effort, please do not reply to this letter as it
will probably be more convenient if I telephone within the next few weeks to
establish whether it is feasible to meet with you and, if so, to make an
appointment that is acceptable to you.
Yours sincerely
Heather I N Wilson
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DEFINITION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION VARIABLE
The technological sophistication variable is a combination of four
variables:
- R&D employees in 1989
- R&D expenditure in 1989
- percentage change in R&D employees 1984-89
- percentage change in R&D expenditure 1984-89
Numerical values were assigned to the different categories of these
four variables:
R&D employees in 1989 (A)
2 = 0 employees
3 = 1 to 5 employees
4 = 5 or more employees
(based on crude numbers)
Percentage change in R&D
employees 1984-89 (C)
1 = negative to 0%
2 = 1% to 33%
3 = 34% to 66%
4 = 67% and over
R&D expenditure in 1989 (B)
1 = £1 to £1,000
2 = £1,001 to £50,000
3 = £50,001 to £100,000
4 = £100,001 and over
(based on crude figures)
Percentage change in R&D
expenditure 1984-89 (D)
1 = negative to 0%
2 = 1% to 33%
3 = 34% to 66%
4 = 67% and over
Each firm was assigned a numerical value for these four variables
which were then totalled. This total was then divided by the number
of variables with a value greater than zero for each firm (this was to
allow for firms which would not receive a numerical value for (C) and
(D) above because they were not operating in 1984). For example:
Firm	 (A)	 (B)	 (C)
	
(D)	 Total	 Total/n	 Result
1
	
4	 3	 4
	
3	 14
	
14/4	 3.5
2
	
4	 0	 2
	
1	 7
	
7/3	 2.3
The total and total/n columns were then taken one stage further:
Total
If n < or = 8, then assigned a value of 1
If n > or = 9, then assigned a value of 2
Total/n
If n	 or = 2, then assigned a value of 1
if n > or = 2.1, then assigned a value of 2
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The two values were then compared:
- if both were equal to 1, then a LOW TECHNOLOGY categorisation was
assigned;
- if both were equal to 2, then a HIGH TECHNOLOGY categorisation was
assigned;
- if the values were unequal, then the Total/n figure was taken by
itself and categories assigned accordingly (i.e. n < or = 2 was LOW
TECHNOLOGY; n > or = 2.1 was HIGH TECHNOLOGY)
In order to filter out anomalies from the high technology category,
those firms which were assigned a high technology categorisation but
which had no dedicated (full-time) R&D staff 	 less than £50,000 R&D
expenditure in 1989 were identified and re-assigned.
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